A influência dos ciclos eleitorais sobre o desempenho orçamentário dos municípios brasileiros

Abstract

According to the theory of political cycles, rulers have incentives to distort local politics in order to increase their chances of staying in power or succeeding allies, and, among other actions, they do this by manipulating public spending. In developing countries, this manipulation can occur both in terms of total expenditure and its composition. Considering the first perspective (total expenditure), this research aimed to verify how electoral cycles influence the budgetary performance of Brazilian municipalities. The sample consisted of 4,962 municipalities from 2013 to 2022, comprising two electoral terms. The data was analyzed using a regression model with fixed effects panel data. The results indicated that the pre-election year, the election year and the post-election year positively influence the budgetary performance of municipalities. In addition to the legal restrictions imposed on those in power, the effect of signalling and the management of citizen perception are characterized as inhibiting factors of the budget deficit condition, considering the negative impact that this result can have on voters. In this sense, given the conditional political cycles model, the existence of a deficit cycle was not found, although a pattern of cyclical behavior of budget surplus levels in each electoral term was identified. This research contributes to the literature in the sense that in Brazilian municipalities, considering the last two electoral terms, the deficit result has been avoided. This fact directs studies towards analyzing the extent of fiscal opportunism with a focus on changing the composition of public spending during the electoral period.