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CENTRO DE CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS LETRAS E ARTES
DEPARTAMENTO DE PSICOLOGIA
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM PSICOLOGIA SOCIAL
DOUTORADO EM PSICOLOGIA SOCIAL

**I AM NOT A RACIST, I EVEN HAVE BLACK FRIENDS: THE SELF-DEFENSIVE
ROLE OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS OF RACISM**

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JOÃO PESSOA – PB

DEZEMBRO - 2020



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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Racist attitudes and behaviors have been strongly resisting the anti-racism norm. Theorizing and research on intergroup relations have shown this occurs because people use justifications to mitigate their behavior's discriminatory nature. In this respect, the literature has not yet clarified whether the simple act of justifying the racist behavior itself is sufficient to protect both the perpetrator's positive private and social image. The current thesis discusses this issue by proposing that individuals *spontaneously* elaborate justifications for their discriminatory behaviors against groups protected by the anti-racism norm, thus preserving their self-esteem and social image. We have developed a research program to test this hypothesis, whose results we organized into three articles. In a preliminary paper, we conducted three studies in which we assessed the validity and reliability of a self-esteem scale that we used in subsequent studies. In the second article, we conducted an exploratory study ($N = 100$) that showed that black people are perceived as more protected by the Brazilian context's anti-prejudice norm. In this thesis's main article, we carried out five experimental studies to test the core aspects of the proposed hypothesis. In Experiment 1 ($N = 203$), we show that participants accused of being racist had their implicit self-esteem affected. In Experiment 2 ($N = 102$), we show that the mere act of justifying racism mitigates the negative impacts on the implicit self-esteem of participants accused of racism. In Experiment 3 ($N = 137$), we replicated previous results in another cultural context (i.e., Spain). In Experiment 4 ($N = 196$), we went further by showing that the negative impact of being accused of racism occurs in managing the most egalitarian participants' social image. Experiment 5 ($N = 148$) analyzed the anti-prejudice norm's moderating role on the impact of being accused of racism on individuals' self-esteem. In general, the results confirm the proposed hypotheses and contribute to studies on processes that legitimize prejudice and discrimination.

KEYWORDS: Prejudice; Self-Esteem; Justifications; Racism; Anti-Racism Norm.

RESUMO

Atitudes e comportamentos racistas têm resistido fortemente à norma antirracismo. A teorização e as pesquisas sobre as relações intergrupais têm demonstrado que isto ocorre porque as pessoas usam justificações para mitigar a natureza discriminatória de seu comportamento. A este respeito, a literatura ainda não esclareceu se o simples ato de justificar o comportamento racista em si é suficiente para proteger tanto a imagem pessoal e social do perpetrador. A presente tese discute esta questão propondo que indivíduos elaboram *espontaneamente* justificações para seus comportamentos discriminatórios contra grupos protegidos pela norma antirracismo, preservando assim sua autoestima e imagem social. Desenvolvemos um programa de pesquisa para testar esta hipótese, cujos resultados organizamos em três artigos. Em um artigo preliminar, realizamos três estudos nos quais avaliamos a validade e a confiabilidade de uma escala de autoestima que utilizamos em estudos subsequentes. No segundo artigo, realizamos um estudo exploratório ($N = 100$) que mostrou que as pessoas negras são percebidas como o grupo mais protegido pela norma antipreconceito do contexto brasileiro. No artigo principal desta tese, realizamos cinco estudos experimentais para testar os aspectos centrais da hipótese proposta. No Experimento 1 ($N = 203$), mostramos que os participantes acusados de serem racistas tiveram sua autoestima implícita afetada. No Experimento 2 ($N = 102$), mostramos que o simples ato de justificar o racismo mitiga os impactos negativos sobre a autoestima implícita dos participantes acusados de racismo. No Experimento 3 ($N = 137$), reproduzimos os resultados anteriores em outro contexto cultural (i.e., na Espanha). No Experimento 4 ($N = 196$), fomos além, mostrando que o impacto negativo de ser acusado de racismo ocorre na gestão da imagem social dos participantes mais igualitários. O Experimento 5 ($N = 148$) analisou o papel moderador da norma antipreconceito no impacto de ser acusado de racismo na

autoestima dos indivíduos. Em geral, os resultados confirmam as hipóteses propostas e contribuem para estudos sobre processos que legitimam o preconceito e a discriminação.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Preconceito; Autoestima; Justificações; Racismo; Norma Antirracismo.

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Introduction

“Language is the repository of our prejudices, our beliefs, our assumptions...”

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie

It was winter in the south of Brazil. In July, a group of friends gathered at a bar to celebrate their reunion during that vacation. Between conversations and beers, one of them introduces his new girlfriend. She was a young black woman. She was the only black person at the table. Although the atmosphere of fraternization partly overshadowed the discomfort of everyone generated by the presence of that person "stranger" to the group, some mistakes were inevitable.

R., the most popular boy in the group, in one of his several initiatives to draw attention to himself, started a conversation with M., the black girlfriend of his friend J. - Hi M., you must not have been lucky with your ex-boyfriends to have become J.'s girlfriend, isn't it? - A question that at first sounded harmless was taken on different connotations. - J. has always been considered physically very ugly, the ugliest among us, and you seem to like him so much. But also, what kind of people should you have dated with, if you've dated someone before, right? - M. started to retreat at the table and the audience began to feel that, disguised as games to "break the ice", those words were diminishing and hurting the girl. It was then that J. himself asked R. to stop, because there was no fun in what he was doing.

At this moment, a movement started to recriminate everyone against R., who, realizing that he was showing a negative image of himself, immediately tried to fix the situation. - No people, I did not mean it badly, I would never "denigrate" her image. Especially because I am not racist, nor do I discriminate against anyone. It was just because she is incredibly beautiful for J., isn't it? - A silence took over the table for a few seconds until someone changed the subject and a new round of beer arrived.

The story just described portrays a very frequent situation in the daily lives of black people in Brazil (Camino, Silva, Machado, & Pereira, 2001; Lima & Vala, 2004). More than that, it illustrates a specific scenario that involves a discriminator becoming publicly aware of his negative attitudes towards black people. From a psychological point of view, some

questions can be raised to understand this situation. For example, what did R., who probably considers himself a fair person, feel when he was confronted with his behavior, becoming aware of being a racist? His first reaction was to "deny" the racist nature of his comments' motives, trying to give non-racist explanations for his behavior. But was this reactive strategy used by him as an ego-defensive resource for his personal image and also for his public image? Regarding R.'s personal image, did he suffer any shock when he realized that other people noticed the racist nature of his act? If so, how did he resolve this internal conflict when he realized that his self-image as egalitarian did not match his racist comments?

Social Psychology has already shed light on answering some of these questions. For example, it has been shown that negative feedbacks about public image impact on the various dimensions that organize self-esteem (Park & Crocker, 2008), such as when academic performance, social success and physical appearance are threatened (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Thus, self-esteem suffers impacts in some of these dimensions, depending on the centrality of each of these spheres, when it is reached when a person realizes that he does not follow the standards required by the norm that governs the social behavior of the group he is part of.

In the case of the story reported above, R. is supposed to have suffered impacts on the dimension of social success that defines his self-esteem. However, it has also been proven that people are motivated to seek positive self-presentation, especially when they are shaken and, thus, tend to show publicly that they are always well (Lupien, Seery, & Almonte, 2010). That is, even when they become aware that they have behaved like "unfair people", they react by trying to hide this discomfort to the maximum. On the other hand, it is possible that implicit oscillations occur, reflecting conflicts with the self-concept itself. Thus, although their public image may apparently not have been affected, i.e. when people claim that everything is going well with them in the presence of events that affect them, their personal

image may be appreciably impacted, whose manifestations of this impact are not publicly detectable. This is basically the difference in the dynamics of the management of explicit self-esteem (i.e., public and conscious demonstrations of self-esteem) and implicit (i.e., generally not conscious manifestations of difficult public perception).

In cases where a person becomes aware that, even endorsing egalitarian values and being a defender of those values, sometimes being caught in discriminatory acts, they are likely to enter an internal conflict that will cause discomfort. One way to resolve this issue may be to adopt some standard of action that will allow them to reestablish their positive image of themselves and reduce conflict. An effective strategy for this is to justify their prejudiced attitudes, whether by denying, projecting or rationalizing their own discriminatory behaviors. For example, Pereira, Álvaro and Vala (2018) showed that threat-based justifications have the ability to protect people's self-esteem when they are accused of discriminating against immigrants.

However, studies on this phenomenon, carried out within the scope of the processes of legitimizing social inequalities, have not given enough attention to the possibility of people spontaneously being motivated to justify their own discriminatory behaviors, that is, we do not know whether the mere act of justifying discrimination with any argument is sufficient to protect the implicit and explicit self-esteem of the person who is accused of being prejudiced. More than that, it is not known whether historical-contextual factors eventually internalized in the socialization process to which a person is subjected (e.g., internalization of egalitarianism), as well as societal factors not yet internalized (i.e., external normative pressure) impact on this phenomenon. For example, when they are labeled as prejudiced, do people who value equality more react in the same way as people who do not have that value as something important to their self-concept? Does the perception that each individual has about the strength of the anti-prejudice norm makes some feel more uncomfortable than

others when they become aware of discriminatory acts? We address these issues by proposing the thesis that people spontaneously elaborate justifications for their discriminatory behavior against groups protected by the anti-prejudice norm, protecting their self-esteem and their social image, especially those people who are more egalitarian and who perceive the pressure of anti-prejudice norm as strong. We have tested the adequacy of this thesis over nine empirical studies. These studies are presented below.

Overview of the current thesis

This thesis aims to investigate the self-defending effect of justifications when a person is accused of being prejudiced. For that, it was necessary to meet some pre-conditions. Firstly, a valid and accurate instrument for measuring explicit state self-esteem is essential, i.e., a form of expressing self-esteem that is sensitive to variations in the social context. To meet the first condition, we conducted three empirical studies in which we demonstrated evidence of factorial, convergent-discriminant, incremental and predictive validity for a reduced version of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES, Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). We write the results of these studies in the first article that constitutes this thesis, which can be seen in Chapter 1.

The second precondition starts from the assumption that the negative impact that awareness can have on a person's personal and public image occurs especially for those who believe they are fair and egalitarian (Schwartz, 2007). That is, in those people who follow the anti-prejudice standard (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'brien, 2002). In this sense, we need to identify the minority group that is most strongly protected by the anti-prejudice rule, so that the violation of this rule can have the potential to affect the public and personal image of those who violate it. To meet the second precondition, we conducted an exploratory study to identify the minority target groups that people consider most protected by the anti-prejudice

standard in the Brazilian context. We wrote an article with the results obtained, specifically, the group of black people was identified as the most protected by the anti-prejudice standard. The article describing these results was published in a Psychology journal and can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

After meeting these preconditions, we carried out a series of experimental studies in which we manipulated information about the racist nature of the participants' behavior and the possibility that they could justify this behavior. Our hypotheses tested in these studies are that (H1): In the context of an egalitarian norm (Crandall et. al., 2002; Sherif, 1936), to ensure a positive self-concept (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), people seek to present themselves as fair, so that if they receive feedback that they have racist attitudes, they experience dissonance caused by the perceived incongruity between their non-racist self-concept prescribed by the anti-racism norm and the information that they exhibit racist behavior.

This dissonance is reflected in a decrease in self-esteem (Pereira et al., 2018); (H2): When public image is threatened, people react, defending themselves (Lisjak, Lee, & Gardner, 2012), using justifications to protect their self-esteem (Pereira et al., 2018); (H3): In people with a high level of internalization of the egalitarian norm (Crandall et al., 2002), there is no motivation to hide concussions in explicit self-esteem, since feeling bad when perceiving themselves as racist is consistent with their image of themselves; (H4): The impacts of feedback informing the racist nature of behavior on self-esteem are only implicitly identified, as people are motivated to publicly deny that they are shaken (Lupien et al., 2010); and (H5): Only people who perceive themselves to be under the pressure of the anti-prejudice norm will suffer self-esteem shocks when they perceive themselves as racist, since there is evidence that there are variations in the strength of the norm and, consequently, in the impact that the perception about it strength has in behavior (Gelfand, Harrington, & Jackson, 2017). The set of these hypotheses is represented as a model in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Model proposed to explain the relationship of racism awareness in self-esteem, moderated by the justifications of racist discrimination, egalitarian values and the perception of pressure from the anti-racism norm

To test the hypotheses of this thesis, we conducted a set of five experimental studies. In Experiment 1, we used a mixed factorial design of type 2 (time: pre-test vs. post-test) x 2 (racist self-presentation vs. control condition) x 2 (justification vs. non-justification), with the first factor varying within-subjects and the other two between-subjects. Our hypothesis was that only participants who receive feedback on their racist behavior reduce their implicit self-esteem (measured with the Liking Name Scale - Gebauer et al., 2008), compared to participants who did not receive feedback that they were racist. In addition, we tested in an exploratory way the role of justifications as a mitigation of the impacts caused by racist self-presentation on self-esteem.

Experiment 2 gathered additional evidence on the role of justification of prejudice as a self-protective mechanism of self-esteem. The experimental design of Experiment 2 was a type 2 factorial (time: pre-test vs. post-test) x 2 (justification: yes vs. no). The objective was to extend the results of the first study using a different measure of implicit self-esteem (i.e.,

Subscription Size - Zweigenhaft, 1977). In Experiment 3, we replicated Experiment 2 in a different context (Spain).

In Experiment 4, we took it a step further by trying to show that the impact of racist self-presentation on both implicit and explicit self-esteem occurs in more egalitarian, but not in less egalitarian individuals. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that only in the most egalitarian people there are shakes in the implicit self-esteem when they receive racist feedback, and that even explicitly they demonstrate to be negatively affected in their dimension of self-esteem of social success. Finally, Experiment 5 assessed whether the pressure of the anti-prejudice standard (strong vs. weak) impacts the relationship between racist self-presentation, use of justifications as a strategy of self-defense and the management of implicit and explicit self-esteem. These five experimental studies form the third article in this thesis, which is described in Chapter 3.

The writing of this thesis is structured in an introduction and four chapters. Chapter 1 presents the article that describes the process of validating the explicit self-esteem scale. Chapter 2 presents the results of the exploratory study on the minority group perceived by the participants as the most protected by the anti-prejudice standard. Then, Chapter 3 presents the main article of the thesis, which describes the five studies that together test the hypothesis that people spontaneously elaborate justifications for their discriminatory behavior against black people, thus protecting their self-esteem and their image especially those who are more egalitarian and who perceive the pressure of the anti-racism norm as strong. Finally, Chapter 4 presents a general discussion on the present thesis.

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Chapter I

Measuring the General and Specific Domains of Self-esteem: The Short-Form of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S)

This chapter is based on:

Brito, T. R. S., Pereira, C. R., Santos, F. A., & Nery, N. N. F. Measuring the General and Specific Domains of Self-esteem: The Short-Form of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S). *(Submitted)*.

Measuring the General and Specific Domains of Self-esteem: The Short-Form of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S)

Abstract: Self-esteem is a crucial human nature feature for understanding the social dimensions of individuals' self-concept. One of its characteristics is peoples' malleability to adapt to social contexts, i.e., the state self-esteem (SSE). Individuals express SES in three different factors: academic performance; social success; and physical appearance. Along with three studies, we present evidence of validity of the Short-Form of State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S) that measures contextual fluctuations in individuals' self-esteem. In Study 1 ($N = 300$), we explored the SSES-S' factorial validity and demonstrated its convergent-discriminating associations with measures of trait self-esteem and human values. In Study 2 ($N = 281$), we confirmed the SSES-S' factorial validity and analyzed its incremental validity relative to trait self-esteem. In Study 3 ($N = 160$), we experimentally tested the SSES-S' predictive validity by proving its sensitivity to detect temporary oscillations in self-esteem, specifically in the academic performance factor. In conclusion, we discuss the potentials and limitations of the SSES-S to measure individual differences in state self-esteem and its implications for research concerning the role of contextual factors in individuals' self-concepts.

Keywords: state self-esteem; self-concept; experimental validity.

Self-esteem has interested scholars since the earliest studies of psychology (e.g. James, 1890). Nowadays, it continues to be a pivotal construct for understanding individuals' self-concept and its relation with the expression of human nature in the contingencies of social life (Bleidorn et al., 2016). Researchers not only try to focus on perceiving self-esteem as an isolated construct, but also how it relates to other constructs, especially depression (Hilbert et al., 2019) and subjective well-being (Schwager et al., 2019). Definitions of self-esteem characterize it as a general attitude towards the self (Heatherton et al., 2003). It is

a global self-evaluation reflecting individuals' beliefs regarding themselves, i.e., how worthy of respect they consider themselves to be (Rosenberg et al., 1995). Beyond the uni-factorial conception of self-esteem, there are some perspectives that interpret self-esteem as the sum of self-concepts from specific domains (e.g., self-esteem based on appearance; academic self-esteem; Marsh & Shavelson, 1985). Although the characteristics of these types of self-esteem are well documented, there is still little evidence about the problem of the relationship between each domain and global self-esteem.

The answers to this problem imply clarifying the organizing principles of self-esteem's internal structure, in addition to clarifying some aspects concerning its malleability and stability. For example, self-esteem has properties which characterize it as a trait (Rosenberg, 1965), but it has some features that allows it to be conceived as a state psychological construct (Wagner, Lüdtke, & Trautwein, 2015). Trait self-esteem refers to more stable and long-lasting self-evaluations, characterized by durability and resistance to environmental changes. State self-esteem, in turn, is defined as self-evaluations that vary more easily according to the social and temporal context in which real-life events occur (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Momentary fluctuations in state self-esteem can be caused by contextual factors, such as feedbacks concerning a particular self-esteem domain (Park & Crocker, 2008).

Accordingly, state self-esteem is an essential construct for the understanding of self-concept, since it can represent both the start of its crystallization process as a trait as well as the opening of a process of change and personal vulnerability to a social context. For instance, Hutteman et al. (2015) showed experimentally that changes in state self-esteem influence changes in trait self-esteem in the period between late adolescence and early adulthood. They concluded that the environment plays an important role and triggers changes during the development of self-esteem. It occurs initially at the state level, which when

becoming stable, also affects changes at the trait level. Studies regarding the structure of self-esteem and its malleability depend on the quality of the instruments used to measure this construct. Are global self-esteem and its factors sensitive to contextual and time variations that occur in individuals' lives? Here we present the results of a research program aiming to demonstrate empirical evidence of the construction and predictive validity of a state self-esteem measure that enables us to solve that question.

Measuring Self-Esteem

Several instruments have been developed to measure self-esteem. Among the most utilized ones are Harter's Self-Perception Profile Series of Scales (Harter & Pike, 1984), Self-Liking and Self-Competence Questionnaires (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995), the Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins et al., 2001), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965).

Heatherton and Polivy (1991) created the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) with the purpose of having an instrument that can measure short-term changes in self-esteem, meaning it would be sensitive to experimental manipulations that cause temporary alterations of self-esteem. The elaboration of the SSES' 20 items was based on the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale items (Janis & Field, 1959). The authors performed five studies to test the scale's validity and reliability in the Canadian context. The results pointed to a tri-factorial organization, defining self-esteem in three correlated factors: *academic performance* – 7 items (e.g., “I feel confident about my abilities”), *social success* – 7 items (e.g., “I worry about seeming like a fool”) and *physical appearance* – 6 items (e.g., “I am satisfied with my body”). The authors considered that the scale could be used as a general state self-esteem score, or that the three factors could be utilized as subscales. Regarding convergent validity, the *academic performance* factor showed a strong and positive correlation with global trait self-esteem (measured with the RSE), but low and negative association with anxiety and depression, social desirability, hostility and satisfaction with body image. Considering

the *social success* factor, it was strongly and positive correlated with social trait self-esteem, although presenting weak negative relation with hostility and weak positive association with satisfaction with body image. Lastly, the *physical appearance* factor had a strong positive correlation with satisfaction with body image, strong negative association with propensity to diet, depression and strong positive relation with global self-esteem (RSE), but it did not correlate with social desirability.

Bagozzi and Heatherton (1994) tested a set of models aiming to clarify the factorial organization of state self-esteem as measured by the SSES. Two empirical studies and confirmatory factorial analysis demonstrated that the best-adjusted model to the data was one specifying a hierarchical organization with a general second-order self-esteem factor, and three first-order specific factors (performance, social and appearance). That is, although self-esteem is oriented by a general factor, it also has specific secondary factors. The authors' contribution broadened the discussion about the factorial structure of self-esteem, and thus helped overcome the drawback of considering it as a one-factorial psychological construct.

Still regarding factorial validity of the scale and its reliability, Aslam and Aftab (2014) showed, in Pakistan, the satisfactory internal consistency of the SSES ($\alpha = 0.80$), strong test-retest ($r = 0.96$) and Guttman's partial reliability coefficients (0.85). Furthermore, the total SSES score presented significant positive correlations with the RSE ($r = 0.49$) and negative with the Anxiety and Depression Scale ($r = -0.51$) and the Suicidal Ideation Scale ($r = -0.29$), ensuring the scale's convergent validity. In another investigation, Chau et al. (2011) adapted the SSES to the Chinese context using a sample of 265 patients who had suffered a stroke ($M_{age} = 71.3$, $SD = 10.3$). The results confirmed a tri-factorial state self-esteem structure, besides showing significant negative correlations of specific factors with depression (varying between $r = 0.31$ and $r = 0.55$), and strong Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficients.

Concerning the predictive validity, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) demonstrated that academic failure affects only the *academic performance* factor. Individually, the state self-esteem was evaluated with 128 university students at the beginning of the semester and right after they received their grades. The authors observed a significant decline in the *academic performance* factor among students with bad grades, while significant differences were not perceived in the other factors.

