Ceticismo Epistêmico-Filosófico: Uma Discussão Teórica Acerca dos Principais Argumentos Céticos e Anticéticos

Abstract

The objective of this work is to elucidate concepts from epistemology, to present what skepticism is and some of the skeptical and anti-skeptical theories that try to offer an answer to the problem of skepticism, furthermore, to analyze the plausibility of the correlated concept of epistemic closure, considering that, like it is with the concept of justification, it’s a project of conceptual analysis to arrive at a better definition for this term. The methodology employed is essentially systematic. First, fundamental concepts of the theory of knowledge are presented that will be necessary for the understanding of the work, taking as reference the traditional definition of knowledge and the famous mental experiment 'brain in a vat', will be investigated the theoretical depth of the different epistemic approaches. In addition to this theoretical discussion, related concepts of propositional logic in epistemology are considered, and logical demonstration of the plausibility of closure was performed in comparison with a type of skeptical theory that doesn’t use closure. As a matter of fact, Drestke's approach can provide us with a more plausible theoretical formulation, however, it remains quite controversial due to its conceptual flaws, not fully undermining the skeptical paradox, since the impasse generated by skepticism is the fact that we can demonstrate that it’s possible for us to know common propositions and, at the same time, not manage to falsify skeptical hypotheses. In short, this work shows how skepticism is present in our daily lives and its great relevance for decisions taken daily, since the philosophical methodology expands the frontiers of knowledge.