Possibilidade de relatórios financeiros fraudulentos e sua relação com a governança corporativa das empresas no Brasil

Abstract

The recent history of financial market reveals huge scandals involving the financial reports of renowned open companies in the international market, which resulted in a confidence crisis in the capital markets all over the world, bringing as consequence the decrease in the credibility of the information extracted from these reports and the rise of the concerns with corporative governance practices of these undertakings. In this context, the present study has the aim to analyze the relation of the Fraudulent Financial Reports’ Likelihood (PRFF) with the corporative governance structure of the open capital companies in Brazil between the years of 2010 and 2015.Therefore, based on the Agency Theory and Disclosure Theory, this work was realized having as sample a total of 208 enterprises with actions negotiated in BM&FBovespa, totalizing 1.890 year-observations (year-comments). The financial-economics data was collected in Thomson Reuters® data bank and the corporative governance data were taken from the Comdinheiro® data base. This research adopted a metric that suggest the Fraudulent Financial Reports’ Likelihood (PRFF), identified from the intersection of the measures of Zscore measures (that measure the bankruptcy predictability) and M-score (that measures the possibility of the enterprise to be manipulative of results). The companies of the sample were segmented with 28,09% classified wit bankruptcy predictability, 23,23% as manipulative enterprises and 11,01% as financial reports fraudster. In regard to Z-score, the variables Administrative Council Independency (ICAD), Administrative Council Remuneration (RCAD), Women Participation in Administrative Council (PMCCAD) and Audit Committee Size (TCA) was evidenced as elements of predictability and bankruptcy reduction. Otherwise, the relation of corporative governance and the M-score, the variables Audit Committee Size (TCA) had negative and significant relation with the possibility of the enterprise to be manipulative. The PRFF has significant and negative relation with the Audit Committee Size (TCA) and Extern Audit Remuneration (RAE), which are directly connected to the elaboration of financial reports, attending the expectative contained in the literature. According to the regressions results using the Bivariate Probit model, the hypothesis that the Corporate Governance structure can cause a reduction in PRFF is not confirmed. Between the main contributions of this study to the academy, stands out its evidence in the Brazilian market, the biggest emergent market of Latin America, collaborating with the reduction of the blank existing in literature on this theme. As for the market, it enables the Brazilian capital market agents to take their own investment decisions with basis on the governance structure, serving, also, the regulatory bodies with reflections about the role of corporative governance.