Alavancagem, propriedade e eficiência de custos como condicionantes do processo de captura regulatória em empresas monopolistas da economia brasileira

Abstract

This thesis aimed to investigate whether the regulatory process is captured by regulated firms, based on the conditions leverage, ownership and cost efficiency. The regulatory process can be materialized in several aspects, but this study focuses exclusively on tariff readjustments/revisions. Regulated companies have their operating revenues dependent on tariff changes. Originally, the institutional role of regulatory agents must be directed towards achieving the social interest, in which services or products can be provided to society at a fair price, and which it is the regulator's responsibility to define. The regulatory capture perspective argues that regulation, which should serve the public interest, actually serves the interests of regulated agents. In this line of reasoning, the interest groups approach argues that regulation serves the interests of the group that manages to exert greater pressure on the regulator. But, not necessarily, the interest of the most influential group is aligned with social welfare. From the capture perspective, regulation can be captured by the regulated and some aspects of the company, measured by accounting indicators, such as leverage and cost efficiency, and capital ownership, can be used by the regulated to pressure the regulator for regulatory decisions favorable to their interests. The sample consisted of companies regulated by price, belonging to the water and sanitation, piped natural gas and electricity sectors, with data available for the period 2007 to 2019. The variables used were: abnormal return (dependent), tariff change, leverage, ownership and cost efficiency (independent) and economic growth, size and industry (controls). The first hypothesis analyzed whether more leveraged regulated companies obtain higher abnormal returns explained by tariff changes. The results suggest that the leverage level, used strategically by the regulated company, can enable regulatory decisions that are more favorable to the companies' interests. The second hypothesis analyzed whether regulated privately owned companies obtain higher abnormal returns explained by tariff changes. The results show that the private identity of the capital owner can lead to regulatory decisions that are more aligned with the interests of maximizing the profitability of regulated companies. The third hypothesis analyzed whether more cost efficient regulated companies obtain higher abnormal returns explained by tariff changes. It was found that cost efficiency does not lead to higher abnormal returns explained by tariff changes, but the results do not indicate that cost efficiency gains negatively imply abnormal returns in companies with smaller tariff changes. It was observed that the capture is not generalized, because the tariff change does not explain the abnormal return in an isolated way, but indicators such as leverage and capital ownership can lead to the capture of the regulatory process.