Teoria da guerra naval, controle e negaçao do mar : o caso do míssil BrahMos na marinha da Índia

Abstract

The present investigation aims to enquire how the adoption of the BrahMos cruise missile by the Indian Navy reflects India's maritime thinking doctrine and strategy. The study seeks, therefore, to answer the following question: How does the adoption and operationalisation of the BrahMos cruise missile reflect the Indian Navy's Sea Control and Sea Denial strategy and doctrine? To develop the analysis, a Case Study was conducted, in which the Process Tracing technique is applied. The case study analysed the historical aspects that were identified as the most relevant to the changing maritime strategic thinking of the Indian Navy. How domestic and international contexts have shaped national interests, Indian national security policy, and maritime doctrine and strategy. Given all this educational (strategic) framework, the means acquired, by purchase or development led to an adaptation to maritime strategic thinking, to the adoption and operationalisation of the embarked BrahMos, reflecting a strategy of Control and Sea Denial. Julian Corbett's Theory of Naval Warfare was chosen as the basis of the study as it deals with the suitability of means to the strategy adopted by a navy. Also, for doing a more robust literature review on what is Control and Sea Denial, to understand the application of the concepts used in Indian maritime strategic documents. The documentary and factual support to the research is done by using specialised literature data extracted from the maritime strategic documents - Indian Maritime Doctrine 2004 and 2009, and Indian Maritime Strategy 2007 and 2009, also international reports like The Military Balance and SIPRI Yearbook have been used. The research concluded that the adoption and operationalisation of the BrahMos cruise missile by the Indian Navy represents adequacy of means to the maritime strategy of Control and Sea Denial presented in its strategic documents.