Morte por mil cortes: uma análise do processo de remilitarização japonesa.

Abstract

The present work intends to analyze the Japanese remilitarization process from the perspective of the security dilemma theory, with the main focus on the period of the second government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012-2020). Thus, the primary objective of this case study is to investigate the hypothesis that the security situation in which Japan is inserted is a central factor influencing the constant changes and revisions of its traditional pacifist posture, adopted right after the end of World War II. This understanding of the relationship between Japanese strategic concerns and the evolution of its defense policy over the years is the fundamental aspect in the construction of this analysis. To achieve this goal, the theoretical framework provided by Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler was used, with their conception of the security dilemma, including the notion of unresolvable uncertainty as a key concept. As for the methodology, this work is based on a qualitative approach of historical-chronologic case study, with information collected from secondary sources, through a narrative literature review, in addition to primary sources, such as government reports, databases and official documents, e.g. White Papers. In summary, the relevance of the investigated theme is reflected in the fact that, despite being a historical process, it remains contemporary, and is still under construction. By understanding the Japanese remilitarization as a continuous and long term process, this analysis focuses on the Abe administration, considering it as one of the most relevant periods for its continuation and deepening. In this sense, the research results point to a strong influence of the geopolitical context in which Japan is immersed on the formulation of its defense policy over the years, especially in cases where it moved away from the traditional pacifism that became the basis of the country's security policy after its defeat in World War II.