AS CONSEQUÊNCIAS DA PARLAMENTARIZAÇÃO DAS DESPESAS PÚBLICAS POR MEIO DAS EMENDAS IMPOSITIVAS

Abstract

In presidential systems such as Brazil's, the budgetary dispute between the executive and legislative branches is intrinsic to the system of checks and balances inherent to presidential governance. Besides discussing and overseeing the budget, the Legislative Branch can modify it through parliamentary amendments, whose implementation was not obligatory due to their non-binding nature. However, Constitutional Amendments 86/2015, 100/2019, 105/2019, and 126/2022 introduced mandatory amendments, obliging the federal government to implement individual and caucus amendments. This change intensified tensions between the branches and ushered in the phenomenon of legislative influence over public spending. This study analyzes the consequences of this process, investigating whether it represents a usurpation of executive powers by the legislature, transparency in resource allocation, and the effectiveness of public spending. The main objective is to demonstrate that, although mandatory amendments aim to decentralize the allocation of public resources, they generate institutional imbalances, weaken governance, and increase the risks of illicit practices, ultimately compromising the effectiveness of public policies. The methodology includes bibliographical and documentary research, as well as qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The study is divided into three chapters: the first addresses the general aspects of the budget and parliamentary amendments, discussing concepts, budgetary principles, and the changes brought about by the aforementioned constitutional amendments. The second chapter examines whether mandatory amendments unduly transfer typical executive functions to the legislature, undermining budgetary management. Finally, the third chapter evaluates whether the implementation of these amendments adheres to the principle of transparency and whether resources are applied in a planned or fragmented manner. The study concludes that the ability of deputies and senators to order billions in public spending on a discretionary basis transforms the legislature into a co-manager of the budget, directly violating the principle of separation of powers. Furthermore, public revenue resulting from parliamentary amendments is largely used as a political bargaining tool to maintain parliamentarians' electoral strongholds. This fragmented and disconnected allocation weakens structuring public policies. Finally, the lack of mechanisms to control and publicize these transfers facilitates illicit practices, as evidenced by the rapporteur's amendments (RP-9) and the so-called 'pix amendments,' both characterized by a lack of transparency in the sources and allocation of public funds.