Moreover, the SSES' sensitivity to experimental manipulations was also analyzed in a study using false feedbacks concerning performance of 79 female university students. The results pointed to a significant effect of the experimental manipulation on the academic performance and social success factors, although not in the physical appearance one. Notably, the participants in the failure conditions had lower scores in the academic performance and social success factors than the participants in the control condition. In addition, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) analyzed the SSES sensitivity to capture changes in individuals' self-esteem after psychotherapeutic interventions in a sample of 18 obese women. The results showed that the effects of the treatment were significant to both the total Explicit Self-Esteem score and each of the three specific factors.

Moreover, Linton and Marriott (1996) demonstrated the sensitivity of the SSES to measure context-dependent individual differences in self-esteem. They adapted the SSES to measure state self-esteem of students aged between 11 and 13 years from the USA. The students' self-esteem was measured before and after an intervention program that promoted organizational and academic abilities. The results demonstrated that the *academic performance* factor was the one that had the most significant difference in means compared to the other factors (social and appearance). That is, there was an increase of self-esteem only in the performance factor after the intervention program.

Based on this empirical and theoretical evidence of context malleability of self-esteem, we describe a research program designed to measure individual differences in state self-esteem. We specifically formulated a Short-Form of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S) to measure individual differences in self-esteem. We conducted a research program in which we analyzed the factor structure, the convergent-discriminant validity and the context-sensitivity of the SSES-S to measure state self-esteem. We thus tested the hypothesis that the SSES-S measures state self-esteem through three factors: academic performance, social success and physical appearance. We also analyzed the scale's predictive validity, by experimentally testing the sensitivity of each factor to capture changes in individuals' self-esteem caused by experimental manipulations of their performance in three distinct domains of their social lives.

Overview of Studies

This research aimed to develop a reduced version of the SSES (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) to evaluate individual differences in state self-esteem. Specifically, we analyzed if the factorial structure of the SSES-S to measure self-esteem is distributed in three factors (academic performance, social success and physical appearance) and if those are sensitive to variations arising in experimentally manipulated social contexts. Study 1 and Study 2 utilized a non-experimental method and aimed at evaluating the factorial validity, reliability, convergent-discriminant and incremental validity of the SSES-S. Study 3 used the experimental method and intended to demonstrate its predictive validity. In each study, all participants provided consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki and the American Psychological Association. The Research Ethics Committee of Federal University of Paraíba, Brazil approved all procedures used in the studies. We have posted the publicly available data of all studies in the Open Science Framework.

Study 1: Exploring the Factorial Structure of the SSES and its Convergent-Discriminant Validity

In this study, we explored the factorial structure of the SSES, its internal consistency and provided preliminary convergent-discriminant information of its validity to measure state self-esteem in the Brazilian context. After translating the items, we applied the scale to a sample of college students and conducted an exploratory factor analysis of the scale items. We tested the hypothesis that the 20 scale items could be reduced to a more parsimonious and psychometrically adequate version of the scale. Additionally, we tested the hypothesis that the items on the scale are organized in a three-factor structure: academic performance; physical appearance; social success. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that if the SSES does measure self-esteem, it should positively correlate with another well-established self-esteem measure widely used in previous studies (i.e., convergent validity) and have low correlations with other constructs that are not theoretically confused with self-esteem, such as that of human values (i.e., discriminant validity).

Method

Participants. We previously defined the sample size according to criteria proposed by Mundfrom et al. (2005). Thus, the sample of this study consisted of 300 university students aged from 18 to 68 years old ($M = 21.93$; $SD = 4.54$), mostly men (54.7%), single (94%) and middle class (48.7%).

Measures. The participants answered the following scales in addition to a socio-demographic questionnaire:

State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). It is a self-reported instrument designed to be sensitive to contextual changes with the potential to alter self-esteem temporarily. We adapted the SSES items to the Brazilian context following the conventional procedures for adaptation of psychological instruments to other contexts (e.g. Borsa et al.,

2012). Initially, a bilingual Brazilian expert translated the scale from English to Portuguese. Then, experts in self-esteem studies reviewed the initial translation. Finally, another bilingual translator performed a back-translation from Portuguese to English. No reformulation of item wordings was necessary. The SSES contains 20 items designed to evaluate three correlated factors: Performance (seven items: e.g. "I feel confident about my abilities"); Social (seven items: e.g. "I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure."); and Physical Appearance (six items: e.g. "I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now."). Participants indicated how much each item described them using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me) to 5 (strongly describes me).

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE – Rosenberg, 1965). It is a one-factorial measure consisting of 10 statements related to a set of feelings of self-esteem and self-acceptance that assesses overall trait self-esteem (e.g. "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself."). Items are answered on a four-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. In the current study, we used Hutz (2000) adapted version to the Brazilian context. We preserved the one-dimensionality of the original scale with its psychometric characteristics being equivalent to those found by Rosenberg (1965), especially with a strong internal consistency coefficient ($\alpha = .92$).

Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-21; Schwartz, 2006). This is a Likert-format scale (1 = doesn't look like me to 5 = looks a lot like me) composed of 21 items (e.g. "He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching") that measure four motivational value domains: conservation, self-transcendence, openness to change, and self-promotion. PVQ-21 showed very good internal Cronbach's alpha coefficients, ranging from .71 (Conservation) to .83 (Self-Promotion).

Procedures. Participants were approached in classrooms. After reading the Consent Form and agreeing to participate, they answered the questionnaires individually and spent an average of 15 minutes to conclude.

Data analysis. We used Jamovi version 1.1.9.0. (Jamovi Project, 2019) running on R (R Development Core Team, 2008) to calculate descriptive statistics for sample characterization, and exploratory factor analysis by using the principal-axis factoring method and Pearson's correlation matrix. The analysis was completely exploratory, in which we considered suitable items with a minimum factor loading of .35 to be considered as belonging to a factor, and the presence of factors with fewer than three items, and with eigenvalue less than 1.00. Complementary criteria for assessing factor robustness are discussed in the context of the results.

Results

Initially, we verified whether the correlation matrix could be factorized and found a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index (KMO) of .71 and Bartlett Sphericity Test = 1620 ($p < .001$). Since the factorization of the data matrix was assured, we performed an exploratory factor analysis. The first factor retention criterion used was the analysis of the Scree Plot of eigenvalues, as proposed by Cattell and Vogelman (1977). From the observation of points that differ in the graph, the number of factors is considered. This criterion pointed to the existence of three factors (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Scree Plot of the factor eigenvalues

We also considered a more robust criterion, the parallel analysis method (Horn, 1965). This consists of the random estimation of a hypothetical set of variables on the base of a correlation matrix, with the same dimensionality (the same number of variables and the same number of subjects) as the observed dataset. The hypothetical matrix is factored hundreds or thousands of times (depending on the robustness adopted by the researcher), and the average eigenvalues obtained from this simulation is calculate. The eigenvalues of the actual data are compared to random eigenvalues and the number of factors in the observed data retained refers to those that have eigenvalues > 1 compared to the random eigenvalues. According to this criterion, we found a robust three-factor solution in the SSES. Thus, we interpreted this three-factor solution and re-estimated the factor loadings by time, fixing three factors and establishing oblimin rotation because we predicted the factors to be correlated.

Table 1.

Factor loadings of the State Self Esteem Scale's items

Items	Social Success	Academic Performance	Physical Appearance
01. I feel confident about my abilities.		0.796	
03. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.			0.932
07. I am dissatisfied with my weight.			0.483
08. I feel self-conscious.	0.776		
09. I feel as smart as others.		0.534	
12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.			0.488
13. I am worried about what other people think of me.	0.857		
14. I feel confident that I understand things.		0.797	
16. I feel unattractive.			0.524
17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.	0.831		
19. I feel like I am not doing well.		0.626	
20. I am worried about looking foolish.	0.788		
Eigenvalue	2.69	1.98	1.63
% Variance	22.4	16.5	13.6
Cronbach Alpha	$\alpha = 0.88$	$\alpha = 0.77$	$\alpha = 0.68$

Each factor was composed of four items, corroborating the initial three-factor structure of the scale. Factor 1 concerned Academic Performance and comprised items 1, 9, 14 and 19. Factor 2 referred to Social Success and loaded items 8, 13, 17 and 20. Factor 3 was Physical Appearance and aggregated items 3, 7, 12 and 16. Eight items were excluded because they had loadings below the specified minimum criterion of .35. The excluded items were: item 2 [I am concerned if I am seen as a success or failure]; item 4 [I am dissatisfied with my performance]; item 5 (I am having trouble understanding things I read); 6 (I feel that

others respect and admire me); item 10 [I am unhappy with myself]; item 11 [I am fine with myself]; item 15 (I feel inferior to others at this time); item 18 (I have less academic skills than I should have). Therefore, the reduced version of the scale in the Brazilian context is composed of 12 items measuring three correlated state self-esteem factors.

We assessed the convergent validity of the SSES-S by analyzing its correlation analysis with the RSE (Rosenberg, 1965). The results (Table 2) showed a strong, positive and significant correlation between the three factors of the State Self-Esteem Scale and RSE. In addition, we analyzed the discriminant validity of the SSES-S (Table 2) by observing its correlation with the four factors of PVQ-21 (Schwartz, 2006). We found only a moderate and positive correlation between self-promotion values and academic self-esteem. The other correlations were very low, indicating that SSES-S and PVQ-21 factors evaluated different constructs.

Table 2.

R Pearson correlations among SSES-S, RSE and Schwartz's Values Scale factors

	Academic Performance	Social Success	Physical Appearance	SSES-S Total Score
RSE	0.751***	- 0.334***	0.467***	0.505***
Self-transcendence	0.177**	- 0.075	0.009	0.026
Self-enhancement	0.200***	0.307***	0.071	0.189**
Openness to change	0.412***	- 0.165**	0.168**	0.199**
Conservation	0.210***	0.100	0.191**	0.248***

Note. RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; SSES-S = Short Form of the State Self Esteem Scale; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Discussion

The results provided preliminary empirical evidence of the factorial, convergent and discriminant validity of the SSES-S version to measure state self-esteem. This version was composed of 12 items, evenly distributed among three factors. The difference in total items reported in this study compared to the full 20-item version (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) has already been verified in previous adaptation studies (Chau et al., 2011) and maintained the original quality of estimates for each SSES-S measurement factor. Moreover, the SSES-S version is an improvement over the original version of the scale because it offers the possibility to evaluate the construct with fewer items, without decreasing the quality of the measurement. Excluding eight original scale items was based on empirical criteria since they did not reach the minimum parameters to be considered adequate for one of the factors measured by the SSES-S, which may indicate its fragility in terms of content or its semantic inadequacy, at least for the sample studied. The excluded items belonged, in the initial version, to social and performance factors. Considering the scale was initially designed for the Canadian context more than 20 years ago, it can be assumed that cultural and temporal differences may have occurred in the items' meaning so they are no longer good indicators of state self-esteem.

Finally, the results also showed that the three SSES-S factors are not confused with human value measures that are not strongly related to self-esteem. Evidence of discriminant validity contributes to ensure SSES-S construct validity because it is not confused with the measurement of another psychological construct. Of greater importance, and following psychometric evidence previously found (Heatherton & Polivy 1991), the convergence of the three SSES-S factors with the total score self-esteem score measured by the RSE was confirmed. That is, both instruments share common characteristics that refer to the measurement of the self-esteem construct. We found a stronger association between the RSE

and the academic performance factor of SSES-S. That is, the performance factor of SSES-S primarily reflects global self-esteem when applied to a sample of college students. This phenomenon is based on previous evidence obtained by Heatherton and Polivy (1991) and suggests an even more complex factorial structure. That is, SSES-S can be used to measure both global state self-esteem and its manifestation of specific factors. This suggests the possibility of using the SSES-S to evaluate a bifactor self-esteem structure, an aspect that we addressed in Study 2.

Study 2: Confirmatory Analysis of the SSES-S and its Incremental Validity

This study aimed at finding additional evidence of the SSES-S' factorial validity. Specifically, we evaluated the suitability of the scale's factorial structure by comparing its measurement model with alternative models. We specifically compared the adequacy of the three-factor model found in Study 1 with a bifactor structure. The original SSES version proposed that the scale items could be used both as a general score (i.e., a G-Factor) and as specific factors (i.e., S-Factors). However, as far as we know, this possibility has not yet been directly tested. In addition, we re-evaluated the internal consistency indicators and verified the incremental validity of the SSES-S relative to its ability to predict a criterion by controlling for the self-esteem trait measured by the RSE. We so conducted a study using a sample of university students who responded to the SSES-S, RSE and measures of life satisfaction, positive and negative affections. We estimated five factorial models to verify if the SSES-S is organized into three independent and correlated factors or if it has a bifactor structure organized in a total score (i.e. a G-Factor) and three specific factors (i.e. the S-Factors: academic performance; physical appearance; social success). Also, to provide additional information on the SSES-S construct validity, we analyzed its predictive

association with other constructs theoretically related to self-esteem (i.e. evidence of incremental validity), such as life satisfaction, and positive negative affects.

Method

Participants. We defined the sample size in advance by specifying a predicted model with 51 df, desired statistical power of .90 and RMSEA of .05 in WebPower (Zhang & Yuan, 2018). According to these parameters, we needed a sample of at least 238 participants. However, we applied the questionnaire to a slightly larger number of participants ($N = 300$) to assure having a sufficiently large sample after eliminating responses with missing data and ineligible cases. Thus, we obtained a final sample of 281 university students, who were on average 24 years old ($SD = 7.10$), mostly women (82.6%), single (85.4%), who considered themselves middle class (51.6%).

Measures. In addition to a socio-demographic questionnaire and the 12-item version of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S) presented in Study 1, the participants answered questions involving the following measures:

Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985). We used the version adapted by Albuquerque and Tróccoli (2004), which consists of 15 items (e.g., I am satisfied with my life; $\alpha = .90$). The participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”).

Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). It consists of two subscales (Positive Affects $\alpha = .86$; Negative Affects $\alpha = .89$) that measure mood, organized into 20 items (e.g. “Nervous” and “Inspired”), which are answered on a five-point Likert scale (1 = “Nothing or very slightly” to 5 = “Extremely”). The participants indicated how much they experienced each particular emotion within a general period (e.g. generally in their life as a whole). We used the version adapted to the Portuguese language by Galinha, Pereira and Esteves (2014).

Procedure and data analysis. The participants answered the questionnaires individually, but in collective situations in the classroom. We used the SPSS and AMOS statistical software for statistical analysis, descriptive, Pearson's r correlation, multiple regression and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We evaluated the goodness-of-fit to each tested factor model structure based on the following indices: ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom (χ^2/df), CFI (Confirmatory Fit Index), GFI (Goodness-of-Fit Index), AGFI (Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) and RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation). In addition, we estimated the scale's reliability by using the composite reliability (CR) and the average variance extracted (AVE).

Results

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the SSES-S items. In general, all items are significantly correlated, in accordance with the initial conception of the SSES-S (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), predicting that although items can be organized into three specific factors, they are related to each other and thus indicate the possibility a general state self-esteem factor.

Table 3.
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations among SSES-S items

Items	<i>M</i>	<i>DP</i>	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2
1. I feel confident about my abilities.	3.54	1.16	- .37	- .41	- .16	- .15	.36	- .24	.31	.34	- .10	- .11	.22
3. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.	3.37	1.27	- .17	- .26	- .07	- .31	.14	- .14	.42	.13	- .04	- .25	-
7. I am dissatisfied with my weight.	3.01	1.55	.22	.17	.14	.23	- .16	.18	- .16	- .04	.13	-	-
8. I feel self-conscious.	3.07	1.43	.42	.23	.51	.31	- .04	.65	- .14	.02	-	-	-
9. I feel as smart as others.	2.90	1.41	- .10	- .21	- .05	- .07	.37	- .05	.13	-	-	-	-
12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.	3.69	1.14	- .23	- .30	- .17	- .29	.21	- .17	-	-	-	-	-
13. I am worried about what other people think of me.	2.56	1.47	.62	.37	.56	.26	- .19	-	-	-	-	-	-
14. I feel confident that I understand things.	3.50	1.06	- .28	- .41	- .10	- .09	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16. I feel unattractive.	2.66	1.37	.22	.36	.29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.	2.90	1.42	.45	.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19. I feel like I'm not doing well.	1.89	1.29	.49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20. I am worried about looking foolish.	2.24	1.48	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note. The correlations in **bold** are statistically significant ($p < .05$)

We then performed CFA specifying the correlated three-factor measurement model of Study 1, representing academic performance, social success, and physical appearance. We compared the goodness-of-fit of this model with three alternative models (Table 4). First, we tested a two-factor model, since there is evidence that self-concept involves individual and social motives, defined from individuals' belonging to social groups (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, we specified the items to load on the social self-esteem factor (items 8, 13, 17 and 20) and on the personal self-esteem factor (i.e. all other items that previously comprised academic performance and physical appearance factors). In turn, the one-factor model assumes state self-esteem as a one-dimensional factor. Additionally, we tested two bi-factor models, which assume that the SSES-S comprises both a general self-esteem factor (i.e., G-Factor) and specific factors (i.e., S-Factors).

The results indicated that the bi-factor model with one G-Factor and three S-Factors (Figure 2) fitted the data better than the other models. In addition, this model presented adequate reliability (General Factor: CR = 0.93; AVE = 0.97; Academic Performance: CR = 0.98; AVE = 0.97; Social Success: CR = 0.98; AVE = 0.93; Physical Appearance: CR = 0.76; AVE = 0.89).

Table 4.

Comparison of Models

	X^2	X^2/df	CFI	GFI	AGFI	AIC	BIC	RMSEA
Three-factors Model	145.328***	2.85	.89	.92	.87	199.328	297.563	.08
Two-factors Model	184.947***	3.49	.85	.89	.84	234.947	325.906	.09
Uni-factorial Model	331.163***	6.13	.68	.79	.70	379.163	466.483	.13
Three-factors with Bifactor Model	60.809***	1.56	.97	.96	.93	138.809	280.705	.04
Two-factors with Bifactor Model	100.804***	2.45	.93	.94	.84	174.804	309.423	.07


Note: *** $p < .001$ 

Figure 2. Standardized parameters estimated in the confirmatory factorial analysis of the factorial structure of SSES-S

We also analyzed the incremental validity of the SSES-S by estimating a regression model in which the three factors of state self-esteem predicted life satisfaction and positive/negative affects, controlling for the trait self-esteem measured with the RSE. The results showed that only the physical appearance factor predicts life satisfaction greater than the RSE; only academic performance predicted positive affects; and the social success and academic performance factors predicted negative affects. The total trait self-esteem score explained all components of well-being (Table 5).

Table 5.

Predictive power of the three SSES-S factors and the total RSE score in the total score of the life satisfaction, positive and negative affections scales

	Life Satisfaction	Positive Affections	Negative Affections
Constant	.37	.37	5.20
Academic Performance	.08	.25**	- .19**
Social Success	.07	.04	- .17***
Physical Appearance	.29***	.06	.01
RSE	1.18***	.62***	- .56***
Model information	$R^2 = .33$ $F(4,275) = 33.64^{***}$	$R^2 = .29$ $F(4,275) = 28.61^{***}$	$R^2 = .34$ $F(4,275) = 34.95^{***}$

Note *** = $p < .001$; ** = $p < .01$; * = $p < .05$

Discussion

According to the CFA results, the bifactor model specifying a general self-esteem factor (G-Factor) and three correlated specific factors (S-Factors) was the most appropriate to represent the factorial structure of state self-esteem measured by the SSES-S. This factorial structure corroborates the previous hypotheses of the scale's authors (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), although it has not yet been empirically demonstrated. Our results have now confirmed the hypothesis that state self-esteem can be assessed from both a total score (i.e. the G-Factor) and specific factors (i.e. the S-Factors). This study thus represents a step forward in illuminating the factorial structure of state self-esteem by demonstrating the empirical viability of the SSES-S' bifactor structure.

In addition, the results showed evidence of incremental validity of the SSES-S, since specific factors predicted life satisfaction and positive and negative affects even when controlling for the trait self-esteem as measured by the RSE. Social success related more to the inhibition of negative affections, while self-esteem based on academic performance was associated with positive affects, showing that for university students, perceiving themselves as having good academic performance strongly relates to positive feelings (Upadyaya & Salmela-Aro, 2013). The factor of self-esteem of physical appearance was more associated with life satisfaction, which reveals that in order to be satisfied, people need above all to feel good about their physical appearance.

To obtain evidence to ensure the SSES-S' factorial and incremental validity, we sought to assess its criterion validity, specifically the predictive validity, since the scale was designed to assess oscillations in state-level self-esteem. Therefore, we conducted an experimental study to test whether the factors of self-esteem are sensitive to detect oscillations caused by contextual alterations due to experimental manipulation.

Study 3: Evidence of SSES-S Predictive Validity

In this study, we experimentally assessed a particular type of predictive validity characterized by the fact that the scores of a scale are sensitive to a criterion that is predicted to be a causal antecedent of the construct that the scale intended to measure (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Accordingly, we used a random-group experiment to manipulate social situations that can affect individuals' self-esteem. We specifically analyzed which scale factors are sensitive to temporary oscillations caused by social context changes that can cause negative impacts on individuals' self-esteem. For this proposal, we confronted participants with situations of social life that usually negatively affect self-esteem (Park & Crocker, 2008). It has been shown that the manipulation of self-esteem impact-enhancing situations is difficult to operationalize because individuals, as a form of defense, always try to deny that they have been affected (Bernstein et al., 2013). For this reason, it was necessary to use a procedure minimize this self-protective effect.

