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    <title>DSpace Coleção: PPGF</title>
    <link>https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5434</link>
    <description>PPGF</description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 11:37:33 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-09-03T11:37:33Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Vícios epistêmicos: ontologia e responsabilidade</title>
      <link>https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/38864</link>
      <description>Título: Vícios epistêmicos: ontologia e responsabilidade
Autor(es): Leite, Lusandro Oliveira
Orientador: Lopes, Arthur Viana
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to address two central questions in the epistemology of vices:&#xD;
What kinds of things are epistemic vices, and in what sense are vices blameworthy or&#xD;
reprehensible? The choice of this topic is motivated by the philosophical concern that&#xD;
intellectual vices constitute some of the most problematic forms of human behavior. Our work&#xD;
focuses on one of the main strands of contemporary studies in the epistemology of vices —&#xD;
namely, the investigation of their structure, defining characteristics, and impact on knowledge.&#xD;
To this end, in the first chapter we examine an ontological question: What kinds of things are&#xD;
epistemic vices? We aim to provide a diagnosis of the psychology of intellectual vices based&#xD;
on the two leading contemporary theories — obstructionism and motivationism. We then&#xD;
briefly argue in favor of a moderate ontological and normative pluralism, according to which&#xD;
a plural account of what vices are and what makes them bad can overcome certain explanatory&#xD;
shortcomings found in purely motivationist or purely obstructionist approaches. In the second&#xD;
chapter, we turn to the question of what it takes to be properly blameworthy or criticizable for&#xD;
one’s epistemic vices. We begin with an overview of Cassam’s (2019) account, according to&#xD;
which an individual can be responsible — and therefore blameworthy — for a particular vice&#xD;
if (i) his or her past actions led to its development (responsibility of acquisition), or (ii) they&#xD;
have the ability to revise or control that vice but fail to do so (responsibility of revision). A&#xD;
person may also be blameworthy if their epistemic flaws reflect badly on them and constitute&#xD;
a deep-seated quality of their character. We then examine Battaly’s (2019) critique, which&#xD;
highlights a “responsibility problem” in the epistemology of vices: namely, that vices must be&#xD;
reprehensible in some sense, meaning that agents can be blameworthy or guilty in a nonvoluntarist&#xD;
way, even when they are not responsible for having those vices and have no control&#xD;
over them. Finally, we consider a possible solution proposed by Tanesini (2021) to Battaly’s&#xD;
challenge. This proposal yields a disjunctive account of criticizability for possessing an&#xD;
epistemic vice — an explanation inspired by the Strawsonian approach to holding people&#xD;
responsible for their character traits.
Editor: Universidade Federal da Paraíba
Tipo: Dissertação</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/38864</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-08-28T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A dimensão artística da estética corporal a partir de Byung-Chul Han</title>
      <link>https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/38826</link>
      <description>Título: A dimensão artística da estética corporal a partir de Byung-Chul Han
Autor(es): Machado, Bárbara Freire Gratão
Orientador: Caminha, Iraquitan de Oliveira
Abstract: This study seeks to understand the artistic dimension of bodily aesthetics. The aesthetic&#xD;
experience of the body as art, in view of beauty, is constituted through habits that supposedly&#xD;
act as sustaining elements of beauty, from a cognitive and scientific perspective, through&#xD;
techniques based on harmony and proportion, health, and well-being. Thinking of bodily&#xD;
aesthetics as art requires the establishment of two dimensions: the dimension of artisticity and&#xD;
artifical intervention. Bodily care, based on artificial interventions, has been sharply criticized&#xD;
by Byung-Chul Han, who, in Saving Beauty, explores the phenomenon of contemporary&#xD;
aesthetics, interpreting it as an experience characteristic of the aesthetics of smoothness and&#xD;
disaster. Here, the study of beauty linked to bodily care is not considered an issue alien to&#xD;
philosophical aesthetics, nor can it be restricted solely to visagism, makeup techniques, massage&#xD;
