Injustiça Testemunhal: Um Diálogo com a Teoria de Miranda Fricker sobre Vício e Virtude Epistêmica

Abstract

This work, situated in the field of social epistemology and virtue epistemology, aims to explore the concept of testimonial epistemic injustice, as developed by Miranda Fricker (2024) in her work Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. The research's central argument stems from the analysis of this phenomenon as a vice that occurs when a hearer, influenced by prejudice, assigns an unjust credibility deficit to a speaker, harming their capacity as a knower. The analysis will delve into the mechanisms of this vice, investigating the role of the social imagination in the formation of stereotypes and the harms caused, such as the degradation of the speaker as a knower. In contrast, the work explores the corrective response to this problem through the analysis of the virtue theory of testimonial justice. We argue that the cultivation of this virtue depends on a reflexive and critical self-awareness and on the training of testimonial sensibility, in order to assess and align testimonial credibility judgments in a more just manner. To broaden the discussion, the contribution of José Medina (2011) will be addressed as a counterpoint to the problem of credibility excess, examining epistemic privilege as another facet of injustice.