AS OBJEÇÕES DE ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE À FILOSOFIA MORAL MODERNA

Abstract

This monographic work has as its object of research Elizabeth Anscombe’s paper Modern Moral Philosophy, published in 1958. Given the importance of this article for moral philosophy, and due to the resurgence of interest around Aristotelian virtue ethics in contemporary discussion, this work aims to provide a key to understanding this paper. Thus, to offer a better elucidation and clarity of the main points raised by Anscombe, I try to examine the three seminal theses she presents in her paper, in an attempt to support her objections to modern moral philosophy. To that end, in the first chapter, I present the background in which are situated her objections to contemporary ethics. In the second, I explore the thesis on the distinction between factual and normative judgments. In the third chapter, I investigate the problem with legalistic concepts of morality and, finally, I analyze her disagreement with consequentialist ethics.