therapy, harmonization, or aesthetic nutrition. Nor should this theme become solely dependent&#xD;
on the standards of commercial aestheticism, indifferent to philosophical and scientific&#xD;
reflection on beauty and bodily aesthetics linked to self-care. It is a phenomenological and even&#xD;
existential philosophical problem, as it concerns the phenomenon of corporeality itself and is&#xD;
directly related to self-knowledge and self-care, since bodily aesthetics ultimately becomes one&#xD;
of the fundamental elements of knowing and caring for oneself. Thus, this research poses the&#xD;
following question: Could therapeutic aesthetics be an art that teaches us to see ourselves and&#xD;
others anew, allowing us to deepen our relationship with beauty, the world, and ourselves? To&#xD;
what extent is contemporary bodily aesthetics connected to art as a therapeutic technique, to&#xD;
health as a cultivation of natural beauty, and to interpersonal relationships as an opening to the&#xD;
bodily contemplation of oneself and the other as beautiful? Addressing these aesthetic questions&#xD;
as a philosophical problem through Byung-Chul Han’s perspective is necessary to determine&#xD;
the extent to which bodily aesthetics constitutes an aesthetic treatment linked to artistic&#xD;
sensibility, as it relates to the sensitive, touches sensitivity, awakens the feeling of beauty, and&#xD;
constitutes meaning.
Editor: Universidade Federal da Paraíba
Tipo: Dissertação</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/38826</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-08-29T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A virada retórica implícita de Richard Rorty</title>
      <link>https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/37818</link>
      <description>Título: A virada retórica implícita de Richard Rorty
Autor(es): Santos, Cauim Ferreira das Neves
Orientador: Fontes, Narbal de Marsillac
Abstract: This dissertation aims to attest the implicit affinity of Richard Rorty's neopragmatism with rhetoric. The main goals of this work are: to contextualize and define rhetoric, highlighting the mistaken separation between rhetoric and philosophy, preceded by the anachronistic assimilation between the Sophists' teaching of logos and the rhētorikē created by Plato, correlated with the Sophists' devaluation in contrast to the development of philosophy; to verify the relationship between post-positivist analytical philosophy, and the influence of the linguistic and linguistic-pragmatic turns on the resurgence of rhetoric in 20th century philosophy, and that the radicalization of this movement in analytical philosophy by Rorty's neopragmatism is succeeded by an implicit rhetorical turn.
Editor: Universidade Federal da Paraíba
Tipo: Dissertação</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/37818</guid>
      <dc:date>2023-07-28T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A ética das virtudes e o problema do relativismo moral</title>
      <link>https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/37556</link>
      <description>Título: A ética das virtudes e o problema do relativismo moral
Autor(es): Nascimento, José Rudson Fidélis do
Orientador: Barros, Vitor Sommavilla de Souza
Abstract: The general objective of this work is to examine some discussions on virtues and the&#xD;
problem of relativism in the contemporary philosophical debate. In this sense,&#xD;
considering that, for moral relativism, different cultures incorporate different virtues,&#xD;
the purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate how relativist ethics becomes a&#xD;
problem for Aristotelian virtue ethics, which seeks to offer an objective and universal&#xD;
foundation for human virtues. Therefore, the research aims to answer to what extent&#xD;
human virtues depend on objective foundations of human nature. Thus, the goal is to&#xD;
elucidate the arguments of some of the main neo-Aristotelian proponents of&#xD;
contemporary virtue ethics, such as Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, in an&#xD;
attempt to respond to the problem of moral relativism. In view of this, these authors&#xD;
argue that it is possible to integrate morality into a naturalistic perspective, in order to&#xD;
demonstrate that it is grounded in the nature of human beings, and that this fact is&#xD;
sufficient to justify a universal and objective ethics, making clear that the exercise of&#xD;
virtues does not depend on contingent and subjective factors.
Editor: Universidade Federal da Paraíba
Tipo: Dissertação</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/37556</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-03-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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