Da proteção ao cerco: o investimento estrangeiro direto como instrumento estratégico na disputa tecnológica EUA-China

Abstract

Amidst the consolidation of commercial and technological competition between the United States and China, economic security has become inseparable from national security in the 21st century. This article analyzes Washington’s investment policy as a core element of its China containment strategy (keep away), combined with a dimension of fostering technological leadership (run faster). The study investigates this policy through defensive mechanisms, such as CFIUS (strengthened by the FIRRMA Act) and offensive ones, such as the CHIPS and Science Act. The research is justified by the growing “weaponization” of the economy, in which the control of capital flows and expertise in frontier sectors, such as AI and quantum computing, is vital for U.S. sovereignty. Through a qualitative methodology of literature review and analysis of official documents, such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and CFIUS annual reports (2020-2024), it seeks to demonstrate how investment policy, in its national dimension, aims to protect strategic sectors from Chinese control and restrict the flow of U.S. capital and technology to China (Final Outbound Rule). This architecture expands into the international sphere, where regulatory power has been mobilized to create a global encirclement coordinated with allies (via TTC and IPEF). It concludes that this strategy resulted in structural deterrence, evidenced by the sharp decline of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the U.S., reconfiguring the geoeconomic order and transforming supply chains into the primary arena of contemporary strategic competition.