We thus used the identification paradigm, in which participants are instructed to think about of a person close to them and to respond according to what this person thinks. In this sense, we asked the participants to think of their best friend and to respond to the SSES-S with answers they thought their best friend would give (self-esteem measure in T1). We then manipulated this best friend's failure into one of three factors that promote state self-esteem (academic performance vs. physical appearance vs. social success vs. control). We specifically presented the participants with an evaluative situation that, depending on the experimental condition, described their best friend as failing in one of these three factors of the SSES-S. Finally, we asked the participants to respond to the SSES-S with the answers they thought their best friend would give after he/she had failed (self-esteem measure in T2). Our main prediction was that if the SSES-S is sensitive to the immediate contextual situation, the expression of self-esteem should be lower in T2 than in T1. On the other hand, self-

esteem should not be affected in the controlling condition, since in this condition there was no social comparison process in which the participants' best friend failed.

Method

Participants. We defined the sample size beforehand using WebPower (Zhang & Yuan, 2018) by taking into account a median effect size [$d = 0.50$, Cohen 1988; standard parameters of $\alpha = .05$ and power = .80 (Erdfelder et al., 1996)]. Thus, we obtained a sample of 172 undergraduate students, with an average age of 23.8 years ($SD = 3.19$), mostly women (82.6%). The participants were randomly distributed in one of four experimental conditions according to an experimental design with 2 (Time: T1 vs. T2) X 4 (Factors of Social Life: Control vs. Academic Performance vs. Physical Appearance vs. Social Success) repeated measures with a between-subject factor in the last one.

Procedures. We conducted the study online using the Qualtrics platform through social networks. Initially, the participants responded to the state self-esteem scale (T1). We adapted the instructions so that the participant should answer "as if it was his or her best friend answering". Then, they read an abstract of an article supposedly published in a prestigious scientific journal of psychology. We manipulated the content of the abstract to correspond to experimental conditions (control vs. social success vs. physical appearance vs. academic performance). The abstract reported the profile that a person should have to be considered valuable. In the social success condition, the text addressed the profile of a socially loved person. In the physical appearance condition, the text described the profile of an attractive person. In the academic performance condition, the text specified the profile of a student with excellent academic performance. After reading the abstract, the participants answered a set of questions ostensibly testing whether their best friend met the characteristics required to be considered a valued person. Then the participants received false feedback concerning the test result, which concluded that their best friend performed below average on

the required criteria. In the control condition, the abstract described a highly regarded library with no mention to participants' best friend. After reading the feedback, we again measured state self-esteem with the SSES-S (T2). Finally, all participants were debriefed and informed about the research propose and the reasons we used the false feedback.

Data analysis. We used the SPSS version 21 statistical software to calculate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures. According to a 2 (time: T1 vs. T2) x 3 (factors of self-esteem: academic performance vs. physical appearance vs. social success) x 4 (experimental conditions: control vs. academic performance vs. physical appearance vs. social success) factorial design, with the first two factors being within-subject, and the last a between-subject factor.

Results

The results showed a significant effect of the factors of self-esteem [$F(2, 168) = 23.176, p = .00, \eta^2p = .12$], indicating the participants considered the target person to base his\her self-esteem more on academic performance than on social success ($b = .47, SE = .09, p = .00, 95CI: .29; .64, d = .51$) and physical appearance ($b = .47, SE = .07, p = .00, 95CI: .34; .60, d = .60$), with no significant difference between social success and appearance ($b = .00, SE = .08, p = .92, 95CI: -.17; .15, d = .01$). Of greater importance was the three-way interaction between time, state self-esteem, and experimental condition [$F(3, 164) = 2.217, p = .04, \eta^2p = .04$]. Decomposition of this effect indicated a significant decrease in academic performance self-esteem between T1 and T2 in the experimental condition of academic performance (see Table 6), [$b = -.26, SE = .09, p = .00, 95 CI: -.42; -.08, d = .33$]. In the other experimental conditions, especially control conditions, there were no significant changes in the factors of self-esteem measured by the SSES-S.

Table 6.

Means and standard deviations of the state self-esteem factors by conditions

Experimental Conditions	Factors of the SSES-S								
		Social		Appearance		Performance		Total	
		T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2
Control		3.06 (1.13)	2.92 (1.26)	2.98 (.74)	3.05 (.86)	3.34 (.91)	3.40 (.78)	3.12 (.49)	3.12 (.61)
Social		3.11 (1.12)	3.14 (1.25)	3.30 (.85)	3.23 (.85)	2.97 (1.15)	2.96 (1.29)	3.38 (.70)	3.33 (.79)
Appearance		3.07 (.87)	3.14 (.95)	3.13 (1.04)	2.98 (.89)	2.82 (.76)	2.82 (.70)	3.34 (.71)	3.29 (.70)
Performance		3.72 (.71)	3.62 (.83)	3.80 (.70)	3.75 (.80)	3.38*** (.91)	3.13*** (.89)	3.06 (.71)	2.97 (.76)
Total		2.98 (1.15)	2.96 (1.29)	2.82 (.75)	2.82 (.70)	3.38 (.90)	3.12 (.89)	3.22 (.67)	3.17 (.73)

Note *** = The difference between means was significant ($p < .05$).

Discussion

The results of this study showed experimental evidence of changes in state self-esteem assessed with a test-post-test repeated measures experimental design. This means that self-esteem measured by the SSES-S is sensitive to manipulated contextual changes. However, we predicted that each scale's factors would be sensitive to experimental manipulations depending on its corresponding specific domain, but not on the others. However, this prediction was confirmed only in the academic performance factor. The failure to obtain changes in the other factors of the SSES-S can be due to the specificity of the sample. In fact, the participants came from a very competitive academic context typical in the life of university students. Accordingly, the SSES-S was sensitive to this particular situation when it was affected in the specific domain of academic failure, which is consistent with previous studies showing that self-esteem is anchored in specific domains that are contingent on the

self (Maroiu et al., 2016; Park & Crocker, 2008). In summary, the results demonstrated here are consistent with previous findings (e.g. Linton & Marriott, 1996) confirming the sensitivity of the academic performance factor to experimental manipulations that specifically affect this sphere of self-esteem.

General Discussion

In the three studies, we analyzed the factor structure, the convergent-discriminant and predictive validity of the SSES-S. In the first study, we showed that the 12 items short-version of the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES-S) measures three correlated factors of state self-esteem (academic performance; social success; physical appearance), besides demonstrating strong evidence for its convergent-discriminant validity. Additionally, Study 2 demonstrated that the SSES-S measures a bifactorial structure, formed by a G-Factor and three specific factors, which accurately predict life satisfaction, the expression of positive and negative affections, after controlling for the general trait self-esteem as measured by the RSE. Finally, Study 3 went further by showing experimental evidence of the SSES-S' sensitivity in capturing contextual variations in state self-esteem. In short, the results are consistent enough to support both the construct and predictive validities of the SSES-S to measure state self-esteem. This is important contribution to researchers and professionals interested in evaluating state self-esteem and needing a valid and reliable instrument.

Indeed, the SSES-S adequately evaluated the state self-esteem through its total score (i.e. a G-Factor) and its specific factors (i.e. The S-Factors: academic performance, social success and physical appearance). Thus, the factorial structure theoretically proposed in the original version (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), and the version later corroborated in other studies (e.g. Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994), was also confirmed in the reduced version presented here. The arrangement of Items in three specific factors, as well as in a total score,

has been suggested in past studies (Chau et al., 2011), but only now has this hypothesis been confirmed. We went further when demonstrating the presence of a bifactorial structure in state self-esteem measured by the SSES-S, which reveals the plasticity of self-esteem in its multifaceted expressions. Moreover, the primary purpose of the scale was corroborated, meaning it is sensitive to temporary oscillations in self-esteem caused by contextual contingencies, as we demonstrated in Study 3.

Additionally, the SSES-S proved to be sufficiently reliable, since it presented satisfactory internal consistency coefficients to both specific and general factors. Its strong consistency was demonstrated using different parameters, such as Cronbach's alpha, composite reliability and average variance extracted. Moreover, Cronbach's alpha coefficients concerning the SSES-S are stronger than of the original version (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Finally, the pattern of correlations we observed between the SSES-S and the measures of other constructs are sufficiently consistent to attest to its convergent-discriminant validity. Together, besides offering evidence of the SSES-S' construct validity and reliability, we also found experimental evidence for the scale's predictive validity.

Theoretical implications

Understanding self-esteem as a unifactorial construct has been predominant in the literature (Rosenberg, 1965). However, there is evidence that individuals respond differently according to each domain of their social lives (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). For instance, a person's self-concept can be damaged after receiving negative feedback concerning success, and react distinctively, presenting little or no alteration when receiving negative feedback regarding physical appearance. These differences suggest that state self-esteem is more complex than what one might expect from a one-factorial construct. It also reveals there are some gaps to be filled by researchers seeking to understand and explain this phenomenon.

This paper has important implications for the debate about the dimensionality of self-esteem because it demonstrates how dynamic and flexible its expression can be.

In general, our findings are consistent with the idea that self-esteem can be expressed both in a one-factorial and in a multi-factorial way. This conception is coherent with the proposal of Heatherton and Polivy (1991), according to whom the SSES-S is adequate to measure state self-esteem while using a total score, as well as its different specific factors. Those authors considered that a general factor of self-esteem underlies the correlations between specific factors of self-esteem (academic performance, social success and physical appearance), which is in line with the idea that individual differences in general self-esteem also can be expressed in correlated specific factors. This may indicate that stronger individuals' global self-esteem is affected by contextual contingencies, so that each self-esteem facet can also be affected in a systematic way. This vision of self-esteem expression presupposes a hierarchical factorial structure, with three first-order factors loading on a general second-order factor, so that the evaluation of self-esteem should be performed at the general factor level, or the level of its subdomains, but not at both levels. This paper contributes to this debate by showing that a bifactor structure fits the data better. In conformity with this structure, is it possible to identify a G-Factor that does not correlate with self-esteem's subdomains, which opens new possibilities for measuring state self-esteem that allow investigating the effect of contextual contingencies on both levels simultaneously (G-Factor and S-Factors). This possibility is particularly useful not only for measuring individual differences in self-esteem when testing theories concerning the impacts of contingency factors in specific domains of self-concept, but it also opens new research avenues regarding the malleability of self-esteem's factorial structure.

Studying self-esteem often allows scholars to understand how individuals evaluate themselves and the impact of this on other aspects of their social lives. For instance, Morf

(2006) argued that “Personality . . . reflects internal states that are contextualized in (and manifested in interaction with) the social environment as people regulate contents of the self in pursuit of their desired identities” (p. 1552). Therefore, we assume that, apart from considering the importance of social environment in the state self-esteem construct, individuals attach their self-concepts to one of the three factors (academic performance, social success or physical appearance), suggesting there are distinct self-esteem contingencies of each individual (Park & Crocker, 2008). Thus, some people give more importance to their academic performance, while others value their physical appearance more and others build the meaning of their lives around the success of their socio-affective relations. Evidence of these ideas has already been highlighted in previous studies, when, for instance, only one factor of the SSES-S was sensitive to an experimental manipulation, with this sensitivity being consistent with the contextual domain that underpin individuals’ self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Here we present a reduced and more pragmatic version of the SSES-S, which can be used as a valid and precise measure of three critical factors that organize individual self-concept.

Our results also provide new insight into the study of well-being. Indeed, self-esteem is a central construct for the understanding individuals’ well-being and life satisfaction (Anusic & Schimmack 2016; Du et al., 2017; Tian, 2014). Research on the influence of specific domains of self-esteem on well-being and quality of life will benefit from the application of the SSES-S. Certainly, our research can contribute to the study of self-esteem in specific domains of social life, providing a more insightful analysis of the role of each self-esteem factor according to the target population’s characteristics, considering individual differences in the anchorage of a specific domain in detriment to another.

Limitations and future directions

Some limitations were present in this research, such as the fact that we only used samples of university students. In that sense, future studies using more diverse samples are necessary to increase the scope for applying the SSES-S. It is important to include clinical samples with participants who have different levels of depression symptoms. Studying the self-esteem of these target groups is particularly relevant to the evaluation of the sensitivity of the SSES-S' factors. For example, testing individuals to whom physical appearance is more important than other self-esteem factors (e.g., fashion models, athletes, people who frequent gyms, etc.), as well as similar groups in which the factor of social success has importance in detriment to the other ones (e.g., individuals like public figures, digital influencers, etc.) can shed new light on the centrality of self-esteem as an organizing principle of people's lives in society.

Another limitation of our work is the context we used to evaluate the influence of experimental manipulation of self-esteem factors. We suggest that future studies test the SSES-S' sensitivity to momentary variations in self-esteem while taking into account both negative and positive feedbacks. Examples are at schools, when receiving low (vs. high) grades, or in clinical situations, when an increase in self-esteem is obtained through therapeutic interventions. This paper does not offer enough information to establish cutoff points that indicate low, medium or high levels of self-esteem, making it impossible to make decisions in the context of diagnostics. However, this limitation leaves opens new avenues for research on the role played by specific self-esteem domains on psychological evaluation and clinical diagnosis.

Despite these limitations, our results are strong enough to provide evidence of construct validity of the SSES-S we propose to measure state self-esteem in both correlational and experimental studies. This short-form version can provide substantial

contributions to the study of self-esteem in psychology and other scientific domains that investigate phenomena related to state self-esteem. The SSES-S is, therefore, a good choice for studying both the general and specific domains of state self-esteem.

Ethical Statement and Informed Consent

All participants provided consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki and the American Psychological Association. The Research Ethics Committee of Federal University of Paraíba, Brazil approved all procedures used in the studies (CAAE 89390918.0.0000.5188).

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Chapter II

Association between Anti-prejudice Norm and Attitudes towards Minority Groups

“We should never forget that everything Adolph Hitler did in Germany was legal.”

Martin Luther King Jr.

This chapter is based on:

Brito, T. R. S., & Pereira, C. R. (2020). Association between Anti-prejudice Norm and Attitudes towards Minority Groups. *Psico-USF*, (25) 3, 507-518. doi. 10.1590/1413-82712020250309.

Association between Anti-prejudice Norm and Attitudes towards Minority Groups

Abstract. In this study we investigated the relationship between the anti-prejudice norm and the expression of attitudes towards minority groups. Participated 100 people who evaluated a list with 16 target groups of prejudice, answering two questions: indicate the groups that feel less prejudice; and which ones do you prefer. The results showed that there are different levels of prejudice expression depending on the type of group, with the women, blacks and people with disabilities being the most protected by the norm. A hierarchical analysis of clusters evidenced an organization of the groups, classified as naturalized, guilty, sexual and political minorities. The anti-prejudice norm and the attitudes presented a strong and positive relation ($r = 0.65$, $p < 0.001$). A multilevel logistic analysis showed that this relation was moderated by the type of group. These results contribute to the studies on the expression of prejudice, besides demonstrating the role of norms in the understanding of the phenomenon.

Keywords: hierarchy; prejudice; social minority.

There is ample evidence in the literature that the public expression of prejudice towards minority groups has decreased over the last forty years. In other words, people say that they are not prejudiced, even though their behaviour shows the occurrence of objective discrimination (Lima, 2016; Lins, Lima-Nunes & Camino, 2014; Pinto and Ferreira, 2014). The social psychology of prejudice and discrimination has shown that this dissociation is motivated by pressure from the antiprejudice norm (e.g. Crandall, Eshleman & O'Brien, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). This norm is based on values of equality as a fundamental principle that should regulate social relations (Schwartz, 2015), and it is present in the legal and normative systems of many western countries.

In fact, the antiprejudice norm has been institutionalised in several official documents. For example, article 5 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil (1988) states that “all are equal before the law, without distinction of any kind”, and the Brazilian Penal Code guarantees that “crimes resulting from discrimination or prejudice by reason of race, colour, ethnic group, religion or national origin shall be punished” (Law No. 7.716/89). Although the normative system prohibits discrimination against various social groups, empirical evidence nonetheless shows that some groups are afforded greater social protection than others (Batista et al, 2014; Pereira & Souza, 2016; Schwarcz & Neto, 2017).

This suggests that, although the institutionalisation of the antiprejudice norm has resulted in fewer instances of the public expression of discrimination, this has not led to its effective internalisation in people’s value systems as an organising principle of their lives. Thus, the control of the public expression of prejudice, but not its private rejection, indicates that people act only out of mere conformity with normative prescriptions, since they are motivated to avoid social sanctions (Modesto et al, 2017; Pereira & Souza, 2016) and to protect their public image (Pereira, Álvaro & Vala, 2018). Thus, it is possible to detect a dissociation between the public acceptance of the antiprejudice norm and the maintenance of negative attitudes towards minority groups.

The Social Psychology of Antiprejudice

Sherif and Sherif (1953) developed a theory, known as the Group Norm Theory, according to which norms are the main factors explaining attitudes and social behaviour. In short, they suggested that people feel pressure to conform to the norms of the groups of which they form part and that individual attitudes are, in fact, simply the reproduction of the attitudes of the group to which they belong. This perspective seems of interest in trying to understand why people tend to state publicly that they are not prejudiced, but, on the other

hand, consider that there is prejudice in the society in which they live (Camino et al, 2001). This suggests the possibility that people are under the influence of two normative systems, corresponding to two types of norms: descriptive versus injunctive (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Descriptive norms refer to what is more frequent or common in a certain group, while injunctive (or prescriptive) norms relate to what is socially approved or admired by the group.

It is likely that attitudes towards minority social groups involve some compromise solution between the two normative systems. Although the public expression of prejudice is condemned for various groups (i.e. antiprejudice is prescriptive), there is evidence that prejudice still persists at the descriptive level (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Lima & Vala, 2004).

Some studies have used the normative perspective (França & Monteiro, 2013; Pettigrew, 1991; Staunton et al, 2014) to explain the expression of prejudice (Crandall et al, 2002; Crandall, Ferguson & Bahns, 2013; McDonald & Crandall, 2015; Pauker, Apfelbaum & Spitzer, 2015; Schultz et al, 2018). According to this line of thought, one way of reducing prejudice is by giving greater prominence to egalitarian social norms.

For example, Lima et al. (2006) undertook three studies in which they highlighted the role of normative contexts in the automatic prejudice displayed towards black people. In the first study, they assessed the effects of two types of normative contexts (egalitarian and meritocratic) and one neutral context on automatic prejudice. In the second study, they investigated the social representations of equality. And, finally, in the third study, they constructed two types of egalitarian normative contexts (formal versus supportive egalitarianism), which, together with the context of competitive meritocracy, enabled them to analyse the impact of these norms on automatic prejudice. In short, the results of their research demonstrated that the meritocratic context increases people's expression of

prejudice, while the egalitarian context does not reduce prejudice, but only eliminates the automatic activation of the negative attitude towards black people.

Walker, Sinclair and MacArthur (2015) investigated the role of social norms in the expression of attitudes towards homosexual rights. Specifically, they assessed the participants' political beliefs, their attitudes towards homosexual rights and their motivation to control their prejudiced reactions. After submitting them to two experimental conditions (the norm of anti-homosexual rights and the norm of pro-homosexual rights), they discovered that, in the condition of "pro-homosexual rights", there was a greater change of attitude in the participants in conforming to the norm than in the condition of "anti-homosexual rights". Furthermore, they showed that not all individuals respond equally to the pressures of the social norm.

Crandall et al (2002) tested the hypothesis that people follow social norms when they express prejudice, having two sources of motivation: an external one, which consists in adapting to the rules of the group; and another internal one, referring to the person's identification with the reference group and his or her internalisation of the norms. Specifically, they investigated whether the public expression of negative attitudes in relation to 105 social groups was related with the social approval (or not) of such expression. The results showed that there were groups about which it was acceptable to express negative attitudes, with rapists, child abusers and thieves at the top of the list. On the other hand, it was less acceptable to express negative attitudes about racial groups or disabled people. Furthermore, they found a strong correlation between the expression of negative attitudes towards the different groups and the extent to which participants considered that group to be protected by the antiprejudice norm.

Despite providing important contributions for understanding the role of norms in explaining prejudice, none of the above-mentioned studies presented results about the way in

which people organise social groups. So, what are the organising principles of the differences between these groups? In this study, we shall attempt to fill in this gap and thus contribute to the literature about the relationship between social norms and the expression of prejudice towards minority groups.

Prejudice is defined as a negative assessment of a group or of a person because he or she belongs to a particular group (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989). This negative attitude may be guided by some principles, such as beliefs shared between people about the nature of each social group (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Moscovici, 1961).

Various research studies have demonstrated the role of common-sense theories about the nature of social groups as organising principles that serve to maintain prejudice (Lacerda, Pereira & Camino, 2002; Pereira et al, 2011). This line of thought is followed, for example, by the studies about psychological essentialism (Bastian & Haslam, 2006), which propose that the categorisation of objects results in a process that defines the nature of social elements (Medin & Ortony, 1989). According to Rothbart and Taylor (1992), we attribute different essences to groups, based on how we perceive them, for example as natural or social.

This interpretation has been used to analyse the structure of essentialist beliefs in understanding intergroup attitudes (Haslam, 2017; Ho, Roberts & Gelman, 2015).

Furthermore, the perspective of social representations (Moscovici, 1961; Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983) also understands the categorisation of groups as the result of an organisation based on common-sense theories, or socially shared beliefs about the nature of social groups. Through processes of anchorage and objectivation, people construct and disseminate beliefs about the nature of groups, facilitating the process of categorisation (anchorage) and stereotyping (objectivation). In short, the perspective of social representations, mainly representations about the nature of groups, understands that, through the beliefs that people have about the nature of social groups, there is a maintenance of the discriminatory practices

that such groups suffer, considering also that these beliefs, in general, contribute to the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Pereira et al (2011) investigated the way in which prejudice against homosexuals was maintained through common-sense theories in Catholic and Protestant seminarists. The results showed that the participants presented two types of prejudice: the first was referred to by the authors as blatant prejudice, while the second was referred to as subtle prejudice. They observed that Protestants were more blatant, whereas Catholics were more subtle. Furthermore, the authors identified the fact that beliefs about the nature of homosexuality explained the differentiation between those who were subtle and those who were blatant in their prejudice. Those who were subtle in their prejudice were anchored in biological beliefs, founded upon natural and innate aspects; while those who were blatantly prejudiced based their attitudes on ethical and moral beliefs.

