A accountability horizontal exercida pela CCAI sobre a atividade de inteligência realizada pela Abin no período 2007-2014

Abstract

The efficacy of the accountability performed by the CCAI represented an indispensable condition to ensure the legitimacy and legality of the State Intelligence activity in a democratic environment. A qualitative research is proposed, through a case study of an unique type, to analyze the effectiveness of the accountability of Congress, carried out in the dimensions and limits of the control and oversight exercised by the CCAI on the Intelligence activity carried out by Abin, between the periods of 2007 and 2014. The analysis of the conceptual framework and historical trajectory in the process of creation and institutionalization of Intelligence activity and the congressional accountability mechanism showed that Intelligence institutions, in general, escape de jure de facto control in democracies that are still in the process of consolidation, as there are incidents in their institutional architectures, both in the way that they are organized and in the content of their practices, which are strongly reactive to parliamentary control. Based on the assumptions of democratic theory and the Intelligence literature, which underlie the action of horizontal accountability in the face of government secrecy, the following criteria were chosen as analysis parameters: normative propositions; control and inspection procedures adopted; and composition. It is concluded, in the analysis of the effectiveness of CCAI's external control and congressional oversight of Abin, that the horizontal accountability exercised by the CCAI is of low effectiveness, proving the raised hypothesis. There was a need to implement an institutional reform in the rules for the composition of the Commission, which includes technical specialization and strategic incentives that promote parliamentary political interest and will.