Conselho de administração, diversidade de gênero e monitoramento

Abstract

In recent years, women have been increasingly inserted in typically male spaces and, in the corporate scenario, a series of efforts have been observed to promote gender diversity within the boards of directors. In this context, the questioning of market agents about the role of women as advisers arises, given the roles of controlling the use of wealth, taking risks, contracting, compensating and monitoring that are attributed. Thus, this research aims to investigate the impact of gender diversity on the monitoring function performed by the boards of directors, observed from the executive remuneration, quality of financial information based on earnings management practice and sensitivity of the CEO's turnover to firm performance. For this purpose, I estimate panel data regressions with a sample of 158 non-financial companies listed on B3 between 2011 and 2018, opting for the estimation of the parameters of the models regarding to executive remuneration and earnings management by GMM-SYS - System Generalized Method of Moments, given the endogeneity of the regressors, and logistic regression for the CEO's turnover analysis. The data analysis showed an average percentage of 8.84% of women in the councils, showing their low representativeness. The results of the estimates indicate that gender diversity on the board, observed from the percentage of women, has a negative effect on the total and variable remuneration of executives and the participation of at least one woman on the board has a negative effect on earnings management. Although it has no direct effect on the CEO's turnover probability, the three gender diversity proxies I used take away the explanatory power of the ROA on this probability, that is, it has an effect on the CEO's turnover sensitivity to the firm's performance, in a way consistent with the expectation adopted in the study that other quantitative and qualitative information would be considered when deciding to replace the CEO in addition to performance. It can be conclude, therefore, that gender diversity on the board improves the effectiveness of the three monitoring functions investigated. I also identified that the return on assets and the presence of independent women on the board positively influence the total and variable remuneration of the executives and the market-to-book positively influences the variable remuneration. The independence of the board, the annual return on shares, the return on assets and the size of the firm have a negative effect on earnings management, whereas the market-to-book has a positive effect on the CEO's probability of turnover. Given the current emphasis on board monitoring, and little empirical evidence on the effects of gender diversity on boards, I hope the results of this research may expand the literature, serving as an instrument for a critical understanding of the implications of potential consequences of the women insertion in these positions, as well as more effective monitoring mechanisms.