Pereira, Torres and Pereira (2004) undertook a study about the relationship between social representations and prejudice towards prostitutes in a sample of Catholic and Protestant theology students. They found that prejudice towards prostitutes was organised in three dimensions: rejection of relations of proximity, negative emotions and positive emotions. Based on the normative perspective, they demonstrated that the group of prostitutes was not so well protected by the norm, since a widespread prejudice against them was identified. However, the authors also demonstrated that this widespread prejudice displayed certain variations. The Protestant students presented higher levels of discrimination in comparison with the Catholics, and these variations were related with the representations that both types of students had about the nature of prostitution.

Following this line of thought, in this research, we investigate whether there are differences in the expression of prejudice towards different target groups. Furthermore, we assess whether there exists a hierarchy of prejudice and analyse its organisation in the light of

the normative perspective and the above-described organising principles. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: (1) Which minority social groups are most protected by the antiprejudice norm? (2) Towards which groups do people express the most positive attitudes? (3) What is the relationship between the antiprejudice norm and individuals' attitude towards groups? and (4) Is there some organising principle governing attitudes towards social groups? The answers to these questions call for an analysis of the main aspects underlying the social psychology of the antiprejudice norm.

Method

Participants. Our sample consisted of 100 participants, with ages varying between 18 and 47 and an average age of 25 ($DP = 6.27$). Most of the participants were women (70%).

Instruments. We developed a list of social groups that are the target of prejudice, based on the one compiled by Crandall et al (2002). The list was composed of sixteen groups, including examples where Brazilian norms tend to condemn prejudice more strongly (e.g. women and black people) and groups where the norms are not so protective (e.g. feminists and prostitutes). All the groups comprising the list are shown in Figure 1.

Normativity was assessed with the following question: "From the list of groups below, select the three towards which you feel least prejudice". The groups that were selected were attributed with the number 1 (a group protected by the norm), while those that were not selected were attributed with 0 (a group not protected by the norm). The positive attitude towards the groups was measured through the question: "In the following list, please indicate the eight groups that you like most". The selected groups were attributed with the code 1 (positive attitude), while those that were not selected were attributed with the code 0 (negative attitude). The aim was to assess whether the participants distinguished the target

groups towards which they expressed positive attitudes from those towards which they nurtured negative attitudes, in keeping with their personal attitudes towards each of them.

Procedure. Our research project was submitted to an ethical committee, and, after receiving a favourable opinion (CAAE 89390918.0.0000.5188), we began to collect data. The selection of participants was based on convenience, being made through a call placed on the social media. After reading the terms of informed consent and agreeing to take part in the research, the participants were sent a questionnaire by e-mail and, after answering the questions, they returned them by e-mail. The data were computed on the statistical software SPSS, version 21.

Data Analysis. The data were analysed using the statistical software SPSS, in its version 21: descriptive statistical analyses were carried out (mean, standard deviation and frequency), together with hierarchical cluster analysis, correlation analysis and variance analysis (ANOVA) with paired contrasts and multilevel logistic regression.

Results

The results are presented according to the answers to the research questions proposed in this investigation. First of all, descriptive statistical analyses were carried out, in order to answer the first question in the questionnaire, which corresponded to the first problem that was proposed: “Which minority social groups are most protected by the antiprejudice norm?”. Figure 1 presents the indicative proportions of each group for which the participants stated that they did not feel prejudice, i.e. the groups that are protected by the antiprejudice norm. The results indicated that the groups suffering least from prejudice were mainly *women, black people and unemployed people*, whereas those that were least protected were *people with HIV/Aids, prostitutes and transsexual and transgender people*. Below (Figure 1),

it is possible to identify a hierarchy with all 16 groups, ranging from those that were most protected by the norm to those that were least protected.




Figure 1. Groups protected by anti-prejudice norm.

Next, the analyses were directed towards the answers to the second question, about people's positive attitudes towards groups. A change was noted in the arrangement of the groups, mainly in the ordering of those groups towards which people expressed the most positive attitudes, which were *black people*, followed by *women* and *disabled people*. The following figure (Figure 2) shows the distribution, taking into account all the target groups.




Figure 2. Groups for which people say they have positive attitudes.

In order to answer the third question, about the relationship between the antiprejudice norms and people's attitudes towards groups, i.e., what extent the indicative proportions of normativity (question 1) and positive attitudes (question 2) are related, a Pearson correlation analysis was undertaken. The proportions observed for each group in the two questions were used. The analysis demonstrated a strong and positive correlation between the two variables ($r = 0.65$, $p < 0.001$). This means that the more anti-normative it was to express prejudice towards a target group, the more the participants declared that they had a positive attitude towards this group.

Next, in order to assess the organising principles of people's attitudes towards social groups, a non-parametric hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) was carried out, corresponding to the fourth research question. The results show four general categories into which the groups were organised (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Dendrogram with minority group classes.

According to the result found in the dendrogram, it can be seen that the groups were organised into four categories. The first is formed by the groups *women*, *black people*, *disabled people* and *native Brazilian*. This category may be called **naturalised groups**. The second category is composed of the groups *unemployed people*, *obese people*, *homeless people*, *people with HIV/Aids* and *prostitutes*. This category may be called **blamed groups**. The third category formed from the groups *militant people*, *landless rural workers* and *feminists* was given the name of **political minorities**. Finally, the fourth category was classified as **sexual minorities** since it was composed of the groups *gays*, *lesbians*, *bisexuals* and *transsexual and transgender people*.

Based on such evidence, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was carried out, comparing the means of the preferences between the categories with the aim of discovering how individuals organised the social groups according to how much they preferred certain

groups (or not). The results of the ANOVA reveal significant differences, $F(1, 98) = 5024.467$, $p < 0.001$, indicating a hierarchy of people's preferences towards different types of target group. Once the presence of a hierarchy of preferences had been identified, we sought to check how the comparisons were made specifically. Multiple comparisons were thus made, which indicated significant differences between the naturalised groups and all the rest ($p < 0.001$), above all in comparison with the political minorities group, with this latter group being assessed as being the least preferred by the participants. There was no difference between the sexual minority groups and the blamed groups. These results will be discussed in the light of the normative perspective and the organising principles of attitudes.

As can be seen, there is a hierarchy in the expression of prejudice, which begins with those groups that are most protected socially by the antiprejudice norm (naturalised groups) moving down to those for whom the norm is not so active (political minorities). It can further be seen that there was almost no difference in the expression of prejudice towards the blamed groups and the sexual minorities. On a scale that ranged from 0 to 1, both of them scored roughly a half (around 0.5), which indicates that people demonstrated extreme positioning only when they assessed how much they preferred naturalised groups and political minorities.

After identifying the relationship between norms and attitudes and the categorisation of the 16 groups into general classes, we posed the question whether the type of group moderates the relationship between the normativity of people's prejudices and the choice of their preferred group. To answer this question, it should be remembered that the dependent variable (the choice of group) is dichotomous and the participants answered (0 = did not choose and 1 = chose) for each of the 16 groups. This means that we have a hierarchical data structure, in other words, 16 choices for each individual. For this reason, the answer to the research problem that we posed must be obtained through a multilevel logistic regression analysis. However, given the high correlation between the antiprejudice norm and the

expression of attitudes towards the target groups, we undertook a preliminary analysis in order to inspect the matrix of correlations between the variables, which showed that there were no problems of collinearity among the variables under analysis ($VIF = 1.44$; *Tolerance* = 0.69; *Conditional Index* varying between 1 and 5.03), making it possible to undertake the regression with terms of interaction for testing the moderation hypotheses.

We undertook such an analysis, considering the positive attitudes towards the groups as a dependent variable, the antiprejudice norm as an independent variable and the type of group (*naturalised*, *blamed*, *sexual minorities* and *political minorities*) as a moderating variable. The results indicated that both the role of the norm [$F(1, 98) = 54.653, p < 0.001$] and the type of group [$F(3, 96) = 7.657, p < 0.001$], as well as the interaction norm*type of group [$F(3, 96) = 4.540, p < 0.005$] were significant in predicting the positive attitudes of the participants. This interaction signifies that the relationship between normativity and attitudes is moderated by the type of group, i.e., the norm impacts differently on the choices of the participants, depending on the group.

To better interpret the interaction, we made a breakdown of the effect of the antiprejudice norm on individuals' attitudes in each type of group (Figure 4). As can be seen, when the norm is around zero (i.e. when the group is not protected by this norm) the expression of positive attitudes towards the groups varies. The political minorities group is the least preferred among the people taking part, whereas the group of naturalised people is viewed more positively. On the other hand, when the antiprejudice norm is high (i.e. when the group is protected by this norm), all the groups are assessed as positive. In other words, what explains the choice of the group as the one preferred by the participants is the perception that expressing prejudice against that group is antinormative. Indeed, the differences between the groups disappear when the expression of negative attitudes is antinormative. When this perception was absent, the participants selected different types of

group, with the political minorities being considered less favourable and the naturalised groups being considered more favourable. This means that the representation about the nature of the group plays an important role, besides normativity.




Figure 4. Effect of anti-prejudice norm on expression of positive attitudes, moderated by target group type.

In short, it was seen that norms have an effect on the expression of positive attitudes, but this effect is moderated by the type of target group involved. The effect was greatest in the *political minorities* group ($B = 18.12, p < 0.001$), followed by the *sexual minorities* group ($B = 5.84, p < 0.001$), the *naturalised* group ($B = 4.41, p < 0.001$) and the *blamed* group ($B = 3.66, p < 0.001$).

Discussion

The analysis of the results was conducted from a psychosocial perspective that takes into account the role played by the norms and social representations that people have about

groups in the suppression and expression of prejudice and the positive attitudes that they feel towards social minorities. Although the norms and representations were not assessed in an explicit way, the results showed that people presented an underlying logic that enabled them to categorise the groups into general classes. Such categorisation implicitly reflects the beliefs that people have about the nature of groups. We will discuss the findings of this study in detail, following a line of thought that is coherent with the proposed research questions.

The first research question sought to identify which groups were most protected by the antiprejudice norm. The results suggested that the expression of prejudice was regulated by a normative framework, since it was coherent with the pattern already identified in previous studies (Crandall et al, 2002). Women and black people were to be found at the top of the list, since these were considered as the groups least targeted by prejudice. In other words, the groups for which there is greatest social disapproval of the expression of discrimination. At the opposite end of the list are the transsexuals, prostitutes and people with HIV/Aids. These groups are less protected by the antiprejudice norm, i.e. participants consider it acceptable to express prejudice towards them.

To some extent, the people belonging to these groups are perceived as being responsible for their acts, and this result mainly indicates that the Brazilian normative context does not exert any strong pressure to condemn discrimination towards groups who have sexual behaviours that are perceived as different from the traditional heteronormative pattern (Alencar, Neves & Parente, 2016; Freires, 2015). The most disturbing feature is that, as they are not protected by the antiprejudice norm, these are the groups that are the greatest victims of aggression and violence in Brazil (Bonassi et al, 2015), as pointed out in the study by Silva et al (2016). In a sample of transvestites and transsexuals, the authors analysed the types of violence to which they were subjected and revealed that 91% had already been victims of verbal violence, 58% psychological violence and 33% physical violence.

In short, as far as the first research question is concerned, it can be concluded that, through the presence of the word “prejudice” in the questionnaire itself, some mechanism was activated in people that motivated them to answer in accordance with what would be most socially acceptable or appropriate (Schultz et al, 2018), thereby suffering some impact. In this case, from the Brazilian prescriptive antiprejudice norms (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

The second research question related to mapping the target groups of people’s positive attitudes, when they had to express their personal attitudes, without having any specific normative framework as their point of reference. From the differences between the results shown in Figures 1 and 2, it was evident that, besides the normative pressures, there are organising principles of attitudes that exert an influence on the expression of such attitudes. In order to analyse these principles, and in answering the fourth research question, we observed how the groups were organised, which enabled us to identify the logic whereby the attitudes express a well-structured categorisation of the target groups.

This framework makes it possible to understand how people express attitudes towards social groups based on specific shared characteristics. For example, when people expressed positive attitudes towards women, they also did so when the targets were black people, disabled people and Brazilian Indians, since they anchored these groups in one single social representation about their nature (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), objectifying them as a general class. In the same way, in preferring feminists, they also preferred landless rural workers and all militant groups in general. These generalisations show that the way in which we perceive social groups is associated with the way in which we will relate to them.

As was demonstrated by Pereira et al (2011), those social groups that are perceived as natural were treated by people as more acceptable when compared to others. Moscovici (1961) already defended that, when we classify them, we define groups and people according

to how much they diverge (or not) from the norm, considering the role of what is socially desirable as our guide in the process of categorisation.

When people are confronted with a social group for the first time, they anchor the new information in a set of beliefs that is already established in their cognitive system, and they see the new group as similar to old ones. This process explains how different groups are categorised, and, by classifying them, people reveal their theories about the social reality (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983). In order to analyse these aspects more deeply, we can discuss the results corresponding to the third research question that we posed: is there a relationship between norms and attitudes?

We partly refute what Crandall and collaborators (2002) had supposed when they stated that attitudes would be a direct reflection of norms, treating the two variables as if they were overlapping ones. Furthermore, the results shown here fill in the gap in the studies about the relationship between norms and attitudes, by demonstrating that it is the type of group which moderates that relationship. In other words, when there are no antiprejudice norms, the expression of attitudes is guided by the representation that people have about the nature of each group. Thereafter, and considering the categorisations, they publicly express prejudice, especially towards groups that are not perceived as natural.

In terms of social impacts, these findings show the need to construct a discourse that leads to a greater internalisation of the antiprejudice norm towards all minority social groups, since this can serve as an antidote for preventing the expression of negative attitudes that lead to the formation of prejudice against these groups. If all groups were equally protected by the antiprejudice norm, then the aggressions displayed towards specific categories, such as black people, women and homosexuals, might probably begin to show a downward trend over time, thus contributing towards transforming the scenario of discrimination in the Brazilian context.

Conclusions

The findings of this present study open up new research avenues about the relationship between norms and prejudice, which may be followed in other studies. Although it is highly relevant, this research is not without its limitations. The first of these is the fact that we have used a small sample that was chosen out of convenience. In this case, it is suggested that future studies should be undertaken with larger samples and with the greatest possible coverage of the various sectors of society. Furthermore, other variables might play an important role in determining the relationship between norms and the expression of attitudes, such as, for example, the type of group that the participant belongs to. Since this study may be considered exploratory in nature, it was not possible to take into account the wide diversity of variables that may be relevant for studying the problem of the expression of prejudice, so that we focused exclusively on those that responded to the research problems that we raised. This being the case, attention is drawn to this investigation's potential contribution to future studies that seek to enlarge upon the findings demonstrated here, as well as the need to use more explanatory variables, giving special attention to the role that the participant's group of belonging may play in the relationship between norms and attitudes towards minority target groups. For example, in qualitative studies with members of each of the categories (naturalised groups, blamed groups, sexual and political minorities), it would be important to study how each person expressed prejudice towards their own group in comparison with other groups.

Another important limitation to be taken into consideration has to do with the questionnaire that we used for the collection of data. This questionnaire was composed exclusively of explicit questions, making it possible to study only the public expression of prejudice. In subsequent studies, it is suggested that implicit measures may be used to access attitudes and test whether there are differences when the hierarchy of private attitudes is

being assessed. However, despite the limitations mentioned, this study can provide an important contribution to the literature about the relationship between norms and prejudice, where prominence is given to the fact that this relationship depends on people's perceptions about the nature of social groups.

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Chapter III

I am not a racist, I even have black friends: the ego-defensive role for justifying racism

“Racism must be recognised.”

Marielle Franco

I am not a racist, I even have black friends: the ego-defensive role for justifying racism

Abstract. Racist attitudes and behaviors have been strongly resisting the anti-racism norm. Theorizing and research on intergroup relations have shown this occurs because people use justifications to mitigate their behavior's discriminatory nature. In this respect, the literature has not yet clarified whether the simple act of justifying the racist behavior itself is sufficient to protect both the perpetrator's positive private and social image. The current research discusses this issue by proposing that individuals spontaneously elaborate justifications for their discriminatory behaviors against groups protected by the anti-racism norm, thus preserving their self-esteem and social image. In Experiment 1 (N = 203), we show that participants accused of being racist had their implicit self-esteem affected. In Experiment 2 (N = 102), we show that the mere act of justifying racism mitigates the negative impacts on the implicit self-esteem of participants accused of racism. In Experiment 3 (N = 137), we replicated previous results in another cultural context (i.e., Spain). In Experiment 4 (N = 196), we went further by showing that the negative impact of being accused of racism occurs in managing the most egalitarian participants' social image. Experiment 5 (N = 148) analyzed the anti-prejudice norm's moderating role on the impact of being accused of racism on individuals' self-esteem. In general, the results confirm the proposed hypotheses and contribute to studies on processes that legitimize prejudice and discrimination.

KEYWORDS: Prejudice; Self-Esteem; Justifications; Racism; Anti-Racism Norm.

Resumo. Atitudes e comportamentos racistas têm resistido fortemente à norma antirracismo.

A teorização e as pesquisas sobre as relações intergrupais têm demonstrado que isto ocorre porque as pessoas usam justificações para mitigar a natureza discriminatória de seu comportamento. A este respeito, a literatura ainda não esclareceu se o simples ato de justificar o comportamento racista em si é suficiente para proteger tanto a imagem pessoal e social do perpetrador. A presente pesquisa discute esta questão propondo que indivíduos elaboram *espontaneamente* justificações para seus comportamentos discriminatórios contra grupos protegidos pela norma antirracismo, preservando assim sua autoestima e imagem social. No Experimento 1 ($N = 203$), mostramos que os participantes acusados de serem racistas tiveram sua autoestima implícita afetada. No Experimento 2 ($N = 102$), mostramos que o simples ato de justificar o racismo mitiga os impactos negativos sobre a autoestima implícita dos participantes acusados de racismo. No Experimento 3 ($N = 137$), reproduzimos os resultados anteriores em outro contexto cultural (i.e., na Espanha). No Experimento 4 ($N = 196$), fomos além, mostrando que o impacto negativo de ser acusado de racismo ocorre na gestão da imagem social dos participantes mais igualitários. O Experimento 5 ($N = 148$) analisou o papel moderador da norma antipreconceito no impacto de ser acusado de racismo na autoestima dos indivíduos. Em geral, os resultados confirmam as hipóteses propostas e contribuem para estudos sobre processos que legitimam o preconceito e a discriminação.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Preconceito; Autoestima; Justificações; Racismo; Norma Antirracismo.

Discrimination is a transversal phenomenon which is present in societies with different cultural backgrounds. The practice of prejudice affects various social categories; however, there are more vulnerable groups and others that are more protected by the anti-prejudice norm (Brito & Pereira, 2020; Crandall et al., 2002). This norm bases itself on

values of equality as a fundamental basic principle which must regulate social relations (Schwartz, 2007). There have been diverse official documents that institutionalize the anti-prejudice norm, such as the Federal Constitution of Brazil in its article 5, item XLII and law 7.716/89 of the Brazilian Penal Code. Notwithstanding, these normative sanctions control only the public expression of prejudice, not directly interfering in their private manifestations, and that indicates people often act only by mere conformism, motivated to avoid social punishments (Modesto et al., 2017; Pereira & Souza, 2017).

Recently, a theoretical model has been developed to explain how people solve the conflict between maintaining prejudiced attitudes and not publicly expressing such attitudes. The Justified Discrimination Model (JDM) argues that prejudiced behaviors need to be justified with argumentation perceived as not prejudiced (Pereira et al., 2010). In other words, people use justifications to solve situations of psychological and social conflict, derived from the tension between the need to act according to the norm and the prejudiced beliefs and attitudes they have (Lapinski & Boster, 2010; Pereira & Vala, 2010). According to the JDM, the structure of justification of prejudice varies in three types: denial, projection, and rationalization (Pereira et al., 2018).

An empirical example of the discrepancy between maintaining prejudiced attitudes and controlling public expression of prejudice was the study led by Camino et al. (2001), in which Brazilian participants acknowledged widespread racism in Brazil, but these same participants did not perceive themselves as racist. Rather, they expressed a particular type of expression of prejudice. This expression works as a reactive formation characterized by the incisive denial of negative feelings towards blacks and by the hyperbolic manifestation of positive attitudes towards blacks. When the same participants were instructed to respond according to "what they think society thinks", their responses revealed the hidden face of

racism in Brazil: an increased devaluation of black people and an exaggerated value for white people. Nevertheless, the authors leave some questions open.

Why does this phenomenon occur? Will this sharp denial of prejudiced feelings and the exaggeration of its opposite side be a positive self-presentation strategy with an impact on the self-concept and social image that people want to demonstrate to society? In this article, we propose that people are motivated to present themselves as non-biased, and this negatively impacts their self-esteem when they become aware of being biased. It is also proposed that this motivation leads people to fabricate justifications in order to mitigate the negative effects on their self-esteem.

