Entre a pedalada e a banguela: o gerenciamento financeiro no fluxo de caixa dos estados brasileiros por intermédio de fundos públicos governamentais em anos eleitorais

Abstract

This dissertation investigates how the allocation of public fund resources, through financial cash flow, influences financial management practices in the public sector, focusing on Brazilian states. The study is based on the premise that public management, in addition to technical and operational challenges, is strongly influenced by political factors, especially during election years. In this context, the research seeks to understand how state-level managers use public funds as instruments to create artificial cash surpluses, manipulate fiscal indicators, and pursue short-term political interests. The study had three specific objectives: (i) to map the scientific production on the subject between 2013 and 2023 through a bibliometric analysis using the Web of Science database; (ii) to identify the antecedents and consequences of financial management through a theoretical flowchart; and (iii) to empirically test, through panel data regression analysis, the influence of fund allocation and election years on discretionary accrual levels in the state public sector. The findings reveal that the international literature on financial management in the public sector is structured around three main axes: fiscal responsibility, transparency, and earnings manipulation. The bibliometric analysis showed growing academic attention to the topic, especially in contexts of fragile governance. The theoretical flowchart systematized key antecedents (such as political cycles, audit quality, and institutional pressures) and consequences (such as loss of transparency, inefficiency, and public distrust). Descriptive analysis revealed significant discrepancies between budgeted and executed values, suggesting possible cash flow manipulation. The panel regression confirmed the hypothesis that the allocation of public funds significantly influences financial management (H1), and that these practices intensify during election years (H2). The findings were discussed in light of Political Cycles Theory, Signaling Theory, and Behavioral Theory, which help explain managerial behavior under electoral incentives and cognitive constraints. The metaphor "between the pedal and coasting" synthesizes these findings, indicating that while the "pedal" represents active efforts to create artificial surpluses through funds, "coasting" symbolizes managerial inertia in contexts of comfortable cash availability. This study offers theoretical contributions by integrating multiple approaches to explain the phenomenon; empirical contributions by providing concrete data on manipulation practices in the public sector; and social contributions by warning of the risks such practices pose to fiscal equity and institutional trust. Strengthening public governance, fiscal transparency, and oversight mechanisms is recommended to mitigate such behaviors.