Quando a dissuasão falha? Uma análise comparativa entre cenários de conflito em Taiwan

Abstract

When might deterrence fail in a potential conflict in Taiwan? The research is justified by the possibility of the use of force between two of the world's leading military powers in the coming years, following a clash in the Taiwan Strait. The paper uses the deterrence theory developed by authors such as John Mearsheimer (1983), Glenn Snyder (1960) and Thomas Schelling (2014) to analyze the scenarios and has the failure of deterrence as the dependent variable. In this sense, the research carries out a comparative study of a qualitative nature of two documents provided by internationally recognized think tanks: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The main objective is to understand what could cause the failure of deterrence in the selected prospective scenarios, in view of the variables established by the deterrence theory. The monograph will test the hypothesis that the failure of deterrence, in the scenarios, occurs due to the Chinese perception that the United States would intervene in an invasion, but would not be willing or able to assume high costs in the event of a direct clash or to intervene immediately in the event of less violent approaches, such as a blockade or quarantine.