The Anti-Prejudice Norm and the Need to Show Unbiasedness

Although many scholars have dedicated themselves to understanding and explaining the processes that preceded discrimination, there is still much to investigate, especially about the impact of social standards on the expression of prejudiced attitudes and behaviors. In the field of Social Psychology, the normative perspective (Sherif, 1936) has offered important contributions, arguing that the suppression or expression of prejudice is explained by the internalization of group norms. Later studies have argued that in situations of intergroup conflict resolution, people are motivated to follow the norms of the group they belong to, either to not be sanctioned - external motivation, or by belonging to the group; or even it could be because they internalized the values that support the norm - internal motivation (Crandall et. al., 2002).

With the intent to act in accordance with the anti-prejudice norm, which prescribes that good people are fair and egalitarian, people are motivated to show themselves unprejudiced by acting in order to deny their own prejudice and to demonstrate that they have positive attitudes towards minority groups; furthermore, for this reason, they do not discriminate against members of minority groups (Camino et al. 2001). The problem arises

when they become aware of their discriminatory actions. Previous studies have shown that an individual who receives negative social feedback has an impaired self-esteem and uses psychological defense mechanisms to restore the positivity of that self-esteem (Leitner et al., 2014). That means, in the face of a threatening situation, people act in a self-protective way (e.g., Pereira et al., 2018), probably looking for some justification that will mitigate the dissonance between their behavior and what is required by the social standard.

For example, Iacoviello et al. (2017) investigated the moderating role of social norms in the relationship between endogroup favoritism and self-esteem. They based their work on the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the Self-Esteem Hypothesis in Endogroup Bias (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), and the Normative Perspective (Sherif, 1936); thus, they tested the hypothesis indicating that from the making comparisons which favor the endogroup in relation to the exogroup (endogroup favoritism) the individual increases personal self-esteem in contexts where the group norm is pro-discrimination. Specifically, they learned that endogroup favoritism increases self-esteem only when the norm is pro-discrimination and that when the norm is anti-discrimination, only individuals who do not favor the endogroup, that is, those who do not discriminate increase self-esteem. *Id est*, endogroup favoritism only raises self-esteem when people believe this is the behavior they should perform (pro-discrimination norm), but their self-esteem is negatively affected when they think that favoring their own group is inappropriate (anti-discrimination norm).

As it has been described, some advances are observed in order to explain how people relate socially, above all, how they react to maintaining a positive social image and reinforce their self-esteem. The latter is seen as a fundamental piece for understanding the motivations underlying intergroup behavior (Pereira et al., 2018). Therefore, understanding how to manage self-esteem is an important step in explaining the dynamics of intergroup processes, such as in instances of prejudice.

The Need to Show Oneself without Prejudice and its Impact on Self-Esteem

The self-esteem hypothesis as a motivation for exogroup discrimination (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) postulates that endogroup favoritism increases individual self-esteem, giving rise to two corollaries which support the idea that people seek a more positive view of themselves: (1) people with low self-esteem they have a greater need to favor their group to improve their self-esteem; and (2) when people engage in behavior that favors the endogroup, their self-esteem increases. This variable can be sensitive to contextual variations (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) and can be impacted by negative feedbacks on the self (Leitner et al., 2014) or objects and preferences understood as an extension of that self (Lisjak, Lee & Gardner, 2012).

Variations in self-esteem can be assessed both implicitly (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and explicitly (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). There is evidence that even in situations where there is a decrease in self-esteem, people tend not to show that they are psychologically unsettled, behaving in a way to conceal this impact. However, the effects continue to be demonstrated implicitly (Lupien et al., 2010). Namely, people are often motivated to present themselves positively even when they do not feel well. It is as if there is a norm that pressures people to deny being psychologically shaken by the contingencies of life. According to Baumeister (1982), self-presentation is defined by using behavior to communicate some positive information about the individual, him or herself, to others. Individuals have a motivation to always look good before other people. This motivation leads individuals to conceal what is not going well, appearing to have a high self-esteem.

Nonetheless, in some cases, there is the presence of an internal conflict, accompanied by emotional discomfort (feelings of shame and guilt) and a mistake between attitudes and behaviors (Crosby et al., 1980). This conflict occurs when the individuals face self-perceptions that are inconsistent with the norm of the group to which they belong, impairing

their positive self-concept. The way that people deal with this discomfort and internal conflict has been studied by several researchers (Allport, 1954; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pereira & Vala, 2010). In the field of Social Psychology, the findings have indicated that people are motivated to settle dissonance by justifying their behavior when it violates the group norm. For example, when a person identifies him or herself as part of a group that adopts egalitarian norms and is caught discriminating, this individual justifies such action using arguments to prove that what he did was not prejudice (Pereira & Vala, 2010; Vala & Monteiro, 2013). It is the ego-defensive function for justifying prejudice.

Indeed, justifications have a mitigating role in the negative effect that perceiving oneself as a discriminator causes self-esteem. For example, Pereira et al. (2018) assessed the role of ego defense strategies in legitimizing prejudice. They tested the hypothesis that threat-based justifications mitigate the negative effect on individuals' self-esteem caused whenever they become aware of their racist attitudes. In the three studies carried out, participants who were led to believe that they had acted in a discriminatory manner against immigrants had a decreased self-esteem, whereas those who had their behavior justified, based on the perception that they felt threatened by immigrants, did not feel significant shocks in their self-esteem. However, at the time, the authors already offered participants justifications based on a threat (symbolic or realistic). Yet, these studies did not assess whether people are motivated to spontaneously produce justifications and whether any justification works to restore self-esteem.

In the present article, we intend to clarify such questions. Specifically, we propose that: (H1) in the context of an egalitarian norm (Crandall et. Al., 2002; Sherif, 1936), aiming at ensuring a positive self-concept (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), people seek to present themselves as just in such manner that, if they are shown they acted in a racist manner, these individuals experience a dissonance caused by the perception of incongruity between their

non-racist self-concept prescribed by the anti-racism norm and the information that they exhibit racist behavior. This dissonance is reflected in a decrease in self-esteem (Pereira et al., 2018). (H2): When public image is threatened, people react by defending themselves (Lisjak, Lee, & Gardner, 2012) and by using justifications to protect their self-esteem (Pereira et al., 2018). (H3): The effect of becoming aware of racism should occur only in the most egalitarian people. (H4): The impacts of becoming aware of the racist nature of behavior on self-esteem are more easily implicitly expressed as people are motivated to publicly deny that they are shaken (Lupien et al., 2010). Finally, (H5): Individuals who perceive themselves to be under the pressure of the anti-prejudice norm will have shaky self-esteem at the very moment they perceive themselves as racist, since there is evidence that variations in the strength of the norm and, consequently, in the impact that the perception on this force has over behavior (Gelfand et al., 2017).

Overview of Studies

To test our hypotheses, we carried out five experiments. For the first, we assessed whether racist self-presentation negatively impacts people's self-esteem and whether the mere act of elaborating justifications mitigates that impact. Specifically, we analyzed whether the elaboration of any kind of justifications is sufficient to protect the public (explicit self-esteem) and personal image (implicit self-esteem) of people when they become aware that they are racist. For the second experiment, we tried to replicate Experiment 1 using a different measure of implicit self-esteem. For Experiment 3, we assessed whether the effect identified in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated in another cultural context (i.e., in Spain). The fourth experiment, in addition to replicating the findings of the previous ones, assesses the moderating role of egalitarian values. Finally, Experiment 5 assesses the effect of perceiving the strength of the anti-racism norm in this relationship.

Experiment 1

People are motivated to maintain a positive self-image (Lupien et al., 2010) and tend to use self-defensive strategies when being exposed to situations where their self-concept is questioned (Leitner et al., 2014). In fact, it has recently been proven that justifications play a protective role in self-esteem whenever people perceive themselves as racist, that is, when they become aware of their prejudiced behaviors (Pereira et al., 2018). Individuals recover quickly or dampen the negative effect on their self-esteem when they have a justification for their behavior. However, while the effective role of this ego-defensive strategy is recognized, it is not known whether the elaboration of justifications is a spontaneous mechanism that people use whenever they feel threatened regarding their self-concept. In addition, there is no evidence in the literature about differences between these fluctuations in implicit and explicit self-esteem. In order to fill these gaps, we developed an experimental study, in which we compared the scores of implicit and explicit self-esteem before and after the participants received the results of a test that supposedly measured their implicit racial prejudice. Particularly, we aimed to analyze the impact on the self-esteem of the participants who receive feedback describing their behavior as racist. Our hypothesis is that these participants experience a negative impact on their self-esteem, which should not occur in a control condition, where the feedback indicates that the results of the prejudice test are inconclusive. That is, in the first case, people are led to a very negative self-presentation in relation to what is normative and, having a control condition, they do not receive this information. In addition, participants were also randomly assigned to two groups, one which the opportunity to justify the feedback received is given, and the other in which it is not possible to justify. Our hypothesis is that when individuals justify themselves is enough to mitigate the negative impact of becoming aware that you are racist.

Method

Participants. The sample size was defined *a priori* from *WebPower* (Zhang & Yuan, 2018) taking into account a median effect size [$f = .30$, corresponding to a $d = .60$ (Cohen, 1988). Using as *standard parameters of $\alpha = .05$ and test power $\beta = .80$* (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996)]. Therefore, this study includes 200 university students from different undergraduate courses from two public higher education institutions located in the municipality of João Pessoa - Paraíba, the majority being men (51.5%), single (93.5%), middle class (43%) and who declared themselves to have a skin color other than black. The participants' ages ranged between 18 and 39 years, with an average of 21.14 years ($SD = 3.96$).

Measure of explicit self-esteem. We used the short version of the state self-esteem scale, which was developed by Heatherton and Polivy (1991) and adapted to the Brazilian context (Brito, Pereira, Santos, & Nery, submitted). This measure has been sensitive to manipulations designed to temporarily alter self-esteem, consisting of 12 items (e.g. I feel confident about my abilities), which is answered on a *Likert* scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me) to 5 (describes me much). The items are organized in a *Bifactor* structure, containing a general factor and three specific factors which are correlated: academic performance (4 items, $\alpha = .69$), social success (4 items, $\alpha = .85$), and physical appearance (4 items, $\alpha = .71$).

Implicit measure of self-esteem. We use the *Name-Liking Scale*, which is an implicit measure of self-esteem, developed by Gebauer et al., (2008). Originally it consists of a single item (How much do you like your name?) which is answered according to a *Likert* scale ranging from 1 (I do not like it) to 9 (I like it a lot). We adapted the instrument and included two more items ("How much would you like to change your name?" and "If you could have chosen your own name, would you have chosen the one you have or another one?") which

were also answered on the same response scale as the original item. The General Factor (*Engelvalue* = 2.108; explained variance 70.27%) of implicit Self-esteem was composed by three items (factorial loads: item 1 = .770, item 2 = - .758, item 3 = .705) that presented adequate reliability ($\alpha = .77$).

Procedures. The experiment consisted of two phases, both face to face, in a classroom setting, with an interval of one week between the two phases. In the first phase (T1), participants were given a Free and Informed Consent Term, in which some information about the purpose of the study was made available in addition to ensuring the voluntary and anonymous nature of participation. After accepting to collaborate voluntarily, data collection was started. Participants started the experiment by responding to self-esteem measures (implicit and explicit). Soon after, they responded to a paper version of the IAT where all participants categorized a list with 60 words (positive vs. negative) and categories (names of black and white people) in two blocks (compatible and incompatible) during a time interval set at 30 seconds for each block. In the second phase (T2), we started by informing the participants that the objective was to present their performance at the IAT they had performed in the first phase. The experimental manipulation took place through false feedback delivered to each participant. For half of the participants, false feedback indicated that they had levels of prejudice and tendency to discriminate much higher than the Brazilian population average, while the other half (control condition) received feedback that the test results were not conclusive. In addition, the participants were also randomly distributed between two conditions which we manipulated the possibility of justification ("justification" vs. "without justification"). In the "justified" condition, the participants had the possibility to justify the *feedback* received, pointing out possible reasons why they obtained the results presented in the *feedback* on their behavior. After justification, self-esteem (implicit and explicit) was assessed again. In the condition "without justification", it was not possible to justify, allowing

self-esteem (implicit and explicit) to be measured right after receiving feedback on the test result. At the end, the manipulation check and *debriefing* were carried and that was when the objective of the study was explained to the participants. Thus, the design of this study was a type 2 factorial (time: T1 vs. T2) x 2 (*feedback*: racist vs. non-racist) x 2 (justification: with justification vs. without justification.)

Data analysis. After removing 25 extreme outliers (i.e., $\pm 3DP$ beyond the average) the sample was composed of 173 participants randomly distributed among the conditions. SPSS statistical software version 21 was used to perform repeated measure factorial ANOVA, of drawings 2 (measurement time: T1 x T2) x 2 (feedback: racist vs. control) x 2 (justification: without justification x justification), where the first factor is within-participants and the last two are between-participants. The dependent variables are the measure of implicit self-esteem and the measure of explicit state self-esteem.

Results

Implicit self-esteem. The results of the mixed factorial ANOVA with repeated measures demonstrated that the main effect of time was significant, $F(1,169) = 5,326, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .03$, indicating that the mean of self-esteem in T2 ($M = 7.43, SE = .12$) was lower than in T1 ($M = 7.58, SE = .11$). The main effect of justification was also significant [$F(1,169) = 4,802, p = .03, \eta^2_p = .03$]. These effects were not qualified by any significant interaction, even though the predicted triple interaction was the one that came closest to the desired significance, $F(1,169) = 2,325, p = .12, \eta^2_p = .01$. Although this interaction was not significant, we decided to analyze the influence of feedback and justifications using contrasts which were planned based on previously planned hypotheses, *One-degree-of-freedom-contrast* (Judd et al., 1995), which usually has a lot more testing power than the analysis of *omnibus test full designer*. These analyzes revealed that racist feedback only impacted the

participants' self-esteem when they could not justify (Figure 1) the result received, so that the self-esteem was lower in T2 than in T1 (see Table 1), $b = -.24$, $SE = .10$, $p = .02$, $d = -.09$.

On the other hand, when the participants could justify the result of the racist feedback they received, the impact on self-esteem did not occur (Figure 1), $b = -.16$, $SE = .12$, $p = .17$, $d = -.05$. That is, the justifications dampened the effect of feedback on self-esteem. Furthermore, there were no variations in self-esteem when the test result did not give conclusive information - control group (see Table 1).




Figure 1. Mean differences of implicit self-esteem (T1 and T2) between conditions.

Table 1.

Means and standard errors (in parentheses) of implicit and explicit self-esteem in each experimental condition, before (T1) and after (T2).

		Control Condition						Racist Feedback					
		No Justification		Justification		Total		No Justification		Justification		Total	
		T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2
Implicit Self-esteem	<i>Liking Name Scale</i>	7.09 (.20)	7.10 (.21)	7.82 (.25)	7.70 (.25)	7.45 (.16)	7.40 (.17)	7.54_a (.17)	7.31_b (.18)	7.77 (.19)	7.70 (.19)	7.66 (.13)	7.50 (.13)
	Academic Performance	3.54 (.13)	3.65 (.12)	3.23_a (.16)	3.48_b (.15)	3.38 (.10)	3.56 (.10)	3.64 (.10)	3.68 (.10)	3.39 (.11)	3.46 (.11)	3.51 (.07)	3.57 (.07)
Explicit Self-esteem	Social Success	3.47 (.16)	3.48 (.16)	3.40 (.20)	3.47 (.19)	3.43 (.13)	3.47 (.12)	3.29_a (.13)	3.15_b (.12)	3.10 (.14)	3.12 (.14)	3.19 (.10)	3.13 (.09)
	Physical Appearance	3.28 (.13)	3.35 (.13)	3.27 (.16)	3.20 (.16)	3.27 (.10)	3.27 (.10)	3.34 (.10)	3.36 (.10)	3.21 (.11)	3.11 (.11)	3.28 (.08)	3.23 (.08)
	Total score	3.43 (.10)	3.49 (.10)	3.30 (.13)	3.38 (.13)	3.36 (.08)	3.44 (.08)	3.42 (.08)	3.40 (.08)	3.23 (.09)	3.23 (.09)	3.33 (.06)	3.31 (.06)

Note: Lines with distinct subscripts are statistically different in the planned contrasts, with $p < .05$. Means with different superscripts are marginally significant, with $p = .08$.

Explicit self-esteem. Besides assessing the variability of implicit self-esteem, the explicit measure of state self-esteem was also taken into consideration, composed of three dimensions and a total score. Regarding the academic performance dimension, it was observed that the main effect of time was significant $F(1,173) = 8,063, p = .00, \eta^2_p = .04$, indicating that the participants expressed more positive self-esteem in T2 ($M = 3.57, SE = .06$) than in T1 ($M = 3.45, SE = .06$). The main effect of justification was also significant [$F(1, 175) = 4,098, p = .04, \eta^2_p = .02$], demonstrating that the participants had lower self-esteem when justifying ($M = 3.39, SE = .09$) than that when not justified ($M = 3.63, SE = .07$). No other main or interaction effects were significant. Despite that fact, we explored the differences between the various conditions in order to see what motivated the increase in self-esteem from T1 to T2 and the unexpected effect of justifications in decreasing self-esteem (see Figure 2). We did this through planned contrasts, which indicated that when participants received feedback describing them as non-racist and also justified their self-esteem was higher in T2 than in T1, $b = .25, SE = .11, p = .02, d = .13$. No other contrast was significant for this type of self-esteem.




Figure 2. Mean differences in academic performance self-esteem (T1 and T2) between conditions.

As for the dimension of *social success*, we found that the main effect of discrimination was marginally significant $F(1,173) = 3,308, p = .07, \eta^2_p = .02$, revealing that the average of the participants was lower when they received feedback that they were racist ($M = 3.27, SE = .12$) than when receiving neutral feedback ($M = 3.35, SE = .10$). Again, the interactions were not significant, however, the planned contrasts indicated that that main effect occurred due to the fact that only the participants who received racist feedback, and who had no opportunity to justify, had a decrease in their self-esteem in the dimension of social success (Table 1) from T1 to T2 (Figure 3) $b = -.14, SE = .08, p = .09, d = -.08$.




Figure 3. Mean differences in self-esteem of social success (T1 and T2) between conditions.

In the *physical appearance* dimension and in the *total score of the scale*, we did not observe any statistically significant effect in any of the conditions.

Discussion

The results showed empirical evidence which is consistent with our first hypothesis by demonstrating that people have diminished their self-esteem when they become aware that they are racist. This effect was observed in an implicit measure of self-esteem and partially in the dimension of social success of state self-esteem explicitly measured. Furthermore, we also confirm the assumption that people, when given the opportunity, spontaneously develop

justifications as a self-defensive reaction when they feel threatened. Namely, justifications act as protectors of self-esteem (Pereira et al., 2018), especially when people have their public image threatened.

With regard to fluctuations in self-esteem detected explicitly, in other words, a reflection of changes in public image, only the social success dimension was impacted by racist feedback. Although it was not previously assumed, it is possible to understand this result since the dimension of social success concerns a component of self-esteem that is anchored in how people consider they are valued and appreciated by others (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Therefore, by perceiving themselves as having violated the anti-racist norm without being able to justify this violation, people have explicitly demonstrated to be concerned with what others think about them. On the other hand, the participants were not shaken in the same dimension as when they could justify, since the justifications dampened the effect of racist feedback.

We also confirmed with the results of this experiment our assumption about the impacts caused by the negative feedback appear mainly in an implicit way. Specifically, we have advanced in understanding the self-defending role of justifications by demonstrating that they act not only to protect people's public image (Pereira et al., 2018), but also to avoid internal discomfort caused by a threat to their private image (Lupien et al., 2010). This assumption was consistent with the results that showed the participants who received racist feedback, but could not justify it, demonstrated a decrease in implicit self-esteem, whereas when they received the same feedback, but could justify it, so they were not impacted. However, additional evidence is still needed to better clarify these paths of the relationship between justifications and implicit or explicit self-esteem. Aiming to accomplish this purpose, we carried out Experiment 2.

Experiment 2

In this study, we seek to replicate the findings of Experiment 1, gathering additional evidence on the role of justification of prejudice as a self-protective action of self-esteem and advancing the explanation of the phenomenon by assessing whether the hypotheses are confirmed with a new sample and by using a different measure of implicit self-esteem. Therefore, Study 2 sought to test the hypotheses that (H1), when receiving feedback that they have racist attitudes, people have their self-esteem affected; (H2) when they can act to justify their attitudes, their self-esteem is not affected by the information that one is racist; and (H3) the impacts of racist feedback on self-esteem are identified, above all, in an implicit manner, as people may be motivated not to publicly demonstrate that they are shaken, which may imply attenuation in the expression of the impact by raising the awareness that one is racist in the public demonstration of a shaky self-esteem. To test these hypotheses, we again manipulated the possibility of justifying racist self-presentation, the participants were randomly distributed between two experimental conditions, one in which it was possible to justify (with justification) and another in which it was not possible (without justification). Self-esteem was measured before and after receiving feedback of being racist, comparing the two experimental groups at one-week intervals.

Method

Participants. As in Experiment 1, we defined the sample size *a priori* [WebPower (Zhang & Yuan, 2018) taking into account a median effect size $f = .30$, corresponding to $d = .60$ (Cohen, 1988)]. We had 102 university students from the Psychology program from a public university in João Pessoa - Paraíba, predominantly female (75.5%), aged between 18 and 41 years old ($M = 21.11$; $SD = 4.73$), single (92%), who declared themselves to have skin other than black and who considered themselves to be middle class (46.1%).

Implicit self-esteem. We used a behavioral measure of implicit self-esteem: *Signature Size*. It is an implicit measure widespread in the literature (Zweigenhaft, 1977; Zweigenhaft & Marlowe, 1973) for detecting oscillations at the private level through the size of the space on a sheet of paper that people use to write their name. The psychological principle which is implicit in the measure is that the greater the space used to write your own name, the more positive the self-esteem of the person who signed it. The measurement corresponds to the area used in the signature, calculated by multiplying the height and width of the space used and then taking the product to the second power, in centimeters, to linearize the values obtained.

