Dos Atos Ilocucionários de Primeiro Nível às Ilocuções de Nível Superior

Abstract

The present work has as its research theme the theory of speech acts and will focus on first-level illocutionary acts and the higher-level illocutions, that is, the conversations. In this theme some observations and problems arise such as, for example, the theory of speech acts having been consecrated, especially, to the study and investigation of first-level illocutionary acts, however, she neglected the analysis of the structure of entire discourses that the protagonists conduct during the conversation. Searle expressed a certain skepticism about the possibility of elaborating a theory of discourse as rigorous as that of first-level illocutionary acts. The present work aims to investigate the structure and theory of first-level illocutionary acts, the reasons that constitute Searle’s skeptical position and the Vanderveken’s contrary position and the principles of his formal theory of discourse. The general objective of this work will be to elucidate and compare the theories that deal with such objects. Our specific objectives are: a) to present the theory and logic of first-level illocutionary acts, with emphasis, on the structure and foundations developed by Searle and Vanderveken, in the work Foundations of Illocutionary Logic; b) examine and expose the arguments and notes that constitute Searle’s skepticism regarding the possibility of elaborating a general formal theory of discourse; and, finally, c) expose and analyze the formal theory of discourse developed by Vanderveken and the way in which he overcomes Searle’s skepticism. For a better understanding of the theories and thoughts that involve the theories that deal with first-level illocutionary acts and higher-level illocutions, our analysis script was divided into three chapters. In chapter I, we will deal with the speech acts of the first-level, that is, the illocutionary acts and of main characteristics. Then, in chapter II, John Searle’s skepticism will be elucidated, following the thought of the second Wittgenstein, about the possibility of elaborating a theory that deals with higher-level illocutions (conversations) as rigorous as the theory of illocutionary acts. Finally, in the chapter III, we will present the overcoming of the challenge, proposed by Searle, by the logician Daniel Vanderveken and, consequently, we will show how Vanderveken conceived a general formal theory of discourses, presenting the fundamental principles of a typology of discourses whose purpose is purely linguistic.