DEMONSTRAÇÃO E NECESSIDADE NOS SEGUNDOS ANALÍTICOS DE ARISTÓTELES

Abstract

The present work has examined an interpretative divergence concerning what makes necessary the cause pertinent to the notion of episteme developed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. The divergence examined is not characterized, therefore, by a conceptual difference around the notion of 'necessity', but by a difference in reading as to what the necessity of the cause that is proper to the episteme is due to. Since the demonstration consists of the way in which the episteme is carried out, the aforementioned lack of consensus, in the way we describe it, presents itself in the way of characterizing the demonstration conceived by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. The interpretative distinction examined has already been pointed out, investigated and explained by Angioni and effectively presented in a master's work by Santana. It takes place in a split between: on the one hand, Barnes and Burnyeat, and, on the other, Angioni. In view of this, we initially focused on the concepts of 'syllogism' and 'episteme', which provided us with a fruitful expository path in explaining both the convergences still present in both interpretations, as well as the precise divergence between them.