Explicit self-esteem. We used the same measure as in Study 1 (Brito et al., Submitted). The responses ranged from 1 (it does not describe me) to 5 (it describes me a lot). The items were organized in a *Bifactor* structure, with a general factor and three specific factors correlated: *academic performance* (4 items, $a = .69$), *social success* (4 items, $a = .85$) and *physical appearance* (4 items, $a = .71$).

Procedures. We carried out the same procedures as in Study 1. Data collection took place in person, in a classroom setting, with an interval of one week between Phases 1 and 2. In Study 2 we did not have a control group, only two experimental groups, one where the participants had the opportunity to justify and the other where that was not possible. Thus, the design of this study is 2 (times: T1 vs. T2) x 2 (Justification: with justification versus without justification), the first factor being within-participants, and the second between-participants.

Data analysis. After excluding 17 extreme outliers ($\pm 3DP$ beyond the average) and selecting only the participants who correctly answered the manipulation check, the sample was composed of 85 people, with 43 of them composing the condition “without justification” and 42 others were under the condition “with justification”. To proceed on with the analyzes, we used the SPSS statistical software in its version 21, with the accomplishment of factorial

ANOVAs with repeated measures applied to drawings 2 (measurement time: T1 x T2) x 2 (justification: without justification versus justification), having as dependent variables, the implicit self-esteem and the explicit state self-esteem measures.

Results

Implicit self-esteem. The results of the factorial ANOVA demonstrated that the effect of the double interaction Time * Justification was significant [$F(1.82) = 6,632$; $p = .01$, $\eta^2_p = .07$]. That indicates feedback that the participants received affected the participants' self-esteem differently depending on the experimental condition to which they were allocated (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Implicit self-esteem mean measured from signature size before (T1) and after (T2) receiving racist feedback across experimental conditions.

As it is possible to observe, the participants increased the implicit self-esteem due to the justified condition, that is, when explaining the reasons that led to the test result, they felt better than they were before receiving the feedback; so, these results were statistically

significant. On the other hand, when they did not have the opportunity to justify the feedback (condition without justification), although it was not statistically significant ($p = .14$), there was a difference consistent with our hypotheses as the participants' self-esteem decreased.

To deepen the analysis, we performed a Covariance Analysis (ANCOVA), using the justification manipulation (with versus without justification) as an independent variable, being a dependent variable the Signature Size in T2 and, as a covariate, the Signature Size in T1. The results showed the significant main effect of the justifications, [$F(1.81) = 9.487, p = .003, \eta^2_p = .11$], so that the participants had higher self-esteem regarding the justified condition ($M = 2.81, SE = .09$) than the condition without justification ($M = 2.45, SE = .08$). As the interaction between manipulation and self-esteem measured at T1 was not significant, the initial self-esteem (high or low) did not influence the effect of manipulation, $F(1.81) = 1.083, p = .30, \eta^2_p = .01$.

Explicit self-esteem. Then, we performed Variance Analysis again with the same type of design, however, using the dimensions and the total score of the explicit self-esteem as dependent variables. None of the effects, neither the main nor the interaction ones, were significant, which means that the participants explicitly demonstrated that they were not affected by the feedback indicating that they were racist. The averages, in general, did not change over time (T1 vs T2) as we can see in Table 2.

Table 2.

Means and standard errors (in parentheses) of implicit and explicit self-esteem in each experimental condition, before (T1) and after (T2).

		No Justification		Justification		Total	
		T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2
Implicit Self-esteem	Signature Size	2.56 (.86)	2.42 (.72)	2.63_a (.70)	2.84_b (.81)	2.60 (.78)	2.63 (.79)
	Academic Performance	3.52 (.13)	3.52 (.14)	3.41 (.13)	3.35 (.14)	3.46 (.09)	3.44 (.09)
Explicit Self-esteem	Social Success	2.59 (.17)	2.59 (.17)	2.82 (.17)	2.82 (.15)	2.71 (.12)	2.68 (.11)
	Physical Appearance	3.17 (.14)	3.17 (.13)	3.23 (.14)	3.10 (.14)	3.20 (.10)	3.14 (.10)
	Total score	3.09 (.11)	3.07 (.10)	3.15 (.11)	3.09 (.11)	3.12 (.07)	3.08 (.07)

Note: Lines with distinct subscripts are statistically different in the planned contrasts, with $p < .05$.

Discussion

The results of Experiment 2 offer additional evidence for the influence of the mere act of justifying the protection of people's self-esteem when they become aware of having racist attitudes. Consistent with previous work (Leitner et al., 2014), and with the results of Study 1, we observed that when people received negative feedback about their discriminatory behavior against black people, they showed to have a shaky self-esteem. Although not statistically significant, they went in the direction which was expected according to our hypotheses.

With regard to our assumption about the motivation that people have to not explicitly demonstrate concussions (i.e., Lupien et al., 2010), in Experiment 2 we observed evidence that meets this assumption since none of the dimensions, including social success, obtained significant effects, even when it was not possible to justify it. This evidence demonstrates that there are gaps to be filled when addressing the role of justifications regarding the self-esteem

of discriminators, since although there is no total consistency in the results of Studies 1 and 2, we can perceive a unique direction in the sense that justifications have the capacity to protect people's self-esteem in situations where they become aware of their racist attitudes. We can consider the possibility of explanations based on the control of other variables to better understand the pattern of expressing or not shaking explicitly. In order to answer these questions and offer more robustness to the construction of the central argument of this thesis and of our hypotheses, we carried out Experiment 3 which again tests the hypotheses presented so far in another context (i.e., Spain).

Experiment 3

Study 3 sought to replicate the results of Study 2, once more, testing the hypothesis about the ego-protective role of justification of prejudice when people are led to believe that they are racist (Pereira et al., 2018). However, this study differs from Study 2 in three aspects. The first is that it uses a different measure of implicit self-esteem (Gebauer et. Al., 2008). The second is that it assesses self-esteem (implicit and explicit) in a very short period of time, different from previous studies in which self-esteem was measured over a week interval. On this occasion, the two phases took place on the same day with a few minutes between phases 1 and 2. The third aspect is the fact that the study was carried out in a different cultural context. We carried out the study in Madrid - Spain, socially marked by the persistence of discrimination against minority groups whose situation maintains historical asymmetric intergroup relations, (González - Castro, Ubillos, & Ibáñez, 2009; Solé & Parella, 2003) and which also allowed us to diversify the target population and consider the possibility that the phenomenon we studied is not a peculiarity of the Brazilian context. Therefore, we can gather evidence that enhances the defense of the argument that both racist feedbacks undermine people's self-esteem and justifications mitigate this effect. The

experiment took place in a classroom setting, however, with the use of computers and online realization on the *Qualtrics* platform.

Method

Participants. After determining the sample size [*WebPower* (Zhang & Yuan, 2018) taking into account a median effect size ($f = .30$, corresponding to $d = .60$ (Cohen, 1988), Standard parameters of $\alpha = .05$ and *test power* $\beta = .80$ (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996)], we have the participation of 137 university students from Madrid – Spain whose average age is 19.35 years old ($SD = 2.52$) and mostly female (56.9%).

Instruments. The same measures as in Studies 1 and 2 were used. To assess implicit self-esteem, we used the Name-Liking Scale (Gebauer et. Al., 2008) with adaptations (Engeivalue = 1,867; explained variance = 62.22%; $a = .69$ (factorial loads : item 1 = .789, item 2 = - .569, item 3 = .623). Since it was done online, it was not possible to measure the size of the participants' subscription.

Procedures. The experiment consisted of the replication of Study 2, however, some changes were made. Data collection took place face to face, in a classroom setting, however, it was carried out on the *Qualtrics* online platform. Participants took the IAT of racial prejudice and they received feedback with no gap of one week between the two phases, as it has been done in previous studies. Implicit and explicit self-esteem was measured before and after racist feedback. Finally, manipulation checks and debriefing were performed. The duration took an average time of 30 minutes.

Data analysis. Initially, six invalid cases (participants in the justification condition who did not issue justifications) and 18 extreme outliers (in at least one measure) were removed from the database. The sample resulted in 113 participants, 61 of them being in the unjustified condition while 52 individuals were in the justified condition. Then, we performed

repeated measure factorial ANOVAs, drawing 2 (measurement time: T1 x T2) x 2 (justification: without justification versus with justification), with self-esteem measures as the dependent variable.

Results

Implicit self-esteem. The results showed that the main effect of time was significant [$F(1,111) = 12,337; p = .00, \eta^2_p = .10$]. *Id est*, racist feedback impacted the participants' self-esteem, where the average self-esteem in T2 ($M = 7.51, SE = .14$) was lower than in T1 ($M = 7.77, SE = .12$). More importantly, we observed that the effect of the double interaction time * justifications was marginally significant [$F(1,111) = 2,868; p = .09, \eta^2_p = .02$]. The decomposition of this interaction indicates that the average of participants in T2 ($M = 7.61, SE = .18$) was lower than in T1 ($M = 8.0, SE = .16$) when they were unable to justify (Figure 5), $b = -.39, SE = .10, p = .00, d = -.22$. Participants who had the opportunity to justify the result did not suffer significant shocks in their self-esteem, $b = -.13, SE = .11, p = .22, d = -.06$.




Figure 5. Mean differences in implicit self-esteem between T1 and T2 in each experimental condition.

Explicit self-esteem. Regarding the dimensions and the total score of explicit self-esteem, the results demonstrated the absence of main effects and of statistically significant interaction (Table 3).

Table 3.

Means and standard errors (in parentheses) of implicit and explicit self-esteem in each experimental condition, before (T1) and after (T2)

		No Justification		Justification		Total	
		T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2
Implicit Self- esteem	Liking Name	8.00_a (.16)	7.61_b (.18)	7.53 (.17)	7.40 (.20)	7.76 (.11)	7.50 (.14)
	Academic Performance	3.79 (.08)	3.74 (.09)	3.82 (.08)	3.86 (.10)	3.80 (.06)	3.80 (.07)
Explicit Self- esteem	Social Success	3.47 (.12)	3.42 (.14)	3.38 (.14)	3.42 (.15)	3.43 (.09)	3.42 (.10)
	Physical Appearance	3.50 (.09)	3.44 (.10)	3.65 (.10)	3.61 (.11)	3.57 (.07)	3.52 (.07)
	Total score	3.59 (.07)	3.53 (.08)	3.61 (.08)	3.63 (.09)	3.60 (.05)	3.58 (.06)

Note: Lines with distinct subscripts are statistically different in the planned contrasts, with $p < .05$.

Discussion

The results of Experiment 3 proved that, as in Brazil, the Spanish context presented the indication that a racist self-presentation negatively impacts the participants' self-esteem (Pereira et al., 2018). In addition, similar to the results found in Study 1, only when people did not have the opportunity to justify this self-presentation, oscillations were noticed, suggesting that justifications protect people's self-esteem when they perceive themselves as discriminators. Once again, the results are in line with our proposal that there is a motivation from people who tend not to demonstrate the shakes in their self-esteem explicitly (Lupien et al., 2010). Although the results show empirical evidence for our hypotheses, there are some important gaps that need to be overcome. For example, there is the presence of intermittency in the expression of shakes in an explicit manner among the results of the Studies. In order to better understand the conditions in which these effects occur, we developed Experiment 4 to test hypothesis 4, that is, to assess whether individual differences in endorsement by

egalitarian values play a role in the relationship between racist self-presentation and self-esteem.

Experiment 4

In the view of the results from previous studies, an additional question was raised about the possibility that some psychosocial variable may have an impact on the effect of the ego-defensive role of justifications, which could contribute to a better understanding of the oscillations in the explicit self-esteem we observed throughout the studies. In fact, in Study 1, it was observed that people demonstrated an increase in a dimension of self-esteem when they could justify the fact that they were described as non-racist, as well as presented negative fluctuations in self-esteem when they received racist feedback and could not justify it. In Studies 2 and 3, the effect of racist feedback was not observed explicitly which demonstrates the existence of a factor not yet taken into consideration that may be interfering in the participants' reactions.

In this sense, through the design of Experiment 4, we analyzed the role of participants' adherence to egalitarian values and evaluated whether the expression of oscillations in explicit self-esteem is related to this adherence since previous studies demonstrated the moderating role of egalitarian values in the influence of racist self-presentation (Pereira et al., 2018). Thus, in addition to trying to replicate the results we obtained in previous studies, this research tests the hypothesis that the awareness indicating one is racist is particularly sensitive for more egalitarian individuals, but not for those who value egalitarianism little.

Method

Participants. As in previous studies, we estimated the sample size *a priori* [WebPower (Zhang & Yuan, 2018) taking into account a median effect size ($f = .30$, corresponding to a $d = .60$ (Cohen, 1988) Standard parameters of $\alpha = .05$ and test power $\beta =$

.80 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996)]. Considering the minimum necessary quantity, we had the participation of 196 university students with an average age of 26.7 years old (SD = 8.99), predominantly female (78.6%) who declared themselves having skin color other than black.

Instruments. In addition to the same measures as in previous studies, we use a scale to assess egalitarian values.

Equalitarianism. In T1, we used three items from the revised version of the *Portrait Values Questionnaire* (Schwartz et. Al., 2012) that assess egalitarianism, namely: 1. Protecting weak and vulnerable members of society is important to me; 2. I think it is important that everyone in the world has equal opportunities in life; and 3. I think everyone should be treated fairly, even people I do not know. The items are answered according to a 5-point *Likert* scale, where 1 means “it does not describe me” and 5 means “it describes me strongly”. We grouped the 3 items into a *General Equality Factor* [*Engeivalue* = 1,794, explained variance = 59.79%, (factorial loads: item 1 = .672, item 2 = .600 and item 3 = .619) α = .66].

Procedures. The experiment consisted of replicating the previous studies. Specifically, from Studies 1 and 2 because it took place face to face, in a classroom setting, and in pencil and paper format, with a week interval between T1 and T2.

Data analysis. After removing 57 outliers, the sample consisted of 139 participants, 73 of them in the justified condition and 66 others in the unjustified condition. We calculated covariance analysis (ANCOVA) at drawing 2 (time: T1 vs. T2) x 2 (Justifications: with justifications versus without justifications) by evaluating the role of egalitarian values as a covariate and their interactions with time and manipulation of justifications. The dependent variables were both the measure of implicit self-esteem, as well as the dimensions and total score of explicit self-esteem.

Results

Implicit self-esteem: Liking Name Scale. The results showed that the main effect of Time was significant, that is, the participants' score on the implicit self-esteem varied in the time interval (before and after) referring to receiving feedback on the result of the implicit racial prejudice test [$F(1, 135) = 10.879, p = .00, \eta^2_p = .07$]. Specifically, a decrease in implicit self-esteem between T1 and T2 was observed. Although the predicted triple interaction was not significant [$F(1, 135) = .06, p > .05, \eta^2_p = .00$], we observed the simple effects in each condition (high and low egalitarianism) in order to explore trends in the results (Table 4). We observed that among people with high egalitarianism (Figure 6a), both when they could justify and when they could not, they showed significant decreases in self-esteem. There were no differences in any of the conditions among people with low egalitarianism (Figure 6b).




Figure 6. Differences between means of implicit self-esteem before and after receiving racist feedback in each condition.

Implicit self-esteem: Signature Size. We observed that the effect of the triple interaction was significant [$F(1,135) = 4,128, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .03$]. Namely, people's self-esteem varied according to the type of condition, during the time interval (before and after) and between the different levels of egalitarianism. We have broken down this interaction effect and, as it can be seen in Figure 7, significant differences were observed only in the justification condition between participants with low egalitarianism (-1 SD of the egalitarianism average). Those who were less egalitarian increased implicit self-esteem when they could justify racist feedback (Figure 7b). In the case of people with high egalitarianism

(+1 *SD* of the average egalitarianism), no differences were observed in any of the conditions (Figure 7a).




Figure 7. Differences between means of implicit self-esteem before and after receiving racist feedback in each condition.

Explicit self-esteem. Considering the total score of this type of self-esteem, none of the effects were statistically significant. The same occurred with the dimensions of academic performance and physical appearance. However, a significant effect of the triple interaction (time * justifications * egalitarianism) on the social success dimension was identified [$F(1,136) = 4,998, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .03$]. Specifically, there were negative impacts on this dimension of explicit self-esteem only on people with a higher level of egalitarianism and

when it was not possible to justify racist feedback (Figure 8a), [$F(1,137) = 3,548, p = .06, \eta_p^2 = .02$].




Figure 8. Differences between mean scores of explicit self-esteem of social success before and after receiving racist feedback in each condition.

Table 4.

Means and standard errors (in brackets) of implicit and explicit self-esteem in each experimental condition, before (T1) and after (T2) among people with high and low egalitarianism.

		High Egalitarianism				Low Egalitarianism			
		No Justification		Justification		No Justification		Justification	
		T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2
Implicit Self-Esteem	Signature Size	2.89 (.12)	3.02 (.13)	2.94 (.11)	2.88 (.12)	2.95 (.11)	2.94 (.12)	2.75_a (.11)	2.96_b (.12)
	Liking Name Scale	7.84_a (.27)	7.54_b (.30)	7.76_a (.26)	7.51_b (.28)	7.52 (.24)	7.40 (.26)	7.60 (.25)	7.48 (.27)
	Academic Performance	3.79 (.14)	3.78 (.14)	3.54 (.12)	3.42 (.13)	3.49 (.12)	3.55 (.12)	3.44 (.12)	3.50 (.12)
Explicit Self-Esteem	Social Success	3.37^a (.18)	3.12^b (.18)	3.12 (.17)	3.22 (.17)	3.09 (.16)	3.08 (.16)	3.52 (.17)	3.33 (.16)
	Physical Appearance	3.25 (.15)	3.20 (.14)	3.19 (.14)	3.22 (.13)	3.14 (.13)	3.18 (.12)	3.36 (.14)	3.29 (.13)
	Total Score	3.42 (.13)	3.39 (.12)	3.24 (.12)	3.26 (.11)	3.22 (.11)	3.26 (.10)	3.38 (.12)	3.38 (.11)

Note: The lines with different subscripts are statistically different in the planned contrasts, with $p < .05$. The means with different superscripts are marginally significant, with $p = .06$.

Discussion

The results of Experiment 4 offer evidence to support our hypothesis about the moderating role of egalitarian values in the relationship between racist self-presentation and self-esteem. In particular, they show that it is necessary to know the level of egalitarianism of each person in order to understand how they react to self-perceiving themselves as having racist attitudes. For example, people who showed to be less egalitarian whose racist self-presentation was revealed were not impacted regarding self-esteem, either implicitly or in any of the explicit dimensions. However, only when they could justify, fluctuations were observed in the implicit self-esteem measured by the size of the signature, as people increased their self-esteem after justifying the racist feedback received.

On the other hand, regarding people with greater adherence to egalitarian values, we observe shakes in the explicit self-esteem of social success, only when the participants could not justify, corroborating the findings of Experiment 1. We also observed, unlike all previous studies, concerning people with high egalitarianism, the justifications did not seem to have enough effect to cushion the impacts of racist feedback on the implicit self-esteem, as measured by the *Liking Name*. This suggests that, in addition to the level of people's egalitarianism, there may be some other variable regarding the social context that is important to take into consideration. Aiming to investigate this issue, we designed Experiment 5 in which we assessed the moderating role of the perceived pressure of the anti-racism standard in the effect of justifications on participants' self-esteem.

Experiment 5

In the studies that we have presented so far, we assessed the relationship between awareness of racism and the impacts that this has on self-esteem, in addition to proving the self-defending role of justifications in this relationship. In addition, we revealed that, depending on the level of participants' adherence to the anti-prejudice standard, i.e., the level of egalitarianism, changes in this effect are observed. However, we have not yet assessed the effect of how much pressure the participants feel under this standard on the management of the self-concept of people who become aware of their racist attitudes. When considering previous evidence (Brito & Pereira 2020; Crandall et al., 2003) about the explanatory role that the pressure of the norm has on the expression of attitudes, we tested the last hypothesis (H5) regarding the moderating role of the perception of the norm in management of the self-esteem of a person who becomes aware of being racist and uses justifications to defend himself. In other words, does the pressure of the anti-prejudice norm interfere with how people react when they present themselves as racists? To answer this question, we conducted

Study 5, in which we sought to assess whether the level of normative pressure impacts the relationship between receiving feedback that one is racist, using justifications as a self-defense strategy and managing implicit and explicit self-esteem. In order to do so, we conducted an experimental study with a similar design to Study 4, using a new moderator: the level of perception of the anti-racism norm.

Method

Participants. The sample size was estimated *a priori* [WebPower (Zhang & Yuan, 2018) considering a median effect size ($f = .30$, corresponding to a $d = .60$ (Cohen, 1988) Standard parameters of $\alpha = .05$ and test power $\beta = .80$ (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996)]. We had 156 university students aged between 18 and 46 years old ($M = 19.76$, $SD = 3.73$), most of them were women (65.4%).

Instruments. In addition to the measures of implicit and explicit self-esteem already described in the previous Studies (i.e., Liking Name Scale and SSES), we use a single item to assess the perception of the anti-prejudice norm: How much do you consider young Spanish university students to be racist? Answers were classified on a *Likert* scale ranging from 1 (Very racist) to 5 (Not racist). The higher the value, the greater the perception that racism is anti-normative in Spain.

