Vícios epistêmicos: ontologia e responsabilidade

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to address two central questions in the epistemology of vices: What kinds of things are epistemic vices, and in what sense are vices blameworthy or reprehensible? The choice of this topic is motivated by the philosophical concern that intellectual vices constitute some of the most problematic forms of human behavior. Our work focuses on one of the main strands of contemporary studies in the epistemology of vices — namely, the investigation of their structure, defining characteristics, and impact on knowledge. To this end, in the first chapter we examine an ontological question: What kinds of things are epistemic vices? We aim to provide a diagnosis of the psychology of intellectual vices based on the two leading contemporary theories — obstructionism and motivationism. We then briefly argue in favor of a moderate ontological and normative pluralism, according to which a plural account of what vices are and what makes them bad can overcome certain explanatory shortcomings found in purely motivationist or purely obstructionist approaches. In the second chapter, we turn to the question of what it takes to be properly blameworthy or criticizable for one’s epistemic vices. We begin with an overview of Cassam’s (2019) account, according to which an individual can be responsible — and therefore blameworthy — for a particular vice if (i) his or her past actions led to its development (responsibility of acquisition), or (ii) they have the ability to revise or control that vice but fail to do so (responsibility of revision). A person may also be blameworthy if their epistemic flaws reflect badly on them and constitute a deep-seated quality of their character. We then examine Battaly’s (2019) critique, which highlights a “responsibility problem” in the epistemology of vices: namely, that vices must be reprehensible in some sense, meaning that agents can be blameworthy or guilty in a nonvoluntarist way, even when they are not responsible for having those vices and have no control over them. Finally, we consider a possible solution proposed by Tanesini (2021) to Battaly’s challenge. This proposal yields a disjunctive account of criticizability for possessing an epistemic vice — an explanation inspired by the Strawsonian approach to holding people responsible for their character traits.