A relação do empreendedorismo do gestor e das falhas informacionais com a tolerância do eleitor à corrupção política

Abstract

This research aimed to analyze how manager’s entrepreneurship and informational failures relate to the Brazilian voter's tolerance for political corruption. Based on literature review, a conceptual model was proposed and the research variables were defined. The conceptual model comprises factors related to tolerance for political corruption (TPC): Manager’s Entrepreneurship (ME) and Informational Failures (IF). Regarding the study variables, TPC was defined as dependent, while ME and IF were defined as independent. The sample was comprised of 441 participants, eligible voters, distributed in three groups (G1, G2 and G3). The instrument of data collection was a Survey composed of two parts: scenarios and questionnaire. The scenarios were developed in videos and the participants’ random choice by one of these made it possible to distribute the three research groups. The objective of the scenarios was to determine the intention to reelect political profiles, described as follows: G1 - Scenario 1 - Politician “Neither steals, nor does” / G2 - Scenario 2 - Politician “Steals little, does little” / G3 - Scenario 3 - Politician “Steals, but does”. As for the questionnaire, collection of demographic questions and 15 (fifteen) assertions supported on theoretical bases were carried out. The answers to the scenarios and to the questionnaire’s assertions were on a Likert scale. For the data analysis, descriptive statistics and comparisons between the groups were performed using non-parametric tests, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney, and the Cohen’s d effect size. The results of the study indicate that the groups’ profiles are similar to the average profile of the national voter. The scenarios point to intolerance for political corruption, while in the responses to the assertions the participants of groups G1 and G2 were put into contradictions that revealed a certain margin of TPC. In the comparisons between the G1 and G3 groups, the provision of public goods, of the ME factor, and the less sophisticated voter, of the IF factor, were evidenced as the main statistically significant variables and with moderate effect sizes. Thus, the research concluded that ME are related to TPC motivated by internal voter conflicts (cognitive dissonance and ethical blindness) which boost the judgment of acquired benefits and reduce ethical values, while IFs are related to TPC due to the voter’s irrationality.