Procedure. As a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic, data collection took place online on the *Qualtrics* platform. The participants initially answered the item that assessed the perception of the norm, in addition to the implicit and explicit self-esteem scales. Then, they performed the IAT of racial prejudice and later received feedback on the test. The experimental manipulation took place as in previous studies, with two conditions, one which it was possible to justify the test result and another which it was not possible to justify. The

implicit and explicit self-esteem were again measured. Finally, manipulation checks and debriefing were performed. The duration took an average time of 30 minutes.

Data analysis. After removing 8 invalid cases that correspond to participants who missed the Manipulation checks, the sample was composed of 148 participants, 70 of them were in the condition with justification and 78 others in the condition without justification. As in the previous study, we applied an ANOVA to design 2 (time: T1 vs. T2) x 2 (Justifications: with justifications versus without justifications) evaluating the role of the perception of the norm as covariate and its interactions with time and manipulation justifications. The dependent variables were both the measure of implicit self-esteem as well as the dimensions and total score of explicit self-esteem.

Results

Implicit self-esteem: Our results revealed that the effect of the double interaction (time * perception of the norm) was significant, that is, the changes in self-esteem over time (before and after) was moderated by the perception of the norm, [$F(1, 144) = 5.180, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .03$]. The decomposition of this interaction showed that individuals with low perception of anti-racism did not suffer impacts on their self-esteem when they perceived themselves as racist, as there were no significant differences in self-esteem before and after receiving feedback on their racist behavior, both when they could not justify it and when they could justify. Only those individuals with a high perception of anti-racism showed shakes in self-esteem when receiving feedback that they would have racist behaviors, and this occurred only when they could not justify this behavior.

Even though the predicted triple interaction (time * perception of the norm * justification) was not significant, we verified the simple effects in each condition (high and low perception of the anti-prejudice norm) to explore possible effects of justifications on the

participants' response pattern. We observed that among people who perceived the social norm as highly anti-prejudice (Figure 9a), there were significant decreases in self-esteem, only when they could not justify it [$F(1,144) = 5,764, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .04$]. In people with low perception of the anti-prejudice norm (Figure 9b), no differences were observed in any of the conditions.




Figure 9. Differences between means of implicit self-esteem before and after receiving racist feedback in each condition.

Explicit self-esteem. We identified a significant double interaction effect between time and perception of the norm [$F(1,144) = 9,322, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .06$] in the dimension of

academic performance. By decomposing this interaction, we observed that people who did not perceive the norm as anti-racism increased the positivity of self-esteem when they were led to have a racist self-presentation and could justify this self-presentation. In the case of people who perceived the norm as anti-racism, we showed that only when they could not justify racist self-presentation, they had a significant decrease in self-esteem. That confirmed justifications protected their self-esteem from the impacts of racist self-presentation.

Although the effect of triple-time interaction * perception of the norm * justification was also not significant, we decompose the simple effects in each condition and found that among the participants who perceived the norm as anti-racism, only in the condition in which they could not justify they suffered shakes regarding their self-esteem (Figure 10a), $F(1,144) = 3,926$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2_p = .03$. On the other hand, in the participants who do not perceive the norm as anti-racism, we observe changes in self-esteem only in the dimension in which it was possible to justify (Figure 10b), $F(1,144) = 3,865$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. In the total score and dimensions of social success and physical appearance of explicit self-esteem, we did not identify any statistically significant effects (Table 5).




Figure 10. Differences between means on the academic performance dimension of explicit self-esteem before and after receiving racist feedback in each condition.

Table 5.

Means and standard errors (in brackets) of implicit and explicit self-esteem in each experimental condition, before (T1) and after (T2) among people with high and low perception of the anti-prejudice norm.

		High Perception of the norm				Low Perception of the Norm			
		No Justification		Justification		No Justification		Justification	
		T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2	T1	T2
Implicit Self-Esteem	Liking	6.39 _a	6.03 _b	6.41	6.26	7.50	7.67	7.33	7.39
	Name Scale	(.33)	(.34)	(.39)	(.39)	(.36)	(.36)	(.37)	(.37)
Explicit Self-Esteem	Academic Performance	3.40 _a	3.27 _b	3.53	3.44	3.83	3.91	3.61 _a	3.76 _b
		(.12)	(.13)	(.14)	(.16)	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.15)
	Social Success	3.08	3.05	3.02	3.04	3.48	3.52	3.02	3.07
		(.16)	(.18)	(.19)	(.21)	(.18)	(.19)	(.18)	(.20)
	Physical Appearance	3.27	3.27	3.20	3.26	3.58	3.68	3.49	3.56
		(.13)	(.14)	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.15)	(.14)	(.15)
	Total Score	3.25	3.20	3.25	3.25	3.63	3.70	3.37	3.46
		(.11)	(.12)	(.13)	(.14)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)

Note: The lines with different subscriptions are statistically different in the planned contrasts, with $p < .05$

Discussion

In this experiment, the objective was to test hypothesis 5, id est, only people who perceive the norm as anti-racist will suffer self-esteem shocks when they perceive themselves as racists, since there is evidence that there are variations in the strength of the norm and, consequently, the impact that perception about this force has on behavior (Gelfand et al., 2017). Our findings revealed that people who perceive low anti-racism in Spain, that is, those who believe that members of their social group can be racist, demonstrate oscillations in self-esteem only in an explicit way. Specifically, they increased their self-esteem by perceiving themselves as racists and justifying this behavior. Because they felt that their attitude was not so different from the standard of their group (Iacoviello et al., 2017), they did not have their implicit self-esteem affected, that is, they did not feel internal discomfort when they

perceived themselves as prejudiced. On the other hand, people who perceive the social norm as strongly anti-racist, show shakes in their self-esteem, both implicit and explicit, when they receive feedback that they are prejudiced and could not justify themselves. These results confirm our hypothesis that people tend to present themselves positively and in coherence with the norm of the group they are part of (Crandall et al., 2002; Lupien et al., 2010). Specifically, consistent with the way they perceive this standard. In addition, they reveal the importance of strengthening the anti-prejudice norm, because when there is a clear perception that prejudiced attitudes are undesirable and inadequate, people feel shaken in their self-concept both at the implicit level, and demonstrate these concussions at the explicit level. Most importantly, we demonstrated the role of justifications as legitimizing prejudice (Pereira et al., 2018), by showing that they acted as protectors of self-esteem even in people who perceived the norm as strongly anti-racist.

General Discussion

Over five experiments, we provide systematic evidence on how implicit and explicit self-esteem management works in situations of threat to positive self-presentation. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that individuals spontaneously develop justifications to protect their social and personal image, when they are led to believe that they have committed racism. In addition, we show that the self-defending role of justifications works differently depending on the level of egalitarianism of individuals.

In Experiment 1, we observed that the participants expressed shakes in the implicit and explicit self-esteem only when they received feedback indicating that they acted in a discriminatory manner and that these impacts were dampened when they had the opportunity to elaborate justifications for their behavior. Then, in Study 2, we reinforced this evidence using a different measure of implicit self-esteem. In Study 3, we replicated the findings in

another cultural context (i.e. Spain). Finally, in Study 4, we controlled the effect of egalitarian social values and showed that being labeled as a racist person affects the self-esteem of the most egalitarian people, but not the least egalitarian ones. Finally, in Study 5, we assessed the moderating role of the perception of the anti-racism norm in the management of self-esteem.

Some psychological explanations help to better interpret the phenomenon shown in the results we obtained. Initially, it is important to remember that people are motivated to maintain a positive image (Leitner et al., 2014) and that this is achieved when it is consistent with the social norms of the context in which they live (Iacoviello et al., 2017). All the studies that make up the present research program were carried out with individuals who live in a social environment where, in general, racism is anti-normative and that equality is valued as a defined value of the concept of fair people. Therefore, one of the ways to have a positive image would be to perceive oneself as a just, egalitarian and non-prejudiced person. However, the egalitarian norm is only one of the factors that make up social reality; on the other hand, there is a historical heritage that is also internalized by people who relate black people to negative characteristics. These two components are responsible for many psychological conflicts that occur when there is maintenance of prejudiced attitudes and people's struggle to suppress the public expression of such attitudes (Pereira, Alvaro & Vala, 2018). In these cases, the stronger the pressure of the anti-prejudice norm, the more people are motivated to suppress discriminatory conduct (Crandal et al., 2002), having their self-value affected when they fail in this struggle, i.e., when they become aware that are prejudiced. In this context, people are likely to have their self-concept threatened when they become aware that they have negative attitudes against blacks. This was the phenomenon shown in the five studies: the participants expressed less positive self-esteem when they received feedback that indicated they were racist.

In fact, normative sanctions help to reduce the public expression of prejudice (Modesto et al., 2017; Pereira & Souza, 2017). However, people developed strategies that allow them to discriminate and not suffer the negative consequences of this act (Pereira et al., 2018). One of these forms occurs when they use justifications that help them to avoid feeling guilty and ashamed, as well as transforming prejudiced attitudes into non-prejudiced ones.

Faced with dissonant information, people actively justify their behavior in order to resolve the dissonance and thus restore the cognitive harmony between considering themselves a good person in a context in which it is important to be non-racist (Festinger, 1957). One important piece of information in this scenario is that when there is a high level of internalized egalitarianism, people feel the negative impacts of becoming aware that they are prejudiced in their self-esteem, which can lead them to a transformation of such attitudes. On the other hand, when there is not an adequate internalization of equality but instead one acts motivated only by conformity to the anti-prejudice norm, it is the situation where justifications are used to protect oneself and, consequently, contribute to the maintenance of prejudice in society (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This happens because these types of people do not have an internal motivation to eliminate prejudice and promote justice and equality, they just need to preserve a social image that adapts to social norms (Crandall et al., 2002).

Another important issue to discuss is the unexpected result we found about less egalitarian people increasing their implicit self-esteem when they perceived themselves as racists and justified such an act (e.g., in Experiment 4). This observation can be explained from previous research (Iacoviello et al., 2017) that demonstrated that when individuals perceive social reality as pro-discrimination, that is, they interpret that the social norm is pro-racism, when perceiving themselves as discriminators they raise their self-esteem because they believe that this is a behavior consistent with the group they are part of. This means that for these people the pressure of the anti-racism social norm is very weak, or that, from their

perception, the anti-racism norm does not exist. As, indeed, we evidenced in Experiment 5 where only the people who perceived the anti-racism social norm as strong expressed publicly and privately in their self-concept, unlike the people who did not perceive the pressure of the anti-racism norm.

Theoretical implications

Our research provides new theoretical information on psychosocial processes that legitimize discrimination against minority groups. We start from an already consensual idea in the literature that prejudice and discrimination persist to be legitimized in contexts of egalitarian norms (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). In this sense, we emphasize a psychological mechanism that plays an important role in maintaining negative attitudes and behaviors, namely, the use of justifications that seem non-prejudiced (Pereira et al., 2010), to disguise prejudiced conduct. This research is the first experimental demonstration that people actively develop justifications that mitigate the negative impact of becoming aware that one is racist in self-concept.

Another relevant point refers to the content of justifications: denial, projection, and rationalization (Pereira et al., 2010), as we show that not only threat-based justification (Pereira et al., 2018) works as a protective mechanism, but that the simple act of denying, the rationalization, or the shifting of responsibility to society are equally capable of canceling the negative effects of perceiving themselves as racist in the self-esteem of discriminators. We also demonstrate that the most egalitarian people suffer from self-esteem undermines at the implicit level, something innovative and that fills gaps already signaled in previous research (Lupien et al., 2010; Pereira et al., 2018).

In this research program we corroborate a series of theories about how discrimination occurs in contexts that have equality as a socially desirable value. First, our results reflect

theorizations about the contemporary expression of prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; 2005), id est, we demonstrate a specific type of legitimizing strategy of prejudice that provides some individuals that their discriminatory actions do not suffer social sanctions. Second, we prove arguments defended by theories that deal with the legitimacy of social inequalities (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2003), specifically, about the role of the anti-prejudice norm in suppressing discriminatory actions based on normative pressure and how people find ways to disguise prejudiced attitudes (Pereira et al., 2018). Finally, our results are consistent with recent research that attests that discrimination when justified (Pereira et al., 2010; 2018) allows individuals to protect their image and not experience negative feelings associated with discriminatory acts. That is, when justifying prejudiced attitudes, people are not psychologically affected, and consequently, they may believe that it is not necessary to change any aspect of their behavior, making it difficult to face discrimination effectively. In summary, we confirm that the use of justifications works as an important tool in maintaining the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994), that is, in legitimizing prejudice, as it ensures that people do not produce motivations for change and continue to discriminate against black people, despite rules and laws that prohibit this type of action.

Limitations and Future Directions

Although this research program offers relevant contributions, there is still much to be investigated about how self-esteem management occurs in non-egalitarian individuals who are accused of racism and about the self-defending role of the justifications of prejudice in this process. We focused only on identifying the conditions in which racist feedback undermines self-esteem and the effect of justifications in contexts where the accusation of discrimination occurs privately. We do not yet know what happens when accusations of racism occur publicly and whether the need to defend oneself is altered by normative pressure. Since there is already evidence in the literature that people increase the intensity of

self-defense strategies when their public image is threatened, more than when only their private image is accused (Leitner et al., 2014; Lupien et al., 2010). In other words, does the violation of normative prescriptions done in public alter the ego-defensive function of racism's justifications? Based on our results, we assume that there is an increase in the use of justifications in order to guarantee a positive social image; however, only with the development of new research this argument will be able to be proven. It would also be useful for future research to include different social minorities as a group suffering some prejudice, as our research was only concerned with the theme of racial prejudice. Finally, our sample was a limiting aspect, as we only have undergraduate students, which prevents generalization to other socially relevant contexts.

Conclusions

Despite the limitations presented, the phenomenon addressed in this research illuminates paths that help to understand the psychological mechanisms related to the maintenance of prejudice in societies that have equality as a socially relevant value. More generally, our results have shown that justifications are an important tool used by discriminators to camouflage their negative attitudes towards black people. By canceling the effect that a discriminatory action can generate on self-esteem, the possibility of change is neutralized and, consequently, contributes to the legitimization of prejudice. More than that, we specifically demonstrate that this phenomenon occurs more strongly in people who feel the pressure of the anti-racism norm as strong and who have internalized egalitarianism as a value.

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Chapter IV

Discussion

“In a racist society, it is not enough not to be racist. It is necessary to be antiracist.”

Angela Davis

Overview of the findings

Brazil is a country with a broad and consolidated slavery tradition, the consequences of which are seen in the deep social inequalities that are consubstantiated with the color of people's skin. However, an institutionalized discourse that tries to deny the racist nature of these inequalities is promoted with the argument that the official legal system considers and values equality between all before the law. This discourse contradicts everyday reality. We are constantly “surprised” by news that describes situations of blatant racism. For example, “Accused of racism, a woman says: I didn't call him a monkey, I called him an orangutan. Case happened in Rio de Janeiro”. This news published in the year of 2020 in a virtual newspaper of great circulation in Brazil, reflects a social situation that occurs frequently, involving from public figures to “ordinary” people, as is the case of the mentioned article. There is something in common in these situations. In general, there is a white person who uses language full of racism to attack and show how much he devalues a black person. Generally, when being socially sanctioned, the person who is discriminating defends himself, denying the racist content of his behavior. Their defense is generally accepted as fair. Their words are redefined. They no longer configure racism to be conceived as a mere racial injury motivated by the "heat of the moment".

In this thesis, we tried to understand the psychosocial dynamics inherent to this type of situation. Specifically, we seek to know what a person who becomes aware of their racist attitudes feels (implicitly) and demonstrates feeling (explicitly) and, mainly, how they react after this awareness. From a set of 9 empirical studies, organized in 3 articles, we offer paths that can lead to possibilities to answer this question.

The first three studies aimed at evaluating the psychometric qualities of a psychological instrument that measures momentary changes in different dimensions of self-esteem (i.e. academic performance, social success and physical appearance). This set of

studies guaranteed the testing of the main hypotheses of the present thesis, by providing confidence and validity to the results related to the impacts that the explicit self-esteem of people suffered from our experimental manipulations.

The fourth empirical study developed brought us fundamental information: according to a sample of Brazilians who analyzed a list of target groups of prejudice, they indicated that black people are the minority that is most protected by the anti-prejudice standard in Brazil, that is, acts of public discrimination against black people would be the most sanctioned by the anti-prejudice rule in Brazil and, consequently, the impacts of this sanction would be greater on the self-esteem and public image of those who violate the norm. More than that, the results of this study confirmed previous findings (Crandall et al., 2002) about the potential of norms as predictors of attitudes towards minority groups, due to the fact that the participants who realized greater pressure from the anti-prejudice norm, expressed equally positive attitudes to all groups, as they believe it is socially inappropriate to feel prejudice against them.

Supported by this evidence, we carried out a set of 5 experiments, with participants from Brazil and Spain. We use these two contexts, firstly because this thesis is developed in Brazil and therefore intends to clarify questions about Brazilian social reality, and secondly, because the study that supported this thesis was carried out with Spanish participants (i.e. Pereira et al., 2018), therefore, we seek to evaluate the replication of results using a different target group.

Experiment 1 that opened up horizons for the defense of our main argument. The results offered preliminary evidence for our assumption that racist self-presentation negatively impacts self-esteem and that people spontaneously defend themselves from this impact, using a specific type of ego-defensive strategy, the justifications for their discriminatory behavior. In Experiment 2, the participants did not show any shaking in their

self-esteem when they believed that they were racist people, neither implicitly nor explicitly. However, in the participants who were able to justify their racist attitudes, we realized that justification increased the positivity of these participants' self-esteem.

In Experiment 3, the shakes in self-esteem appeared only implicitly. Which led us to raise the hypothesis that there may be variables that are interfering in this management of self-esteem. In addition, we needed to clarify why only participants in Experiment 1 show shakes in their public image (explicit self-esteem). When we carried out Experiment 4, we found that only those participants who highly value egalitarianism were shaken when they were led to believe that they had racist attitudes. This result helped us to clarify an important point to be considered in our main hypothesis: A racist self-presentation will impact the self-esteem of only people who consider egalitarianism to be a socially relevant value. When they become aware that they have racist attitudes, these people have as first reaction the self-defense, since they use justifications as a mechanism to reestablish their self-concept. Finally, Experiment 5 enabled us to take a step further by proving that our main hypothesis just described, would only be true for people who clearly perceive the strength of the anti-racism social norm, leading them to manage their public and private image according to what is prescribed by that standard.

In summary, the set of results we obtained are consistent with our thesis that people who perceive the norm as anti-racist and who value equality as a defining characteristic, feel fragile in their self-esteem (implicit and explicit) when they are led to believe that they are racist and react spontaneously using justifications to protect themselves.

Theoretical and practical contributions

We did not start from ground zero to elaborate the central argument of the present thesis, because in the scope of studies on prejudice, from the perspective of Social

Psychology, relevant advances had been achieved. For example, Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (1982), which assumes that we are all motivated to preserve a positive self-concept and the maintenance of such positive self-concept is provided by group belonging (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Subsequent studies have already shown that the human being, in fact, has a concern for presenting himself positively, demonstrating a public image consistent with what is socially desirable for the group he is part of (Baumeister, 1982). However, when something threatens this positive self-presentation that we try to maintain socially, we react spontaneously, aiming to restore what has been shaken. By using self-defensive strategies in situations where we are made aware of the racist nature of our attitudes, we are prevented from reevaluating our attitudes and behaviors, contributing to feed the prejudice network that still exists.

We assume that people who are led to believe that they have racist attitudes, experience an internal conflict between what is socially desirable (anti-racism norm) and the internalization of negative attitudes arising from the process of historical and social construction of the cultural formation of the Brazil. The awareness of this conflict, which is similar to the concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), and facing it critically, could lead to a change in behavior. However, the most common is the fact that people have a spontaneous reaction to defend themselves when threatened in their self-concept (Lapinski & Boster, 2010; Leitner et al., 2014; Lisjak et al., 2012; Lupien et al., 2010). This reaction nullifies the possibility of reflection, reevaluation and reframing in relation to the meaning and negative impact of their behavior, which on the contrary, will remain active and contribute to the legitimization and continuity of prejudice. On the other hand, we hope that the internal discomfort, caused by the awareness of being racist, will be reflected in the recognition of the racist nature of his acts, and that this may have the potential to promote a transformation/reframing of racist attitudes by the discriminator. Therefore, the

transformation would have the potential to occur from an individual level, to an intergroup level.

However, based on our findings, we can say that this process occurs only for people who recognize equality as a relevant social value and who seek to have that value as a definer of their personal identity. Well, only these people felt the discomfort arising from racist self-presentation. Therefore, only they could reflect on their attitudes, in order to transform them. In fact, the internalization of egalitarian values (Schwartz, 2007) has been a key element in studies on prejudice and discrimination. The level of internalized egalitarianism proved to be an important component to be considered when trying to analyze the dynamics of legitimizing prejudice through the mere act of justifying oneself. On the other hand, considering that the dynamics that permeate the study of prejudice and the understanding of this phenomenon as multidimensional (Dovidio, 2001), understanding the nuances that involve the role of social or contextual variables is essential. On this aspect, we were able to prove the fundamental role of the perception of the norm as anti-racism in the relationship evidenced in the present thesis.

The importance of social norms is a factor present in much of the research on prejudice. For example, Pettigrew (1958) already argued that changes in social norms have the potential to collaborate in tackling prejudice. Later, Crandall et al. (2002) prove that either by normative pressure, or by internalization of the norm, people are motivated to behave according to the way they perceive what is socially prescribed by their group's norm. Our results were consistent with these assumptions, since only people who perceived the norm as an anti-racist had implicit and explicit shocks in their self-concept.

