Uma análise da ameaça de emprego de armas nucleares táticas na invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia: dissuasão estratégica e tabu nuclear

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain, from a qualitative analysis, the threat of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. For this purpose, it is based on the theory of nuclear deterrence and nuclear taboo as explanatory variables for the phenomenon. Thus highlighting the possibility of breaking the nuclear taboo in force since the end of World War II. To this end, the research is based on the theory of deterrence using authors such as Morgan (2003), Schelling (2020), Mearsheimer (1983; 1993), in addition to Waltz (1981; 2001; 2012), as well as official documents from Russia, such as the Russian Nuclear Doctrine (2020). Additionally, it relies on Tannenwald (2007), with its considerations on the nuclear taboo, and on Atkinson (2010), whose criticisms complement it. In order to achieve the proposed objectives, the official documents of the Russian nuclear strategy were analyzed in the light of the aforementioned debates. In conclusion, the research highlights that the nuclear taboo, although present, does not have sufficient impeding force regarding the use of nuclear weapons. However, its support for nuclear deterrence strengthens it as a strategy adopted by nuclear-armed states.