O pluralismo razoável e a delimitação de doutrinas e modos de vida na filosofia política de John Rawls

Abstract

This work addresses the limits of the plurality of doctrines and ways of life in a democratic constitutional state, based on John Rawls's political liberalism. It examines the concept of reasonableness and the criterion of reciprocity used by Rawls to justify the exclusion of doctrines considered irreconcilable with democratic principles, taking into account the need to preserve reasonable pluralism and political stability. Along this path, it analyzes the notions of the political conception of the person, overlapping consensus, public reason, and the assumptions of an ideal theory of justice. The work considers the critiques put forward by feminist theorists such as Carole Pateman, Susan Okin, and Marilyn Friedman, aiming to investigate the role of Rawlsian theory in the face of gender inequalities. In response to these objections, Elizabeth Brake’s proposal of agnostic neutrality, based on epistemic criteria, is evaluated as an alternative that reconciles political liberalism with feminist demands. The study defends the hypothesis that, despite contemporary objections, Rawls’s political philosophy remains relevant for thinking about the delimitation of doctrines and ways of life in a constitutional democracy.