In view of these aspects, we can consider that the present thesis investigated the ego-defensive role of racism justification considering individual (adherence of individuals to egalitarianism) and social (anti-racism norms) and that the results of our experimental studies

converge to suggest that only in more egalitarian people who perceive the norm as anti-racist this ego-defensive strategy works. Since the less egalitarian and who do not perceive the social context in which they are inserted as an anti-racist, they do not feel the need to defend themselves because they do not seem to have their self-concept shaken by feedback that leads them to believe that they are racist. In summary, our findings illustrate processes underlying prejudice that contribute to its legitimation.

Limitations and Future Directions

We recognize that although relevant and theoretically consistent, our results are not without limitations. First, the limitation regarding the profile of the sample of empirical studies, composed exclusively of university students. This characteristic prevents us from elaborating arguments about the ego-defensive role of justifications in different age groups, or at different educational levels. In this sense, more research is needed to systematically investigate whether the effects we have obtained are replicated in individuals of different age groups and educational levels. Second, we use both the experimental manipulation and the instruments to measure the variables, data collection procedures of the "pencil and paper" type, as well as in their digital version in Qualtrics, which may have mitigated the effects of the phenomena that we predict because they are more susceptible to the bias of social desirability. In addition, the strategy we use (i.e., false feedback on racist behavior) may not have been sufficiently convincing to have the impact on people that they believe are really racist.

Another weakness of our experiments was that we were looking to impact people's public image, however, the test result (i.e., racist feedback) was made available to each participant individually, which may not have generated the shock we expected. Finally, we do not control the effect of other implicit ego defense mechanisms that may have neutralized the

impact of feedback from being racist on people's self-esteem. In this sense, we suggest conducting future studies that consider these limitations and advance in explaining the phenomenon that was shown here.

Conclusion

Several factors can contribute to the fact that racism persists in contemporary societies. In the present thesis, we show a legitimating racism strategy that neutralizes, in the discriminating agent, the impacts that an eventual awareness of racism may have on its self-concept. Still, the ego-defensive effect of justifications is not the same for everyone. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of this self-protection varies depending on the level of egalitarianism and the perception of the social anti-racism norm that individuals claim to have.

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Appendixes

Appendix A

Materials used in Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3 of Chapter I

Study 1

State Self-Esteem Scale – SSES (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991)

INSTRUÇÕES. Por favor, marque em cada uma das afirmações abaixo a opção que melhor descreve o modo como você está se sentindo neste momento.

	Não me descreve	Descreve-me muito	Descreve-me pouco	Descreve-me	Descreve-me muito
1. Eu me sinto confiante sobre minhas capacidades.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Estou preocupado (a) se sou visto (a) como uma pessoa de sucesso ou fracasso.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Estou satisfeito (a) com a aparência do meu corpo.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Estou insatisfeito (a) com o meu desempenho.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Estou tendo problemas para entender coisas que eu leio.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Sinto que os outros me respeitam e me admiram.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Estou insatisfeito (a) com o meu peso.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Estou atento (a) ao que os outros pensam sobre mim.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Eu me sinto tão inteligente quanto os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
10. Estou descontente comigo mesmo (a).	1	2	3	4	5
11. Estou bem comigo mesmo (a).	1	2	3	4	5
12. Estou satisfeito (a) com a aparência que tenho.	1	2	3	4	5
13. Estou preocupado (a) com o que as outras pessoas pensam de mim.	1	2	3	4	5
14. Tenho certeza de que compreendo bem as coisas.	1	2	3	4	5
15. Eu me sinto inferior aos outros neste momento.	1	2	3	4	5
16. Sinto-me pouco atraente.	1	2	3	4	5
17. Estou preocupado (a) com a imagem que estou passando para os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
18. Estou com menos competências acadêmicas do que deveria ter.	1	2	3	4	5
19. Sinto-me um fracasso.	1	2	3	4	5
20. Preocupa-me se os outros pensam que sou uma pessoa tola.	1	2	3	4	5

Study 1

Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-21; Schwartz, 2006)

INSTRUÇÕES. Agora, por favor, avalie o quanto cada uma das descrições abaixo se parece com você.

	Não parece comigo	Parece pouco comigo	Parece mais ou	Parece comigo	Parece muito comigo
1. Pensar em novas ideias e ser criativo, fazendo as coisas à minha maneira.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Ser rico, ter muito dinheiro e possuir bens valiosos.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Defender que todas as pessoas, incluindo as que eu não conheço, devem ser tratadas com igualdade e justiça.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Mostrar as minhas capacidades para que as pessoas possam admirar o que faço.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Viver em um lugar seguro, evitando tudo o que possa colocar em risco a minha estabilidade.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Fazer muitas coisas diferentes na vida e procurar sempre coisas novas para fazer.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Defender que as pessoas devem fazer o que lhes mandam, cumprindo as regras em todos os momentos, mesmo quando ninguém está observando.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Escutar as pessoas que são diferentes de mim e, mesmo que não concorde com elas, procurar compreendê-las.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Não pedir mais do que se tem, acreditando que as pessoas devem viver satisfeitas com o que possuem.	1	2	3	4	5
10. Divertir-me sempre que posso, fazendo coisas que me dão prazer.	1	2	3	4	5
11. Tomar as minhas próprias decisões sobre o que eu faço, tendo liberdade para planejar e escolher as minhas ações.	1	2	3	4	5
12. Ajudar e zelar pelo bem-estar das pessoas que me rodeiam.	1	2	3	4	5
13. Ter sucesso e impressionar os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
14. Defender que o país deva estar livre de ameaças internas e externas, protegendo a ordem social.	1	2	3	4	5
15. Correr riscos e procurar sempre novas aventuras.	1	2	3	4	5
16. Comportar-me sempre de maneira apropriada, evitando fazer coisas que os outros consideram erradas.	1	2	3	4	5

17. Estar no comando e dizer às outras pessoas o que elas devem fazer, esperando que cumpram.	1	2	3	4	5
18. Ser leal aos amigos e dedicar-me às pessoas que me estão próximas.	1	2	3	4	5
19. Proteger e preservar a natureza.	1	2	3	4	5
20. Respeitar a crença religiosa e cumprir os mandamentos da sua doutrina.	1	2	3	4	5
21. Apreciar os prazeres da vida e cuidar bem de mim.	1	2	3	4	5

Study 1

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale - RSE (Rosenberg, 1965).

INSTRUÇÕES. Por fim, leia atentamente cada uma das afirmações e indique o quanto você concorda com cada uma delas.

	Discordo muito	Discordo	Concordo	Concordo muito
1. Eu sinto que sou uma pessoa de valor, no mínimo, tanto quanto as outras pessoas.	1	2	3	4
2. Eu acho que eu tenho várias boas qualidades.	1	2	3	4
3. Levando tudo em conta, eu penso que sou um fracasso.	1	2	3	4
4. Eu acho que sou capaz de fazer as coisas tão bem quanto a maioria das pessoas.	1	2	3	4
5. Eu acho que eu não tenho muito do que me orgulhar.	1	2	3	4
6. Eu tenho uma atitude positiva com relação a mim mesmo.	1	2	3	4
7. No conjunto, eu estou satisfeito comigo.	1	2	3	4
8. Eu gostaria de poder ter mais respeito por mim mesmo.	1	2	3	4
9. Às vezes eu me sinto inútil.	1	2	3	4
10. Às vezes eu acho que não presto para nada.	1	2	3	4

Study 2 and Study 3

Short Form of State Self-Esteem Scale – SSES-S

INSTRUÇÕES. Por favor, marque em cada uma das afirmações abaixo a opção que melhor descreve o modo como você está se sentindo neste momento.

	Não me descreve	Descreve-me muito	Descreve-me pouco	Descreve-me	Descreve-me muito
1. Eu me sinto confiante sobre minhas capacidades.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Estou satisfeito (a) com a aparência do meu corpo.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Estou insatisfeito (a) com o meu peso.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Estou atento (a) ao que os outros pensam sobre mim.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Eu me sinto tão inteligente quanto os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Estou satisfeito (a) com a aparência que tenho.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Estou preocupado (a) com o que as outras pessoas pensam de mim.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Tenho certeza de que compreendo bem as coisas.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Sinto-me pouco atraente.	1	2	3	4	5
10. Estou preocupado (a) com a imagem que estou passando para os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
11. Sinto-me um fracasso.	1	2	3	4	5
12. Preocupa-me se os outros pensam que sou uma pessoa tola.	1	2	3	4	5

Study 2

Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988).

INSTRUÇÕES. A seguir você encontrará uma lista com dez estados emocionais. Pedimos-lhe que indique o quanto ultimamente tem experimentado cada um deles marcando um número.

	Nada ou muito	Um pouco	Moderadamente	Bastante	Extremamente
1. Interessado/a	1	2	3	4	5
2. Nervoso/a	1	2	3	4	5
3. Entusiasmado/a	1	2	3	4	5
4. Amedrontado/a	1	2	3	4	5
5. Inspirado/a	1	2	3	4	5
6. Ativo/a	1	2	3	4	5
7. Assustado/a	1	2	3	4	5
8. Culpado/a	1	2	3	4	5
9. Determinado/a	1	2	3	4	5
10. Atormentado/a	1	2	3	4	5

Study 2

Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985)

INSTRUÇÕES. Agora, por favor, leia as afirmações a seguir e indique na escala de resposta ao lado o quanto cada uma descreve sua forma de pensar ou sentir.

	Discordo fortemente	Discordo	Discordo levemente	Nem concordo nem discordo	Concordo levemente	Concordo	Concordo fortemente
1. Na maioria dos aspectos, minha vida é próxima ao meu ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. As condições da minha vida são excelentes.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Estou satisfeito (a) com minha vida.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Dentro do possível, tenho conseguido as coisas importantes que quero na vida.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Se pudesse viver uma segunda vez, não mudaria quase nada na minha vida.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Study 3

Manipulation - Social Success Condition



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
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Qual o perfil de pessoas socialmente desejáveis?

David Schultz and Lilian Ortiz
Harvard University, Cambridge

Alguns atributos são compartilhados por pessoas socialmente desejáveis, como por exemplo, o fato de possuírem muitos admiradores. Um exemplo disso, são as “curtidas” que recebem em suas redes sociais. Em média 500 a 600 likes por publicação na primeira hora após a postagem. Já no âmbito acadêmico, essas pessoas são aquelas que recebem muita atenção dos professores, que parecem dar aula em especial para elas. Outra característica comum nessas pessoas é a grande quantidade de convites para festas de aniversário que recebem, mesmo quando não são tão próximas do aniversariante. Recebem pelo menos um convite por semana. Além dos amigos, o tratamento que os familiares, sobretudo os pais, dão a essas pessoas é sempre de muita atenção e carinho. Por exemplo, quando são solteiras ou ainda moram com os pais, todos os dias ou o pai ou a mãe fica muito feliz e satisfeito em levar o café da manhã na cama para essas pessoas.

Palavras-chave: perfil; pessoas socialmente desejáveis; atributos.



Study 3

Manipulation - Physical Appearance Condition



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
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Qual o perfil de pessoas com boa aparência?

David Schultz and Lilian Ortiz
Harvard University, Cambridge

Alguns atributos são compartilhados por pessoas de alta atratividade, como por exemplo, o fato de serem geralmente altas, em média medindo 1,80. Quanto ao peso, no caso das mulheres é em média 55 quilos, enquanto que os homens pesam em geral 80 quilos. Esse perfil de pessoas atraentes também compartilham o fato de ter dentes muito brancos, brilhantes e simétricos, constituindo um sorriso atraente, mesmo sem que nunca tenham realizado qualquer procedimento odontológico durante a vida. Além disso, sempre recebem convites de agências de modelo, independentemente da idade. Possuem todas as partes do corpo proporcionalmente distribuídas e perfeitas. As mulheres são descritas como delicadas, elegantes, possuem cabelo longo, saudável e brilhante, são sorridentes, espontâneas, doces e não costumam usar maquiagem. Já o perfil de homens atraentes engloba características como: serem fortes, simpáticos, charmosos, inteligentes, cavalheiros, e com senso de humor. Essas pessoas sempre chamam a atenção, independente do ambiente que frequentem.

Palavras-chave: atratividade física; atributos; perfil.



Study 3

Manipulation - Academic Performance Condition



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
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Qual o perfil de pessoas com alto desempenho acadêmico?

David Schultz and Lilian Ortiz
Harvard University, Cambridge

Alguns atributos são compartilhados por pessoas com alto desempenho, como por exemplo, o número de horas dedicadas aos estudos diariamente, o que corresponde a pelo menos 10 horas extraclasse. Outra característica é a fluência em três idiomas diferentes de sua língua materna. No nosso contexto essas pessoas falam além do inglês, outras duas línguas, sobretudo o francês e o alemão. Possuem habilidade para resolver problemas lógico-matemáticos utilizando poucos minutos, ou até mesmo segundos pois na escola as suas notas em matemática e física nunca eram abaixo de 9,5. Também apresentaram um histórico escolar com média superior ou igual a 9,7. Possuem hábitos culturais e literários específicos, tendo como atividade diária de lazer a leitura de romances, poesias, ou a apreciação de obras de arte e música, além de assistir peças de teatro. Além dos textos acadêmicos que são obrigadas a ler, elas normalmente leem mensalmente ao menos dois ou mesmo três romances de escritores clássicos. Por fim, essas pessoas investem em livros e assinatura de revistas científicas.

Palavras-chave: alto desempenho acadêmico; atributos; perfil.



Appendix B

Materials used in Chapter II

Abaixo encontrará uma lista com 16 grupos sociais. Pense sobre cada grupo e selecione os **três grupos** em relação aos quais você acredita que sofrem **menos preconceito**.

- () Bissexuais
- () Desempregados
- () Feministas
- () Gays
- () Índios
- () Lésbicas
- () Militantes
- () Moradores de rua
- () Mulheres
- () Negros
- () Pessoas com deficiência
- () Pessoas com HIV/Aids
- () Pessoas obesas
- () Pessoas Trans (Travestis e Transexuais)
- () Prostitutas
- () Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra

Ainda pensando nos 16 grupos recém citados, classifique-os de acordo com o quanto você gosta de cada grupo. Em cada uma das colunas abaixo, escreva o nome dos dez grupos que você menos gosta de um lado e o nome dos dez grupos que você mais gosta do outro.

8 Grupos que Menos Gosta	8 Grupos que Mais Gosta

Appendix C

Materials used in Study 1, Study 2, Study 3, Study 4 and Study 5 of Chapter III

Study 1, Study 2, Study 3, Study 4 and Study 5

Short Form of State Self-Esteem Scale – SSES-S

INSTRUÇÕES. Por favor, marque em cada uma das afirmações abaixo a opção que melhor descreve o modo como você está se sentindo neste momento.

	Não me descreve	Descreve-me muito	Descreve-me pouco	Descreve-me	Descreve-me muito
1. Eu me sinto confiante sobre minhas capacidades.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Estou satisfeito (a) com a aparência do meu corpo.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Estou insatisfeito (a) com o meu peso.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Estou atento (a) ao que os outros pensam sobre mim.	1	2	3	4	5
5. Eu me sinto tão inteligente quanto os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
6. Estou satisfeito (a) com a aparência que tenho.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Estou preocupado (a) com o que as outras pessoas pensam de mim.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Tenho certeza de que compreendo bem as coisas.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Sinto-me pouco atraente.	1	2	3	4	5
10. Estou preocupado (a) com a imagem que estou passando para os outros.	1	2	3	4	5
11. Sinto-me um fracasso.	1	2	3	4	5
12. Preocupa-me se os outros pensam que sou uma pessoa tola.	1	2	3	4	5

Study 1, Study 3, Study 4 and Study 5

Liking Name Scale adapted (Gebauer et al., 2008)

Por favor, responda as perguntas a seguir, marcando um X no número que melhor representa sua opinião:

1. O quanto você gosta do seu nome?

Muito pouco				Mais ou menos			Gosto muito	
								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

2. O quanto você gostaria de mudar o seu nome?

Muito pouco				Mais ou menos			Gostaria muito	
								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

3. Se você pudesse ter escolhido o seu próprio nome, você teria escolhido o que tem, ou escolheria outro?

Escolheria outro nome				Não tenho certeza		Escolheria o nome que tenho		
								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Study 1, Study 2, and Study 4

Task (IAT racial prejudice) – Congruent

INSTRUÇÕES. Abaixo você encontrará um conjunto de palavras, misturadas com nomes de pessoas famosas. A sua tarefa é classificar cada palavra e cada nome de pessoa. Se a palavra for positiva, marque a coluna da esquerda. Se a palavra for negativa, marque a coluna da direita. De modo similar, se a pessoa famosa for branca, marque a coluna da esquerda. Se for negra, marque a coluna da direita.

**POSITIVA
OU
PESSOA BRANCA**

**NEGATIVA
OU
PESSOA NEGRA**

()

PELÉ

()

()

BARACK OBAMA

()

()

WILLIAM BONNER

()

()

BONITO

()

()

TRISTEZA

()

()

AMOR

()

()

LÁZARO RAMOS

()

()

WILL SMITH

()

()

XUXA MENEGHEL

()

()

DOR

()

()

KAKÁ

()

()

GRATIDÃO

()

()

RAIVA

()

()

GLÓRIA MARIA

()

()

DUNGA

()

()

SHAKIRA

()

()

RONALDINHO GAÚCHO

()

()

ÓDIO

()

()

NELSON MANDELA

()

()

DESESPERO

()

()

INVEJA

()

()

MARINA RUY BARBOSA

()

()

MEDO

()

()

FAUSTÃO

()

()

ALEGRIA

()

()

FEIO

()

()

JOAQUIM BARBOSA

()

()

AMIZADE

()

()

PAZ

()

()

ANGELINA JOLIE

()

()

FELICIDADE

()

()

SUCESSO

()

Task (IAT racial prejudice) – Incongruent

INSTRUÇÕES. Realize a mesma tarefa da página anterior, marque um (X) na categoria em que cada palavra faz parte. Atenção, fique atento às novas categorias.


POSITIVA		NEGATIVA
OU		OU
PESSOA NEGRA		PESSOA BRANCA
()	PELÉ	()
()	BARACK OBAMA	()
()	WILLIAM BONNER	()
()	BONITO	()
()	TRISTEZA	()
()	AMOR	()
()	LÁZARO RAMOS	()
()	WILL SMITH	()
()	XUXA MENEGHEL	()
()	DOR	()
()	KAKÁ	()
()	GRATIDÃO	()
()	RAIVA	()
()	GLÓRIA MARIA	()
()	DUNGA	()
()	SHAKIRA	()
()	RONALDINHO GAÚCHO	()
()	ÓDIO	()
()	NELSON MANDELA	()
()	DESESPERO	()
()	INVEJA	()
()	MARINA RUY BARBOSA	()
()	MEDO	()
()	FAUSTÃO	()
()	ALEGRIA	()
()	FEIO	()
()	JOAQUIM BARBOSA	()
()	AMIZADE	()
()	PAZ	()
()	ANGELINA JOLIE	()
()	FELICIDADE	()
()	SUCESSO	()

Study 1, Study 2, and Study 4

False Feedback – Racist Self-Presentation

Análise dos Resultados

O questionário que você respondeu continha um teste subliminar que **avaliava sua pré-disposição para agir de maneira discriminatória com relação a pessoas negras**. O gráfico a seguir mostra as respostas que você deu a estímulos específicos que serviram para elaborar seu perfil comportamental. Observe o gráfico e leia com atenção a explicação dos resultados.



Os estímulos incluídos nas respostas dadas avaliavam os seguintes aspectos:

- a) O estímulo 1 avalia atitudes discriminatórias contra negros;
- b) O estímulo 2 avalia os motivos que levam a manter tais atitudes;
- c) O estímulo 3 avalia a intenção de discriminar negros no futuro.

A partir da Análise de seus resultados podemos constatar valores elevados tanto em atitudes discriminatórias quanto na intenção de discriminar no futuro. Portanto, seu perfil indica que **você é uma pessoa que tem uma motivação psicológica implícita que faz com as suas ações discriminem pessoas negras. Isto ocorre mesmo quando você acha que não está discriminando.**

Study 3 and Study 5

Examples of IAT Racial Task items – Congruent

Seleccione la categoría correcta.		
Blanco ☐ Palabra Positiva	incompetente	Negro ☐ Palabra Negativa
☐		☐

Seleccione la categoría correcta.		
Blanco ☐ Palabra Positiva		Negro ☐ Palabra Negativa
☐		☐

Study 3 and Study 5**Examples of IAT Racial Task items – Incongruent**

Seleccione la categoría correcta.		
Blanco o Palabra Negativa		Negro o Palabra Positiva
☐	lento	☐


Seleccione la categoría correcta.		
Blanco o Palabra Negativa		Negro o Palabra Positiva
☐		☐

Study 3 and Study 5

False Feedback – Racist Self-Presentation

Análisis de los Resultados

El cuestionario al que ha respondido contenía un test subliminal con el que se evaluó tu predisposición para actuar de manera discriminatoria en relación a las personas negras. El gráfico que te mostramos a continuación muestra las respuestas dadas a estímulos críticos que sirvieron para elaborar un perfil de tu comportamiento. Observa el gráfico y lee con atención la explicación de los resultados.



Los estímulos incluidos en las respuestas dadas evalúan los siguientes aspectos:

- a) Los estímulos 1, 2 y 3 evalúan su prejuicio implícito en contra de las personas negras;
- b) Los estímulos 4, 5 y 6 evalúan los motivos que llevan a mantener estos prejuicios;
- c) Los estímulos del 7 al 10 evalúan la intención de ser prejuicioso en un futuro.

En el análisis de sus resultados podemos constatar niveles elevados tanto en **prejuicio implícito** como la intención de ser prejuicioso en un futuro. Por lo tanto, tu perfil muestra **que eres una persona prejuiciosa en contra de las personas negras**.