Justiça e virtude em Platão e Aristóteles

Abstract

This dissertation aims to show that justice is the virtue par excellence for both Plato and Aristotle. Our theoretical framework is the works The Republic and Nicomachean Ethics, respectively. The research takes as a starting point some Socratic dialogues that precede the Republic seeking to analyze the discussions of the character Socrates with his interlocutors about the definition of virtue. It is evident, then, that in each dialogue that precedes the Republic, virtue is presented in a different way. Now it presents itself as a unitary, sometimes as multiple, receiving different definitions or even ending in aporia. In the first chapter, we show that in order to understand Plato's concept of virtue, it is necessary to analyze the dialogues together, as it points to a general definition. Although the answers are inconclusive, they signal the philosophical character that is the search for the essence and foundation of things. In the second chapter, we show that in the Republic, Plato tries to define the essence of justice, but before defining it, it is necessary to demonstrate that it is virtue. He presents a definition of virtue without incurring aporia, defining justice as the virtue of virtues, that is, virtue par excellence. It is the condition of possibility and, at the same time, aggregator of the other virtues, such as: courage, harmony and wisdom. The righteous man is necessarily courageous, balanced and wise. In the third and final chapter, we show how Plato's ethicalpolitical thought echoes in Aristotle, who, in turn, takes up the problem of virtue by articulating it with ethics and politics and, like Plato, he demonstrates that justice is the most excellent of virtues, for it is the most perfect and, therefore, superior to all.